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More than 650 million people in sub-Saharan Africa have no access to modern forms of energy, 
constituting over half of the global unelectrified population. Aside from financial, institutional 
and regulatory shortfalls, technical know-how gaps have led to deficiencies in national and 
international energy planning efforts in the region. This thesis, written as a PhD by publication 
based on six academic journal articles, addresses a number of these shortfalls. The first paper 
constitutes the literature review, identifying severe methodological and content gaps in energy 
planning research in sub-Saharan Africa. The second paper reveals the existence of important 
social (high sub-national electrification inequalities) and political (institutional and regime-
type factors) aspects in sub-Saharan Africa, which are crucial to understanding the region’s 
electrification. As a result, both the third and fourth paper include different political risk 
minimisation objectives in novel, multi-criteria energy planning optimisation models of the 
continental African, and the regional Southern African Power Pool, respectively. Building on 
these models, a third national-level energy planning model incorporates social objectives of 
minimising sub-national electrification inequalities and is applied to Uganda in the fifth paper.  
The multi-criteria models reveal optimal, and in several cases, comparably cheap social and 
political risk mitigation strategies. Notably, in all three model applications, higher solar energy 
shares in the generation mix are the cost-minimal way of achieving politically and socially 
more desirable energy systems. Solar energy’s favourability is due to falling costs, its flexibility 
in terms of location, size and type, as well as its decentral abundance in Africa. 
The sixth paper performs a qualitative analysis of current multilateral African electrification 
implementation efforts. It argues that achieving electrification at scale requires a re-orientation 
of current international initiatives towards pro-poor strategies, including increased financial 
and know-how transfers as well as regulatory environments benefitting the local African public 
and private sector. 
In summary, the thesis shows the high importance of social and political objectives for energy 
planning and implementation in Africa, and suggests different ways how such factors can be 
incorporated into multi-criteria optimisation models at various scales. 
 
IMPACT OF THE PHD 
This PhD has had direct policy impact. Based on the work, the author was invited to address 
the EU-Parliament at a session of the African, Caribbean, Pacific and EU (ACP-EU) 
Development Cooperation in Brussels on the role renewable energy can play for development 
in ACP countries. This has led to verbatim adoptions of key recommendations in the ACP-
EU/102.723/19/fin. Resolution passed by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in March 
2019. Furthermore, the author was asked by the Ministry of Energy in Uganda to consult on 
policy-relevant issues, and engaged with other energy sector stakeholders in Uganda, Ghana 
and Eswatini. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has described the 
author’s work as “impressive” in a 2019 report [1] and invited the author to speak at the 2019 
IRENA LTES summit in Berlin. In terms of academic impact, the author has published ten 
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1.1 Thesis motivation: The electrification status in sub-Saharan Africa 
The UN Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in September 2015 includes the goal to 
provide universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030. 
No world region is currently farther removed from reaching this goal than sub-Saharan Africa. 
More than 650 million unelectrified people live in sub-Saharan Africa [2]. The access rate for 
the entire region is roughly 36%; for rural areas, it is significantly below 20% [3]. Those who 
have access often face issues of high per kWh prices [4] and an unreliable grid system with 
frequent blackouts [3]. 
The majority of the academic literature agrees that electrification is a crucial part of socio-
economic development [5]. Although some of its positive effects have been challenged [6], 
electrification increases have been associated with higher youth literacy rates [7], improved 
ambulant and nursing care [8], enhanced employability especially for women [9], as well as 
enhanced agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities [10]. 
Figure 1 shows the total share of the population without access to electricity for African 
countries. It is evident that the sub-Saharan African region exhibits a great variation in access 
rates. While rates are comparably high in North African countries and in South Africa, several 
Sahel and central African countries possess little to no reliable power infrastructure. Countries 
like Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, the Central African 
Republic or South Sudan have experienced armed insurgencies and conflict in the last two 
decades [11], which may help to explain their low electrification levels. However, the issue of 
low access rates also applies to countries with higher political stability such as Namibia, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia or Zambia. Other countries like Botswana, which is land-locked and marred 





Figure 1: Electricity access rates in Africa in 2012 [12] 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces four severe power infrastructure challenges. Firstly, it is the region 
in the world with the lowest installed generation capacity per person, totalling just below 0.1 
kW per capita, which equals less than 10% of Europe’s and less than 5% of North America’s 
figure [13]. In order to provide electricity access to all in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030, Mentis 
et al. (2017) have estimated a required cost of roughly 1.3 trillion USD [14], equating to a 
staggering 80% of the total current annual GDP in sub-Saharan Africa [3]. 
Secondly, sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region where per capita generation capacity has 
declined since 1990, albeit positive GDP per capita growth in the same period [15]. 
Consequently, much of its infrastructure is old and characterised by inefficiencies and losses 
many times greater than in modern infrastructure systems commonly found in industrialised 
countries [9]. As population growth is still considerable in the region, there exists a growing 
gap between the pace of electrification delivery and the increase in population: In 2018, the 
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World Bank listed South Africa and Ghana as the only two countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
where the absolute number of unelectrified people has declined between 1990 and 2016 [2]. In 
all other 47 sub-Saharan African countries, the number of unelectrified people is higher today 




India has increased access 
substantially between 1990 and 
2016 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, connection 
rates outpaced population growth 
in Ghana and South Africa 
2016 
 
Figure 2: Absolute number of people without access to electricity, worldwide [2] 
 
Thirdly, while the African continent is endowed with the world’s highest solar and hydropower 
potential, as well as considerable wind, biomass and geothermal resources, it relies more 
heavily on fossil fuels for electricity generation than Europe [16]. As Figure 3 indicates, 76% 
of installed capacity rely on coal, oil or natural gas as fuel in 2011, a number that was practically 
unchanged in 2016 [2]. The same number for the EU was close to 50% in 2017, with a falling 
trend. 
Fourthly, the little electrification infrastructure, which is present in sub-Saharan Africa, is 
highly unequally distributed. In addition to the substantial regional electrification inequality on 
an international level (see Figure 1), significant sub-national electrification inequalities exist. 
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For instance, in Uganda, access is around 50% in Central Uganda but less than 10% in Northern 
Uganda. In several cases, this has led to considerable sub-national socio-political tensions [17]. 
What is more, the average urban electrification rate in sub-Saharan Africa is more than three 
times higher than rural electrification, a feature which is unique to sub-Saharan Africa [18].  
 
 
Figure 3: Total power plant capacity shares in sub-Saharan Africa, 2011 [16] 
 
The literature has suggested the necessity of a multi-faceted approach for improving sub-
Saharan Africa’s electrification status. Access to finance needs to be improved [19-38], 
adequate policies, regulations and political setup need to be implemented [39-54], and local 
capabilities as well as technical know-how have to be enhanced [39, 40, 43, 44, 55-69].  
Poor energy planning in sub-Saharan Africa is a frequently mentioned issue in the sector, often 
viewed as a crucial negative outcome of low local capacities and institutional challenges. 
Energy planning, when executed properly, aims to determine the optimal location, type and 
size of both electricity generation plants as well as transmission lines to meet the demand across 
the network. With capacity requirements in Africa exceeding the current installed capacity by 
more than 100% until 2030 [16], efficient planning approaches are required to minimise the 
cost of any planned network expansion. Poor planning approaches have been found to have led 
to inefficient and inadequate usage of the limited resources available for electrification on an 
international, regional and national scale in sub-Saharan Africa [5, 6, 14, 70]. Hence, rigorous 
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energy planning approaches are required, which consider national and international levels of 
analysis [16].  
This thesis focuses on improving electricity planning in sub-Saharan Africa by designing novel, 
multi-criteria energy planning optimisation models tailored towards the conditions in sub-
Saharan Africa. The following sub-section lays out the structure of the thesis and briefly 
describes each chapter. 
 
1.2 Thesis structure  
This thesis is structured in eight chapters. The subsequent Chapter 2 systematically reviews the 
electricity planning and implementation literature on sub-Saharan Africa. It defines the 
literature gaps this thesis focuses on, the PhD’s objectives, which are directly informed by the 
gaps, and the set of specific tasks, which need to be completed to achieve the objectives. Five 
of the identified literature gaps are chosen to be addressed in this thesis, namely (i) the neglect 
of political factors in African energy planning, (ii) the paucity of energy planning research on 
all levels of African electrification (continental, regional and national), (iii) the 
underrepresented usage of sophisticated multi-criteria planning methods, (iv) the limited 
number of generation technologies included in planning models, and (v) the challenges 
surrounding implementation of electrification initiatives in Africa. Informed by these gaps, 
chapter 2 defines three core objectives: (1) To study the relevance of additional decision criteria 
to conduct robust electricity planning in sub-Saharan Africa, (2) to create novel and relevant 
insights for (a) continental, (b) regional and (c) national-level power systems in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and (3) to suggest policy measures to improve implementation of current African 
electrification initiatives.  
This PhD thesis is written as a PhD by publication, incorporating a total of six academic journal 
articles, which form the six main chapters of the thesis. They address the three objectives, as 
shown in Table 1. Each of these papers will be set up by a brief introduction section in each 
main chapter of this thesis, featuring a description how the respective paper fits into the overall 
narrative of the thesis and how it is addressing the objectives of this research. Furthermore, a 
brief conclusion is offered at the end of each paper to summarise points, which cut across 
individual chapters and, which further implications arise for the remainder of the thesis. At the 
time of submission of this thesis, all six of these articles had been published in international 
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energy journals. The published articles have gathered 102 citations on Google Scholar at the 
time of submission.1 
 
Table 1: Mapping of journal articles, thesis chapters and thesis objectives addressed 
Thesis 
chapter Journal article 
Impact 
factor Objective 
2 Trotter, P. A., M. C. McManus, and R. Maconachie. 
"Electricity planning and implementation in sub-Saharan 
Africa: A systematic review." Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 74 (2017): 1189-1209. [71] 
9.2 Classify the current state of 
the literature  
3 Trotter, P. A. "Rural electrification, electrification inequality 
and democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa." Energy 
for Sustainable Development 34 (2016): 111-129. [18] 
2.7 (1) Show the relevance of 
additional decision criteria 
4 Trotter, P. A., R. Maconachie, and M. C. McManus. "Solar 
energy's potential to mitigate political risks: The case of an 
optimised Africa-wide network." Energy Policy 117 (2018): 
108-126. [72] 
4.0 (2a) Create novel insights for 
African continental power 
system 
5 Trotter, P. A., R. Maconachie, and M. C. McManus. "The 
impact of political objectives on optimal electricity 
generation and transmission in the Southern African Power 
Pool." Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 28.3 (2017): 27-
42. [73] 
0.8a (2b) Create novel insights for 
regional sub-Saharan African 
power system 
6 Trotter, P. A., N. J. Cooper, and P. R. Wilson. "A multi-
criteria, long-term energy planning optimisation model with 
integrated on-grid and off-grid electrification – The case of 
Uganda." Applied Energy 243 (2019): 288-312. [74] 
7.9 (2c) Create novel insights for 
Uganda national power 
system 
7 Trotter, P. A., and S. Abdullah. "Re-focusing foreign 
involvement in sub-Saharan Africa's power sector on 
sustainable development." Energy for Sustainable 
Development 44 (2018): 139-146. [75] 
2.7 (3) Suggest policy measures to 
improve current mode of 
implementation 
a The Journal of Energy in Southern Africa is the only energy journal published in Africa. It is also the only energy journal 
worldwide where the vast majority of its editorial board is African (90%). This made this journal the first choice for this 
article despite its comparably low academic impact factor. 
 
 
Before developing the novel planning optimisation models, chapter 3 is devoted to studying 
the relevance of political factors for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature review 
indicates that political factors are highly salient when analysing the failure or success of 
electrification approaches in sub-Saharan Africa, yet quantitative planning research has almost 
entirely ignored such factors. Chapter 3 combines econometric and qualitative analyses to show 
that among sub-Saharan African countries, a positive and statistically significant association 
                                                 
1 In addition to the six articles which are featured in this thesis, four further articles were written during this PhD 
(see section 2.5) which are not included in this thesis as they do not form the core of the work but can best be 
categorised as side projects. 
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exists between the quality of national democratic institutions and rural electrification rates. The 
results indicate the importance of political factors for understanding electrification and the 
associated benefits of including such factors in planning models. As political factors differ 
dramatically between different countries, they are particularly relevant in planning instances, 
which include trade between several countries (i.e. a continental or regional scale). 
Chapters 4 to 6 develop a novel, multi-criteria long-term electricity planning model for a 
continental, regional and national level of analysis, respectively. They study the impact of 
including new and relevant decision criteria on the optimal location, type and size of electricity 
generation plants and transmission lines in different African case examples. All three papers 
that make up chapters 4 to 6 address several gaps identified in the literature review. The model 
in chapter 4 is applied to the African continent, the model in chapter 5 addresses the 12 
countries of the Southern African Power Pool, while Uganda is the national case study 
discussed in chapter 6. The models include different political and social factors as additional 
objective functions, expanding the traditional case where only a cost-minimisation approach is 
used. Hence, they do not yield a singular optimal solution but a set of non-dominated solutions 
where no objective can be improved upon without worsening another.  
Chapter 7 goes beyond the planning of electrification infrastructure and asks how large-scale 
electrification efforts have been implemented. It finds that electrification in sub-Saharan Africa 
has largely been dominated by foreign donors and private sector companies in recent years. 
The current push for market-based approaches with profit-orientation is argued to be unlikely 
to deliver successful large-scale electrification of rural areas with weak purchasing powers 
Based on best practice examples from various countries, a number of policy measures are 
recommended to overcome this problem. 





2. ELECTRICITY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW (PAPER I) 
2.1 Content overview and thesis context 
This chapter presents a detailed literature review of electricity planning and implementation in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The review is published in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews.  
It has three prime objectives. First, it aims to characterise electricity planning research in sub-
Saharan Africa. It surveys its regional distribution, research trends over time, as well as 
technologies and value chain elements considered. Second, it examines the different 
quantitative and qualitative methods used in the literature. Third, it studies the type of decision 
criteria that have been shown to be relevant for electricity planning in sub-Saharan Africa. 
These are of technological, economic, environmental, social, and, notably, political nature. 
These three points together then allow for drawing conclusions regarding the gaps in the 
literature and positioning the research of the PhD project within these gaps, steps undertaken 
at the end of chapter 2 in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.  
The scope of the review is considerably beyond the engineering literature. The fundamental 
technical aspects of power generation and transmission have been well known for many 
decades and are unlikely to be the root cause for sub-Saharan Africa’s low access rates. Instead, 
explicitly including social and political science research in the review allows capturing all 
factors that have influenced electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, the review 
incorporates quantitative and qualitative electricity planning and related implementation 
research, considering each of the 49 sub-Saharan African countries, the four regional power 
pools and the continent as a whole. Applying a broad understanding of electricity planning and 
a practical limit of 20 reviewed articles per country and region revealed 306 relevant peer-
reviewed journal articles included in the review. In addition to characterising the literature and 
examining the types of decision criteria and methods used, the review also summaries the 
various recommendations of the literature regarding successful electrification implementation 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
As a rich and informative literature on the different methodologies used in energy planning 
already exists [76-85], this report will not review the characteristics of such methodologies per 
se. Its goal is rather to identify content gaps and previously neglected factors in optimal 
electricity planning in sub-Saharan Africa specifically and promote their introduction into 
electricity planning optimisation models, which are based on well-established methods.  
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A B S T R A C T
Universal electricity access is an important development objective, and the focus of a number of key global UN
initiatives. While robust electricity planning is widely believed to be a prerequisite for effective electrification, to
date, no comprehensive overview of electricity planning research has been undertaken on sub-Saharan Africa,
the world region with the lowest access rates. This paper reviews quantitative and qualitative electricity
planning and related implementation research, considering each of the 49 sub-Saharan African countries, the
four regional power pools and the sub-continent as a whole. Applying a broad understanding of electricity
planning and a practical limit of 20 reviewed articles per country and region, 306 relevant peer-reviewed journal
articles are included in this review. A general classification scheme is introduced that classifies the planning
literature along the addressed value chain depth, number of different analysed criteria and number of evaluated
decision alternatives. The literature is found to be strongly clustered in a few countries, with less than 5
identified relevant articles in 36 of the 49 countries. The total amount of articles per year is clearly increasing
over time, addressing technology choice, operation, distribution and implementation analyses. Although
including different high-level criteria in analysing electricity systems is common, the literature is only starting
to use formalised multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) tools. The review indicates that 63% of relevant
articles favour renewable energy technologies for their given problems. Frequently mentioned success factors
for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa include adequate policy design, sufficient finance and favourable
political conditions. While considerable regional and methodological literature gaps are apparent, the literature
in this review identifies a rich and fruitful ground for future research to fill these gaps.
1. Introduction
It has frequently been argued that access to electricity is a crucial
prerequisite for socio-economic development [1–4]. In the context of
developing countries, it has been shown to be associated with higher
literacy rates [2], improved health care [5], enhanced employment
opportunities [6] and productivity advancements [7]. Acknowledging
electricity's crucial role for combating global poverty more generally,
the UN aims to achieve universal energy access by 2030, via its
“Sustainable Energy for All” initiative.
While several regions in the world are yet to achieve universal
electricity access, the gap in reaching this goal remains most
significant in sub-Saharan Africa. According to 2012 World Bank
figures, only 15% of its rural and 35% of its total population have
access to electricity. Consequently, more than 630 million people in
the region are currently un-electrified. In comparison, South Asia,
the world region with the second lowest electricity access figures,
has a rural electrification rate four times as high as sub-Saharan
Africa. Furthermore, the urban bias in electrification measured as a
ratio between rural and urban electrification is 3.5 times greater in
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world [4].
Mandelli et al. (2014), in their well-written comprehensive data and
policy review paper on energy in Africa, provide a variety of key insights for
successful energy-driven sustainable development in Africa. They conduct
in-depth analyses of African energy systems, present primary energy
potential data and discuss a variety of different policy options in great
detail [8]. Scholars have furthermore agreed that a systematic approach to
electricity planning is a sine qua non for successful large-scale electrification
(see for instance [9–14]). However, despite its salient rural electrification
shortage, Rojas-Zerpa and Yusta (2014) suggest that sub-Saharan Africa
has received considerably less scholarly attention than South Asia with
regards to using modern electricity planning techniques [9]. To date, no
academic paper has systematically structured and reviewed the wider
African electricity planning literature.
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This paper seeks to fill this gap by reviewing a wide range of
quantitative and qualitative literature on electricity planning and
related implementation analysis in sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, it
pursues two principal goals. First, the paper aims to support and
encourage future research on the topic. It explores relevant electricity
planning and/or implementation literature, or the lack thereof, for each
of sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries. In addition, it also reviews the
comparative literature featuring more than one country, as well as
literature on regional power pools and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. A
systematic approach to literature searching ensures that articles with
few previous citations are not overlooked. The paper characterises each
article reviewed by using a range of criteria, including: regional scope,
temporal development, kind of electricity producing technologies
addressed, value chain depth, decision criteria employed, alternatives
studied and methodological approaches utilised. Wider trends in the
sub-Saharan electricity infrastructure literature are identified, and a
number of existing gaps are revealed. A brief overview of the
substantial findings in the literature presents crucial success factors
for electrification mentioned in the reviewed articles, as well as the
extent to which researchers tend to find renewable energy systems
(RES) or non-renewable energy systems (non-RES) more promising to
address sub-Saharan Africa's electricity needs. As a rich and informa-
tive literature on the different methodologies used in energy planning
already exists [9–13,15–19], this paper will not review the character-
istics of such methodologies per se.
Second, the paper presents a novel classification scheme for the
energy planning literature in general in order to improve the structure
of discussing energy planning approaches. Review papers on energy or
electricity planning have not produced an explicit, widely used frame-
work for characterising energy or electricity planning approaches.
Instead, they have tended to focus on purely identifying the methodo-
logical concepts used in a given paper rather than actually objectively
characterising the employed method. The latter should be independent
of how the researchers named their method used. This has led to
different, and at times contradictory, ways of classifying the literature
[9–13,15,16,18,20]. For example, the concept of mathematical opti-
misation has been classified as separate from multi-criteria decision
making (MCDM) approaches [9,12], compatible with, but distinct from
MCDM [13], as one of many possible instances of MCDM [10,15,20],
and as one of two types of MCDM [18]. This paper avoids the dangers
of producing such conflicting results by classifying energy planning
approaches based on mutually exclusive characteristics that can be
applied universally beyond single methodological concepts.
Section 2 discusses the review methodology. It first presents a
comparably broad definition of electricity planning, which is used
throughout this paper. Furthermore, Section 2 details the review
approach used in this paper and presents the literature classification
scheme which allows a characterisation of energy planning research.
Section 3 provides the literature review results. The literature is
discussed in terms of regional distribution, temporal development,
technological scope, value chain depth, decision criteria, decision
alternatives and methods in turn. Recommendations for successful
electricity planning in Africa apparent from the reviewed literature are
presented in Section 4, while Section 5 offers a conclusion which
summarises the key achievements and gaps of the African electricity
planning literature.
2. Review methodology and energy planning classification
2.1. Definition of electricity planning
Electricity planning, or more generally, energy planning, has been
defined in greatly varying degrees of comprehensiveness. Some scho-
lars have chosen relatively narrow definitions. For example, Hiremath
et al. (2007) state that “[t]he energy-planning endeavor involves
finding a set of sources and conversion devices so as to meet the
energy requirements/demands of all the tasks in an optimal manner.
This could occur at centralized or decentralized level” ([14] p. 730).
Hence, energy planning is seen as a process directed towards solely
finding an optimal, usually cost-minimal, supply mix for a given
centralised or decentralised demand. Subsequently, however, the
extent of energy planning has been considerably widened. Both
Loken (2007) and Rojas-Zerpa and Yusta (2014) have argued that
energy planning problems involve multiple decision criteria so that a
simple global optimum often does not exist [9,10]. However, both
works mirror [14], by mostly focusing energy planning on finding
suitable energy supply options. Other scholars have produced yet more
encompassing energy planning definitions. In some cases, these have
been summarised under the term integrated energy planning.
Bhattacharyya (2012), in his review paper on off-grid electricity
planning, writes that “a successful implementation … requires a careful
planning of all related stages, which goes beyond just the technology
choice or component selection decision” ([12] p.690). Other stages
along the value chain he deems important for energy planning are
obtaining good demand estimates, appropriate energy delivery and
adequate implementation mechanisms. Bhattacharyya saliently high-
lights the importance of ex-post analysis in energy planning to derive
valuable lessons learned for future projects. Mirakyan and De Guio
(2013) offer a similarly broad definition in their review of integrated
energy planning. It again features the multi-criteria nature of energy
planning, its applicability at different units of analysis, its spread across
different value chain stages including energy generation, transmission,
distribution and use, as well as the relevance of ex-post analyses ([13]
p. 290). Further work on integrated energy planning corroborates such
comparably broad definitions [21].
In order to review African electricity planning as comprehensively
as possible, this paper follows a broad definition of electricity planning
similar to the integrated energy planning literature. Electricity plan-
ning is seen as an integrated approach of analysing an economically,
technologically, environmentally, socially and/or politically suitable
equilibrium between electricity demand of a given unit of analysis and
different available supply options across at least one element of the
electrification value chain (see [13]). This definition has comparably
broad implications for scale, depth and approach of the electricity
planning articles included in this review. First, it is applicable on
different scales, ranging from local remote to national and interna-
tional applications [9,12,14]. Therefore, articles dealing with the
electrification of a remote rural village are included in the review, as
are analyses of the national electricity infrastructure or the Africa-wide
transmission network. Second, following [11–13,21], this paper con-
siders the electricity planning exercise to span different value chain
elements. Specifically, it includes studies in the review which address at
least one of the 5 value chain stages of obtaining demand estimates,
selecting electricity producing technologies, planning operations, de-
signing transmission and distribution of electricity, or ensuring an
enabling environment for successful implementation of electrification
in an African context. Third, the above definition explicitly includes
both ex-ante design exercises of new electricity systems and ex-post
analysis of existing systems which derive lessons for electricity plan-
ning [12]. Hence, articles which qualitatively assess the past electrifica-
tion of an African town are included in the review, much like those
which use a quantitative approach to design a suitable future supply
mix for a given demand. Relevant quantitative methods are single-
objective optimisation [9,18,19], MCDM [10–12,15,17,20], life-cycle
assessments (LCA) [14] or model simulations [12]. Qualitative re-
search includes evaluations of project implementations [22], non-
technical analyses of generation technologies or specific energy policy
analyses [8,18,20].
Despite this encompassing definition, specific content limits apply.
Articles that solely address energy potentials are not included (see [8]
for a review) as they are commonly exogenous to electricity planning.
The same applies for strict engineering technology design work such as
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developing a new type of solar PV modules, and papers that do not
primarily address electricity but are concerned with other energy usage
such as biofuels for transport or biomass for cooking and heating.
2.2. Geographic extent and review methodology
Using the concept of electricity planning described in Section 2.1,
this paper reviews academic articles which address one of the 49
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, two or more of these countries at once,
one of the four regional power pools (Western African Power Pool
(WAPP), Eastern African Power Pool (EAPP), Southern African Power
Pool (SAPP) and Central African Power Pool (CAPP)), or sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole region. A list of the respective 49 countries is
presented in Section 3.1. For practical reasons, the maximum number
of articles included in this review per country is 20. Where there are
more than 20 relevant papers addressing a specific country, the 20
reviewed papers were chosen based on the authors’ judgement of both
timeliness and relevance. Furthermore, the review only includes
English-speaking peer-reviewed journal articles. It does not, therefore,
include conference presentations, government documents or peer
reviewed papers in languages other than English.
In terms of methodology, this paper employs a systematic approach
to literature searching in order to achieve the goals set out in Section 1.
Articles have been identified using Scopus, Web of Science and Google
Scholar. All 49 sub-Saharan African countries, the four regional power
pools and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole have been each combined as
search items with all possible declinations and composite word forms
stemming from “energy”, “electricity”, “power”, “multi-criteria”, “multi-
objective” and “technology selection.” Where otherwise impractical, the
search was limited to possibly relevant scientific fields such as
“Energy”, “Engineering”, “Social Science”, “Environmental Science”,
“Economics” and “Agricultural Science”, applying intentionally broad
filters and conducting all searches twice with Scopus and Web of
Science to limit the unfortunately unavoidable issue of overlooking
relevant papers. Several Google Scholar searches and checking refer-
ence lists in relevant papers complemented the systematic literature
search approach. Applying this approach led to the identification of 306
papers ranging from 1977 to 2016 which are reviewed in detail in
Section 3 and Section 4.
2.3. Classification of electricity planning approaches
While there is a considerable literature on reviews of energy
planning that already exists [9–13,15–20,22], no objective classifica-
tion method for energy (or electricity) planning approaches has been
used consistently. Some reviewers partition the literature based on
methodological concepts rather than tangible approach characteristics,
thus leading to ambiguous classifications [9–13,15,16,18,20]. The
process-oriented framework by Mirakyan and De Guio (2013) is useful
as it shows the depth of energy planning, yet it suffers from feedback
loops which render mutually exclusive classifications difficult [13].
Others focus solely on a specific method or part of energy planning
[10,11,15,20], being unable to categorise the wider relevant literature
arising from the comparably broad definition used in this paper (see
Section 2.1).
This paper classifies the reviewed literature by expanding the
energy planning approach classification scheme presented by Zhou
et al. (2006) [18] to encompass broader integrated energy planning
approaches. It uses aspects of the planning process framework
presented by Polatidis and Haralambopoulos (2008) [21]. Zhou et al.
(2006) employ a tree-based classification system with number of
decision criteria as its first node, dividing between single and multiple
objective decisions, before it trickles down into different methodologi-
cal approaches. Avoiding the pitfall of relying on methods for literature
classification described in Section 1, this paper instead uses three
objective categories to classify the electricity planning approach. As a
first category, it introduces the value chain depth a given article has
addressed. For the purpose of this paper, the planning exercise spans
the 5 stages of the electricity value chain mentioned in Section 2.1 [11–
13,21]. A depth of 1 implies a given paper has addressed one of the
value chain elements, for instance only generation technology selec-
tion, while an analyses of several value chain stages results in a higher
depth. The second classification category denotes the amount of
decision criteria used in the analysis, taken from Zhou et al. (2006).
As mentioned in Section 2.1 this paper distinguishes 5 high-level
criteria, namely economic, technological, environmental, social and
political criteria (see also [12,23]). A given paper is defined to feature a
given criterion if it includes a relevant respective qualitative or
quantitative analysis, which could potentially affect a later decision





































Fig. 1. DCA-classification scheme for electricity planning literature.
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number of different decision alternatives considered in a given paper
(see [21]). Some researchers choose to evaluate a set amount of
alternatives, while optimisation techniques allow a solution to be found
without predefining specific alternatives, possibly the most important
merit of such an approach. The number of algorithmically analysed
alternatives thus approaches infinity for purely continuous optimisa-
tion, or is a very large finite number for discrete optimisation. This is
true even if only one kind of electricity producing technology is
addressed, for example, where to install how many solar PV cells in a
given country.
The resulting Depth-Criteria-Alternatives (DCA) classification dichot-
omises these three categories and arranges them in a logic tree format to
yield eight different planning literature types. This is illustrated in Fig. 1
and can be equally applied for electricity planning or energy planning in
general. For value chain depth and number of decision criteria, it appears
intuitive to distinguish between either single or multiple instances,
whereas the threshold for the number of possible decision alternatives
was chosen to be at least three versus more than three for the purpose of
this paper. While not all articles included in this review can be classified
in this way (for example, some do not address any specific alternative),
this classification scheme enables us to compare the extent of a given
electricity planning approach.
After having classified articles in this way, it is then further possible
to distinguish the eight resulting types by extent of planning (i.e. how
many articles of a given type focus on sub-national, national or
international energy planning) and by perspective (i.e. how many
articles of a given type follow an ex-ante or ex-post analysis approach).
These distinguishing exercises are provided and discussed in Section 3.
3. Approaches to electricity planning and implementation in
sub-Saharan Africa
The review results below are presented in a set of tables and
diagrams themed by their respective topics. A table that lists all 306
research papers with all these attributes would be too large for
inclusion in this paper and is available upon request from the authors.
The categorisations were carried out to the best of the authors’
judgement by investigating all papers in the review. While errors in
classification cannot be ruled out, the number of reviewed papers deem
individual misjudgements secondary for the goal of showing over-
arching trends.
3.1. Regional distribution
Table 1 distributes all 306 reviewed articles geographically, indicat-
ing the country or region addressed in the respective articles. A few
features are worth noting. While no relevant research article could be
identified for 12 countries and less than 5 articles for 36 of the 49
countries, 47% of the identified articles are clustered in 6 countries.
This number would have been dramatically higher if all relevant
articles from these countries had been reviewed. Thus, scholarly
attention in electricity planning has been highly unequally distributed
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Fig. 2 illustrates Table 1 for the 49 countries on a map. There
appears to be a geographical bias in the amount of English-speaking
research considering specific countries, with a concentration in
English-speaking West Africa as well as a stretch of countries from
East to South Africa. On the contrary, both Central Africa and the
French-speaking Sahel countries appear far less present in (at least) the
English academic literature.
To analyse the factors that drive this considerably unequal dis-
tribution of researched countries, two logistic panel data regression
models have been conducted. The two binary dependent variables are
Internationally authored article and Domestically authored article.
They are coded as “1” if in a given country-year, this review has
identified at least one research article where its first author was based
outside the country or region of focus, or where the first author was
based inside that region, respectively. The resulting explanatory
variable coefficients and significance levels are provided in Table A1
in the appendix A. The panel data analysis shows that population size
and whether a given country uses English as an official language are
Table 1
Reviewed articles grouped by country or region they address.
Country References ∑ Country References ∑
Angola [24] 1 Mauritania [140,141] 2
Benin [25] 1 Mauritius [142–151] 10
Botswana [26–34] 9 Mozambique [152–155] 4
Burkina Faso [35–38] 4 Namibia [156–158] 3
Burundi [39,40] 2 Niger – 0
Cameroon [41–52] 12 Nigeria [159–178] >20
Cape Verde [53–56] 4 Rwanda [179,180] 2
CAR – 0 Sao Tome & Pri. – 0
Chad – 0 Senegal [181–189] 9
Comoros – 0 Seychelles [190] 1
Congo, Rep. [57] 1 Sierra Leone [191,192] 2
Cote d'Ivoire [58,59] 2 Somalia – 0
Djibouti [60] 1 South Africa [193–212] >20
DRC [61,62] 2 South Sudan – 0
Eq. Guinea – 0 Sudan [213–215] 3
Eritrea [63–66] 4 Swaziland [216] 1
Ethiopia [67–86] >20 Tanzania [217–236] >20
Gabon – 0 Togo – 0
Ghana [87–106] >20 The Gambia [237–240] 4
Guinea – 0 Uganda [241–257] 17
Guinea-Bissau – 0 Zambia [258–263] 6
Kenya [107–126] >20 Zimbabwe [264–276] 13
Lesotho [127–130] 4 Several countries [277–296] >20
Liberia [131–133] 3 CAPP [297] 1
Madagascar – 0 EAPP [298–302] 5
Malawi [134,135] 2 SAPP [303–307] 5
Mali [136–139] 4 WAPP [308,309] 2
Africa [310–329] >20
Total 306





Fig. 2. Geographic distribution of countries addressed in reviewed articles.
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most strongly associated with the occurrence of research publications
included in this review authored by either international or domestic
scholars. Neither result is surprising. Scale effects can be expected to
increase publication volume. The finding that more research is
produced in English-speaking countries appears to be trivial due to
the selection criterion of solely reviewing literature written in English
used in this review.
The salient statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable
in both models suggests that previous research on a given country may
foster the production of further research regardless of where the
authors are based. Political stability as well as higher tertiary education
percentages among the population are furthermore positively asso-
ciated with research from both international and national scholars.
Both factors may constitute an enhanced enabling environment, and
seem to be especially crucial for domestic scholars as the statistical
significance is markedly stronger for domestic compared to interna-
tional authors. Interestingly, lower GDP per capita levels appear to
attract more publications from international authors, holding all other
variables constant. A possible explanation for this is that international
scholars might possess an explicitly developmental mandate from
external funders, or a personal interest to conduct research on
economically less developed countries. This GDP per capita effect
disappears for domestically authored articles.
Apart from the country which is addressed in a given research
article, electricity planning can differ in terms of regional scope. It can
either address a subnational (e.g. in the case of project implementation
analysis or village electrification simulations), national (e.g. national
policy design analysis or national demand projections), or international
electricity planning problem (e.g. international electricity transmission
optimisation). Some papers, for instance those that provide detailed
subnational GIS data on preferred electricity producing technology for
a whole country [162,217,254], can be classified as both subnational
and national. Table B1 in Appendix B provides the unit of analysis for
all reviewed articles. It shows that articles with a subnational and
national unit of analysis are fairly balanced and represent the focus of
this review (147 and 169 articles, respectively), whereas only 25 papers
with a cross-national focus are included.
3.2. Temporal development
Fig. 3 plots the number of articles reviewed in this paper per
year over time. There is a slight bias in the selection of the papers
towards more recent works for those 8 countries and regions that
have been addressed in more than 20 relevant publications.
However, even controlling for this bias, there is a clear upward
and slightly exponential trend in publications on electricity plan-
ning and implementation analysis in sub-Saharan Africa. It has
continued for the first 4 months of 2016. As indicated, the salient
spike in 2002 is mainly due to the inclusion of several articles in a
special issue on African energy policy implementation in the
Energy Policy journal published in that year.
There are numerous possible reasons for this upward trend. In
general, a snowball effect of publications can be expected for research
in general, implying that previous publications in a field foster further
and more detailed research. The econometric analysis in Section 3.1
supports such an argument. For instance, existing research may
function as a source for notoriously scarce data on several sub-
Saharan African countries and thereby eases further publications.
Furthermore, global UN initiatives like the Sustainable Development
Goals have highlighted the urgency of infrastructure construction in the
developing world. In addition, sub-Saharan Africa's move to democra-
tisation and the inherent institutional and security improvements have
provided a more stable ground to conduct field work, similarly evident
from the econometric analysis in Section 3.1.
3.3. Technological scope
Most reviewed articles on electricity planning in Africa suggest that
the continent is richly endowed with various renewable energy
resources which can be used for electricity generation. A wide range
of papers address a different set of renewable technologies, such as
solar, wind, hydro and biomass, and frequently compare them to non-
renewable technologies, such as coal or gas fired power plants, diesel
generators or nuclear energy. To analyse which technologies have
received the most attention, Table 2 lists relevant generation technol-
ogies with a focus on renewables and shows the respective reviewed
articles that have evaluated the technologies.
Table 2 demonstrates that of all technologies, solar PV has received the
most scholarly attention, with more than half of the reviewed papers
explicitly analysing it. This result is not surprising, given sub-Saharan
Africa's vast solar energy potential, the technology's relative maturity and its
greatly underused nature [8]. Studying off- and mini grid applications of
solar PV cells (and other decentralised renewable energies) is a popular
topic in the literature due to frequent occurrence of low population densities
in sub-Saharan Africa. Extension of the national grid is often compared to
such decentralised electricity generation approaches in sub-national con-
texts. Comparably few articles analyse solar PV cells as a centralised
technology to play a significant role in the national grid; an exemplary
exception is [114] with its discussion of solar PV powering the Kenyan
national electricity grid.
Contrary to solar PV, solar thermal technologies have not frequently
been considered as an alternative for electricity production in sub-
Saharan Africa despite its kindred potential. The sub-continent's
immense reliance on non-renewable energy sources as well as hydro-
power is furthermore reflected in the amount of literature published in
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Fig. 3. Number of reviewed articles per year over time.
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paper solely refers to electricity generation, for instance using bio-
gasification, and does not include the rich literature on biofuels for
transport or charcoal for cooking in Africa.
Among all reviewed papers, there were only two articles that
discussed other generation technologies beyond the ones stated in
Table 2. First, Kisaalita et al. (2006) briefly analyse the possibility of
using animal draft power to charge low voltage batteries in
Southwestern Uganda [255]. In this technology, a pair of cattle animals
such as oxen pull a long pipe in a circular motion at low-rpm and high-
torque values which is converted into high-rpm rotation by a gear
system to an electrical generator charging the batteries. Second,
Mechtenberg et al. (2012) present an innovative and noteworthy
analysis of human powered electricity devices in Uganda [250].
Although low in exergy, such technologies can be considered in regions
where the average peak power demand per capita is below 20 W.
Examples include merry-go-round generators in schools, or hand crank
lighting and bicycle generators which can achieve suitable voltages for
lighting as well as charging a cell phone and even a laptop.
Table C1 in the appendix C illustrates how many different electricity
generation technologies are addressed in the relevant reviewed articles,
using the same 10 categories present in Table 2. It should be noted that
not all reviewed articles have addressed a generation technology. For
instance some work solely focuses on distribution or demand of
electricity or implementation policy analysis. The distribution of
different technologies addressed is fairly uniform between one and
four, and then trails off markedly as complexity and data requirements
increase. Numerous articles have addressed only one energy technology
but have analysed a variety of different design alternatives of this
technology (for instance [40,67] for hydro power, [246] for bioenergy
and [197] for solar thermal energy).
The two papers that feature nine different generation technologies
illustrate how evaluating many technologies can be beneficially applied
in greatly differing contexts. Kisaalita et al. (2006), in their analysis of
milk cooling plants, focus on a subnational unit of analysis and use
both quantitative and qualitative methods to subsequently narrow
down the different technology options [255]. Alternatively, Taliotis
et al. (2016) choose both a national and international level of analysis.
They model the electricity supply systems of 47 African countries and
run a single-objective optimisation model implemented in the open
source OSeMOSYS application to choose the cost-minimal future
generation technology mix for all countries combined with an interna-
tional distribution network [310]. The paper features some noteworthy
graphical illustrations of the resulting distribution network.
3.4. Value chain depth
Following its comparably broad definition, this review considers the
electricity planning exercise to include 5 different electrification value
chain stages, thereby including literature that goes beyond solely
selecting suitable generation technologies (see Section 2.1). These 5
value chain stages are demand estimation, generation technology
selection, operation planning, transmission and distribution design,
and constructing an enabling environment for implementation. Table 3
maps all reviewed articles to these different value chain elements.
190 or 62% of the reviewed articles discuss generation technology
choice, reflecting the primary task of electricity planning to select a set
of appropriate technologies to supply a certain demand. However,
there is a similarly rich relevant literature on implementation of
electrification in sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from an analysis of
decentralised projects to the national energy plan scope. Due to the
poor state of many transmission networks in sub-Saharan Africa, many
researchers have focused on decentralised generation. Other articles
are concerned with improving the centralised grid infrastructure
regarding loss reduction and covering greater distances. Articles are
only included in the “demand estimation” category if they study actual
demand of a given region using household surveys or econometric
analysis for forecasting. Generic demand assumptions present in most
electricity planning articles are thus not included in this category.
Table D1 in the appendix D counts the number of different value
chain stages addressed in each reviewed article, yielding the respective
analysed value chain depth. More than half of the reviewed articles
address more than one of these elements, deepening their reach along
the value chain. Yet no reviewed article considers more than three
stages.
Table 2
































Solar thermal [31,32,34,38,41,71,141,171,173,189,194–197,200,208,218,232,241,255,258,279,282,295,296,310,327] 27
Geothermal [60,70,108,117,122,134,142,196,218,241,255,302,310,314,318,319] 16
Other [250,255] 2
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3.5. Analysis/decision criteria
3.5.1. Type of criteria used
As noted in Section 2.1, this paper includes research that considers
economic, technical, environmental, social and/or political decision or
analysis criteria for electrification in Africa. Table 4 shows how
frequently these criteria are used in the reviewed literature. A specific
criteria is counted as being present in a given paper if the paper
features a respective qualitative or quantitative analysis that could
support decision-making. For instance, an article that uses mathema-
tical cost-minimisation to find a certain technology mix and addition-
ally provides a calculation of how CO2 emissions are affected by this
mix versus a given base case, would be counted as featuring both
economic and environmental criteria. Where an article does not
produce explicit technology recommendations, Table 4 lists analysis
rather than decision criteria. For example, for a paper that solely
forecasts electricity demand, the relevant analysis criteria are those
that drive their demand estimation. Similarly, for a paper that
examines a past electrification project, the relevant analysis criteria
are those that are used to assess the quality of the project. This logic
allows mapping at least one criteria to every reviewed article.
Overall, economic criteria are by far the most prevalent, with
economic analysis being present in 287, or 94%, of all reviewed
articles. Amongst a range of factors, economic criteria include invest-
ment cost, operation and maintenance cost, lifetime cost, levelised cost
of electricity, lifetime project cost, and net present value. Different cost
types can influence the direction of the analysis. Söderholm (1999), for
example, points out that lifetime costing approaches tend to miss
considerations on peak power demand, instead focusing on actual
energy delivered for a longer period of time [273]. Yet in peak demand
situations, usually in the early evening, power has to be provided for a
very short time and with quick response rates. Söderholm (1999)
argues that some technologies may be economically viable in these
situations despite their high lifetime cost to prevent temporary
electricity outages. In general, the prevalence of economic criteria
indicates the almost universally accepted importance of finding cost-
effective solutions to electrify the countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Social criteria are present in slightly more than half of the reviewed
papers and include social and cultural acceptability, job creation and
other social benefits. Their popularity in sub-Saharan African electri-
city planning springs from their importance in decision-making that
concerns whether or not to electrify remote areas or poor population
shares where electrification may not have positive financial paybacks in
the short run. Some generation technologies can have higher social
benefits than others. For instance, in their analysis of a biomass
gasification plant for electricity production, Buchholz et al. (2012)
argue that unlike diesel generators, biomass gasification requires local
labour, a potentially stimulating effect for the local economy [248].
Furthermore, several studies have used qualitative arguments to high-
light the cultural difficulties of certain electricity generating technolo-
gies in specific settings. An example of cultural consideration is
provided by Peterson (2006) in his noteworthy account of a micro-
hydropower plant in a village in the Democratic Republic of Congo
[62]. He writes that the inhabitants believed in the “Mami Wata”
goddess who lives in the rivers and demands a human sacrifice if it is
disturbed, for example through building a micro-hydro plant. When the
Table 3
Value chain elements addressed by reviewed articles.











































a A given reference is defined to have addressed a certain criterion as soon as it includes respective relevant qualitative or quantitative analysis that could function as a possible
determinant with regards to the studied problem.
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father of the villager overseeing the project died during the plant's
construction, the villager became a social outcast and was subjected to
isolation and insults, as the villagers suspected him of having killed his
father to placate the Mami Wata. Peterson goes on to recommend that
development projects are culturally grounded, that true communal
needs are assessed before deciding to build an energy system, and that
communal instead of individual ownership structures are implemen-
ted. This account bears resemblance to the analysis offered by Keketso
(2003, p.7) in the context of a large-scale hydro project in Lesotho
[130]. This paper reveals that after several houses in nearby villages
were destroyed due to earth tremors shortly after the construction of
the plant, one villager was quoted as saying: “Some say a giant snake
that used to live in the river is now angry because too much water is
collected at the same place.” In a similar vein, when Kisaalita et al.
(2006) discuss animal draft power, they dismiss the technology because
in Southwestern Uganda, the use of cattle for work disagrees with the
cultural place of the animal [255]. As they are seen as an admired and
valued form of currency, such a monotonous usage of cattle would be
considered highly disrespectful. However, the authors point out that
this is not necessarily the case in other parts of Uganda.
A heightened global awareness of climate change, and more
specifically acknowledgement that sub-Saharan Africa is projected to
be among the world regions most drastically affected by global
warming, has fostered a rising number of studies that include
environmental analysis and decision criteria. Many researchers point
out that renewable energy technologies can be decentralised to electrify
rural communities where grid extension is not a viable option, thereby
combining environmental and social benefits.
Technological criteria commonly include functionality, reliability,
efficiency, safety and quality of energy measured in exergy content. For
example, Okello et al. (2014) find a number of technological advan-
tages for using bioenergy technology including reliability, safety and
functionality [246]. Eder et al. (2015) undertake an opinion survey on
the quality of energy in Tiribogo, a rural Ugandan village, after it had
been newly served with a mini-grid biomass gasification power plant
[243]. They find that households primarily prefer biogas electricity as it
provides brighter light than previously used kerosene lamps.
Furthermore, several papers have analysed political criteria in
electricity planning. These include national energy security, political
favourability and proneness to patronage. Ahlborg and Hammar (2014),
in their comprehensive analysis of the drivers and barriers for rural
electrification in Tanzania and Mozambique, find that the main driver for
rural electrification is political priority [281]. Government campaigns
and programs are argued to play a decisive role in rural electrification,
using electrification as an election-related endowment. The study cites
political dependencies on foreign donors and institutional inefficiencies
between the national and local political levels as important barriers for
rural electrification. Another example of analysing political criteria for
electricity planning is Ayodele's (1982, p.9) insightful qualitative work on
decision-making for a Nigerian hydro-electric plant [177]. He points out
that “some political factors may mitigate purely the socio-economic
considerations in the technological choice decision making process.”
Ayodele discusses in detail how politicians from Northern Nigeria, who
were in government at the time, had a clear political preference for a
large-scale hydropower plant to be built in the North, versus alternative
natural gas plants in the South of the country. Due to considerable
transmission losses in the Nigerian grid, the location of the power plant
had considerable implications, most notably in terms of which areas
could be cost-effectively electrified and which could not. Thus, the
government, in a patronage move, opted for the Northern hydropower
plant to ease electrification for its political supporters. Similarly, in
Zimbabwe, as Söderholm (1999) points out, electrification investment
decisions in the 1980s and 1990s often followed political objectives, such
as energy independence from neighbouring countries and a socialist
ideology of creating state employment, goals which outweighed financial
and environmental considerations [273]. As a consequence, the newly
independent Zimbabwean government invested in building a large-scale
domestic coal-fired power station at Hwange, rather than expanding a
joint hydropower plant with Zambia or increasing imports from the
Congo/Zaïre and Mozambique.
One interesting aspect of political analyses criteria should be noted
– 146 of the 306 reviewed articles employ quantitative research
methods. Only 6% or 9 of these 146 articles have either analysed some
form of political criteria or mention favourable politics as an important
success factor for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa
[59,88,144,149,248,251,254,312,321], and only 4 of these address
generation technology selection [88,149,248,251]. Yet 54%, or 86 of
the 160 reviewed articles which use some kind of qualitative research
methods, employ either political analysis criteria or discuss politics as a
critical success factor. Hence, while qualitative researchers show that
the politics of electricity matters for successful delivery in sub-Saharan
Africa, this aspect is mostly absent in quantitative electricity planning.
3.5.2. Number of criteria
The use of multi-criteria analysis in energy planning has been
frequently advocated and argued to be capable of dealing with a rich
variety of problems and objectives [10–12,15,17,20]. In this review,
the application of a given criterion is understood comparably broadly
as described in Section 2.3. Table 5 maps each reviewed article against
the number of analysis and/or decision criteria, and categorises them
by quantitative, qualitative or a combined approach.
Table 5 illustrates that qualitative research tends to address more
criteria than quantitative research. The average numbers of different
criteria addressed are 2.8 and 1.9, respectively. Papers employing both
quantitative and qualitative methods address an average of 3.1 criteria.
Related to this point is that the extreme values of a number of different
criteria are heavily biased towards one type of research method. On the
one hand, 85% of the articles addressing only one criterion use
quantitative methods, for example a cost optimisation that is not
complemented by environmental or technological simulations. On the
other hand, all six identified articles that employ all five different
criteria feature a significant amount of qualitative analyses. A possible
reason for this is that social and political criteria are easiest addressed
in a qualitative matter. For example, Barry et al. (2011) in an extensive
qualitative study covering eight case examples from Malawi, Rwanda
and Tanzania find a total of 13 factors that need to be taken into
consideration in energy planning [287]. These 13 factors map well onto
the 5 high-level criteria in Table 4. Such an implementation analysis is
insightful and constitutes valuable feedback for energy planners to
incorporate them into future approaches.
3.5.3. Time trend in number of criteria used in quantitative research
Fig. 4 plots the temporal development of the number of different
criteria used in quantitative research included in this review until the
year 2015. It depicts a slight upward trend with an average of 2.1
criteria used in the period between 2011 and 2015. This reflects the
growing importance of environmental and social criteria besides
economic ones in electricity planning in sub-Saharan Africa.
Several researchers call for a growing inclusion of criteria. For
instance, policy analyses have frequently concluded that policy short-
comings in many cases were due to a sole focus on economic criteria.
Pineau (2007) argues that the electricity sector reform in Cameroon
failed to provide long-term sustainability, as it focused solely on
financial returns in the short-term and lacked any kind of integrated
energy-environment planning [49]. Writing about South Africa, Gaunt
(2005) argues that before the 1980s there had been only an economic
objective in electrification planning [207]. When it became clear that
large parts of the country could not afford electricity, social and
political objectives were added to electrification plans – with voters’
appeal playing an important role after the end of apartheid.
Yet, arguably, while the amount of analysed criteria has grown, it
has remained stagnant since 2001 and still at a fairly low overall level
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given the well-established methods of MCDM.
3.6. Alternatives
Proposing a potential solution for an electricity supply and demand
problem usually involves analysing and evaluating a set of potential
alternatives. The number of such alternatives is not necessarily equal to
the different generation technologies considered. A paper that considers
four different configurations of a biogas plant for meeting the electricity
demand of a village studies one generation technology, but evaluates four
alternatives for a decision. Table E1 in the appendix E presents the number
of studied alternatives for those reviewed articles that examined different
alternatives for a given problem. Table E1 includes 169 articles of the 306
reviewed articles. The remaining 137 articles have not explicitly studied
different electrification alternatives – i.e. those that are solely concerned
with forecasting electricity, with discussing energy policies and reforms,
with project implementation or with generation technology in general
without naming concrete alternatives for a given supply and demand
problem. The number of algorithmically considered alternatives approaches
infinity for purely continuous optimisation, or is usually a very large finite
number for discrete optimisation and certain large-scale simulations. For
practical reasons, such cases have been grouped together as approaching
infinity in Table E1.
Complexity increases with evaluating an increasing number of
discrete alternatives likely explain the steady decrease in articles
dealing with a higher number of such alternatives. While 54 articles
explicitly compare 2 decision alternatives, 26 papers compare 3, 14
compare 4 and 10 compare 5 alternatives. As optimisation and some
simulations allow a straight-forward way of analysing a very large
number of alternatives, the considerable number of 56 studies in the
“→∞”-category is not surprising. No article that has not used mathe-
matical optimisation or large-scale simulation has assessed more than
10 discrete alternatives for its given problem.
3.7. Application of the DCA-classification
Combining Table D1 in the appendix D, Table 5 from Section 3.5.2,
and Table E1 in the appendix E makes it possible to map those 169
reviewed articles that have explicitly considered different alternatives
in the process of electricity planning according to the DCA-classifica-
tion introduced in Section 2.3. Table 6 presents the resulting literature
classification.
Each of the eight categories in the classification scheme feature at
least 5 references. A sizeable portion of the reviewed electricity
planning literature in sub-Saharan Africa examines more than one
value chain element and considers more than one criterion in its
analysis. Articles are relatively evenly split with regards to having
evaluated no more than three alternatives. Interestingly, the most
encompassing type 8 features the most articles with 49 identified
papers addressing more than one value chain element, analysing more
than one criterion and evaluating more than three different alterna-
tives. The academic trend of including a variety of criteria in electricity
planning noticeable in previous review articles [10–12,15,17,20] is
























Fig. 4. Average number of criteria used by reviewed quantitative articles until 2015
(N=132).
Table 5
Number of analysis/decision criteria employed by reviewed articles clustered by research method type.







































58 [199,255,258,305] 4 92
4 [37,133,246,251] 4 [32,34,43,61,66,93,107,117,128,135-
,150,169,186,201,224,239,241,259,-
263,288,293–295,299,318,324,326]
27 [140,187,195,273] 4 35
5 – [287,313,316,322,323] 5 [250] 1 6
Total 306
a A given reference is defined to have addressed a certain criterion as soon as it includes a respective relevant qualitative or quantitative analysis that could function as a possible
determinant with regards to the studied problem.
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studies, albeit at a relatively low pace (see Section 3.5.3).
Further analyses allows us to characterise the 8 different DCA types.
Table 7 categorises all articles which have been classified with a DCA
type as taking either an ex-ante or an ex-post analysis perspective. The
former examines a potential future electrification solution, while the
latter assesses an electrification project or scheme which is already in
place to derive valuable lessons from past experiences. Not surpris-
ingly, the ex-ante research is most abundant and dominates all 8 DCA
types in this review. Yet DCA type 7 is almost evenly balanced, with 22
articles taking an ex-ante, and 21 taking an ex-post perspective. Hence,
a significant portion of articles where less than 3 alternatives have been
evaluated using a comprehensive multi-criteria analysis approach that
spans more than one value chain stage examine past electrification
projects. 68% of the ex-post articles are of DCA type 7 or 8, while this
ratio is only 50% for ex-ante studies. Thus, this review finds ex-post
analyses included in this review to exhibit a greater extent of analysis
on average than ex-ante studies, featuring more criteria and consider-
ing more electrification value chain stages.1
Furthermore, Table F1 in the appendix F shows which respective DCA
types have favoured different units of analysis. Researchers who have
studied electrification on a sub-national level have a relatively clear
preference for choosing encompassing analysis methods, as reflected in
the high frequency of DCA types 8 and 7. Studies on a national unit of
analysis, however, do not saliently prefer any DCA type, implying that the
extent of research efforts grows with smaller units of analyses. The sample
size of reviewed transnational electrification studies is too small to allow
robust conclusions on their approaches used.
3.8. Methodologies and approaches
Table 8 lists the dominant scientific method used in each reviewed
article. While such a table provides insightful findings, grouping
articles by methods can be complicated as different authors may
understand a given method in different ways. In this paper, MCDM
is understood as requiring a systematic method of combining a set of
different objectives with the goal of yielding one or several Pareto-
efficient solutions to a given decision problem [20]. Hence, articles
which, for example, analyse several different criteria but do not
combine them in a systematic way to yield potential Pareto-efficient
solutions, are not counted as MCDM. To circumvent the issue of
inconsistently grouping mathematical optimisation articles (see Section
1), they have been split in two objective categories, namely single and
multi-objective approaches, with the latter being understood as an
instance of MCDM following [10,15,20].
Table 6




































































Total articles classified 169
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the input from one of the anonymous reviewers
which led to this finding.
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In terms of quantitative research, model simulations and calculations as
well as single-criteria optimisation are the most popular approaches. The
number of MCDM is relatively small but rapidly growing, with 18 of the 27
identified articles published since 2010. LCA-studies, while an integral part
of energy planning in Europe, have received comparably little attention in
sub-Saharan African electricity planning.
Qualitative research is likewise important for electricity planning in sub-
Saharan Africa. Zvoleff et al. (2009), in their mathematical optimisation
paper to minimise electricity transmission costs in four African countries,
acknowledge crucial experience gained from rural electrification policy
analysis papers [290]. They name the work by Bekker et al. (2008) in South
Africa [201] and Haanyika (2008) in Zambia [259] as crucial for the design
of future energy systems. Qualitative research is furthermore able to
uncover aspects of electricity planning that are difficult to capture in
quantitative terms, such as cultural implications of electrification projects,
[255] and [62], described in Section 3.5.1.
Table G1 in the appendix G lists those articles that specifically suggest a
generation technology mix for a given supply and demand problem. All
other articles either analyse a set of technologies without providing specific
recommendations or allude to other aspects of the wider field of electricity
planning such as demand analysis, implementation evaluations or house-
hold opinion surveys. Table 9 provides a list of software used in some of the
Table 7
Analysis perspective across different DCA archetypes.
DCA type Ex-ante ∑ Ex-post ∑ Total
Type 1 [45,58,114,176,215,240] 6 [233] 1 7
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a This category features articles that include mathematical optimisation models with a single optimisation criterion (usually cost minimisation). These articles, however, might feature
further quantitative analyses such as simulations that add further criteria to the analysis, for instance an environmental calculation of CO2 emission changes when the cost-optimal
solution would be implemented.
b All identified articles that feature a multi-objective optimisation model (or several subsequent single optimisation models) addressing different decision criteria are included in the
MCDM bucket as they are understood as an instance of MCDM.
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reviewed articles. The HOMER package is found to be by far the most
popular tool in sub-Saharan African electricity planning. Commonly
focusing on a sub-national project scale, it is capable of least cost
optimisation of lifetime electricity cost and providing additional environ-
mental analysis for specific solutions. However, the software appears to be
limited in its possibilities to include different temporal or spatial scales of
demand or further, non-monetary decision criteria. In addition, studies
solely based on packages like HOMER often overlook actual implementa-
tion issues for their proposed solutions.
4. Recommendations for electricity planning and
implementation in sub-Saharan Africa
4.1. Recommended technology mix
The majority of 63% of the articles that have explicitly recom-
mended a specific generation technology for their given electricity
planning problem express a preference for purely renewable energy
technology solutions. Only 21% clearly favour non-renewables, while
16% find a hybrid system to be the best system.2 This result indicates
that the literature included in this review often sees renewable energy
technologies as a preferable option across greatly different cases of sub-
Saharan African electrification. The literature mentions its abundance
on the continent, especially solar and hydropower, and its availability
in remote areas that are considerable distances away from the central
electricity grid. Renewables are more environmentally friendly, imply
social benefits and can lessen resource-related political risks due to
their universal occurrence.
The fact that only 16% of the relevant reviewed papers promote a
hybrid solution is due to many of the papers not allowing for this
option, but rather being designed as an either-or approach. It should be
noted that there is a slight increase in the favourability of non-
renewable technologies if only those papers are considered that have
looked at only investment costs as their economic criterion. As soon as
a lifetime cost or NPV approach replaces a sole investment cost,
renewables become more attractive as their low maintenance and
non-existing fuel cost offset relatively high upfront investments.
4.2. Electrification delivery success factors
Table 10 provides a list of success factors that the respective
references have identified as being crucial for successful electrification
delivery. Eight frequently cited success factors are presented.
A significant amount of qualitative research has pointed to different
energy policy options as well as the institutional factors they believe
would foster electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. Numerous authors
have discussed privatisation, free market approaches, centralised
versus decentralised governance, prioritisation and creating an en-
abling environment for private electricity producers. Karekezi and
Kimani (2002), for example, strongly encourage policies that foster a
greater participation of private small to medium-scale independent
power producers (IPP). They cite the example of Mauritius as a best
practice example where 25% of electricity is produced in co-generation
plants within the sugar industry [293].
Electricity infrastructure is capital intense, especially due to
high upfront costs that are characteristic of almost any electrifica-
tion effort. Low population densities tend to exacerbate this effect.
As the financial means of un-electrified population shares tend to
be limited, amortisation times are long, if existing at all. Thus,
sufficient access to funds financing upfront investments is argued to
be a crucial success factor for electrification, by most articles
concerned with implementation. At the same time, many papers
argue that social benefits achieved through electrification are
crucial to justify such investments. Whether the funds spring from
national reserves or international donors, accessing finance will be
easier when the financer is likely to introduce social benefits
through the investment. Having achieved tangible social benefits
in previous projects will furthermore increase the demand of
electrification elsewhere, constituting a further argument for social
benefits being crucial for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa.
In this review, 85 reviewed studies point to some form of
political success factor. Especially in qualitative research, the
political dimension of energy projects has frequently been cited.
Ahlborg and Sjöstedt (2015) explain the success of an NGO-
implemented small hydroelectric plant in the Kisongo river in rural
Tanzania [219]. They assert that the NGO has successfully avoided
the mistake of treating the project as purely technological, instead
admitting to its deeply political character and using the available
village-level to national-level political channels to the advantage of
the project. Likewise, Hammons et al. (2000) point to political
difficulties as the prime reason why talks about increasing elec-
tricity export from the Congo had stalled despite its considerable
potential [328]. Kessides voices political concerns over long-
distance energy transmittance through different sub-Saharan
African countries in general [316]. Finally, Rugabera et al. (2013)
argue that maintaining political stability in a country is a necessary
condition to attract foreign direct investments for electrification
infrastructure [226].
Building local capabilities, as well as ensuring local community
involvement in electricity planning, has furthermore been pointed out
frequently as instrumental for successful project implementation.
Sovacool et al. (2013) explain in detail how the fact that community
ownership, and especially female ownership within the communities,
was crucial for the large-scale dissemination of diesel-powered off-grid
energy solutions in Mali in the early 2000 [136]. As all costs and
maintenance efforts were shared, considerable parts of the commu-
nities took an active role in ensuring adequate usage of the technology
Table 9












2 As hybrid systems are mainly examined in optimisation studies, excluding such
studies yields a slightly higher number of 73% of the studies favouring pure RES systems,
versus 23% recommending non-renewable energy systems. While the associated sample
size is too small for robust conclusions, considering only those articles that have taken an
ex-post analysis perspective and are therefore mostly based on field work largely confirm
the overall shares of recommended generation technologies.
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for income generation, resulting in positive cash flows for all installed
generators. Moreover, in their Kisongo river project report in Tanzania,
Ahlborg and Sjöstedt (2015) mention the early institutionalisation of
community ownership of the whole project as a key success factor
[219]. This was achieved by forming what they call a “community-
based utility,” building local management capacity and implementing
regulations to secure non-hierarchical leadership and democratic
decision-making. Mbohwa (2002) explains a fitting counterfactual of
this finding [270]. The paper describes how two small-scale bio-
gasification plants were installed in rural Zimbabwe in 1989 without
any technology transfer or community engagement. After only two
years, both systems had permanently stopped operating because
neither community was able to fix minor damages. Furthermore,
building awareness has been an important factor especially for
decentralised renewable energy systems. Ondraczek (2013) explains
that a lack of awareness of solar energy technologies was an important
factor for why Tanzania's solar market took much longer to develop
than its Kenyan counterpart where solar technologies have been much
more a topic of general public discussions since the 1980s [282].
Today, however, the literature tends to find that most people in sub-
Saharan Africa are generally aware of electricity producing technolo-
gies such as solar PV cells.
Securing land access in general, despite the abundance of land
in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, is not guaranteed in all parts
of the region. Land can be deeply politicised, or in some cases
extremely scarce, in light of rapidly growing populations and
desertification. Palanichamy et al. (2004), in their analysis of
energy systems in Mauritius, point to large land requirements for
comparably small amounts of electricity generation due to the
country's reliance on bagasse biomass [150]. They demonstrate
that land in Mauritius has become a scarce resource, as it is a
comparably small island state that is dominated by monoculture
sugar cane plantations.
While the list presented in Table 10 is by no means exhaustive, it
does provide a number of reoccurring themes in the literature and may
function as a starting point for electricity planners to consider during
planning exercises.
5. Conclusion-the myriad opportunities for electricity
planning research in Africa
This paper has reviewed 306 scientific articles in the field of
electricity planning and related implementation analysis, consider-
ing case examples from sub-Saharan Africa. It has furthermore
introduced a novel classification scheme to categorise planning
research which has been applied to the reviewed literature and can
be used in general. The paper has illustrated a number of char-
acteristics and developments in this literature, which at the same
time have exposed several glaring gaps that imply myriad oppor-
tunities for further research.
In terms of the characteristics of the literature, the following points
are worth summarising:
• A range of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been studied in
detail with regards to electricity planning and implementation, most
notably South Africa, but also Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and
Ethiopia.
• There is a clear positive and encouraging trend in electricity
planning research considering sub-Saharan African countries or
regions as case studies.
• A wide variety of approaches have been used in the sub-Saharan
African context, most going beyond simple single-criteria analysis
(given that addressing a certain criterion is broadly defined as
discussed in Section 3.5.1). Qualitative research addressed an
average of 2.8 different high-level criteria, while quantitative
research included 1.9 criteria. Examples of all eight DCA-classifica-
tion types exist, with those addressing multiple value chain ele-
ments, multiple criteria and more than three decision alternatives
being most numerous. Notably, on average, ex-post analyses in-
cluded in this review use more encompassing analysis approaches
than ex-ante studies, featuring more criteria and more electrification
value chain stages. Ex-post studies are often highly valuable con-
tributions to electricity planning, deriving lessons and critical
success factors through carefully analysing past electrification
experiences
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• Taking together all articles that explicitly recommend a specific
generation technology for the problem they have studied regardless
of their specific planning approach used, 63% of the articles
conclude that they favour renewable energy technologies, 21% argue
for the usage of non-renewables, and 16% recommend hybrids.
Scholars frequently find renewable energy technologies to imply
environmental, social and political benefits while appearing to be
cost-competitive in several different circumstances, especially in
remote regions far from the national grid.
• Successfully delivering electrification in sub-Saharan Africa strongly
depends on the specific circumstances in a given case. Scholars have
nonetheless pointed to a set of reoccurring crucial success factors,
among them adequate policy design, sufficient finance, securing
social benefits, a favourable political situation and community
engagement together with local capability building.
From the analyses of this literature review arise a number of further
research needs:
• Most sub-Saharan African countries have received little or no
scholarly attention in terms of electricity planning. No single article
could be identified for 12 countries and fewer than 5 articles for 36
of the 49 countries in the region. Yet, it is crucial to conduct
electricity planning addressing the specific country or region where
it is supposed to be implemented. While some findings remain valid
across national borders, others can be conflicting. For instance,
Campbell et al. (2003) find that urban Zimbabwean residents tend
to use electricity as soon as they have access to it [267], while this is
not the case in a South African case example [205].
• There has not been a single identified study that has planned
electrification along more than 3 out of 5 possible value chain
elements. However, it would be enlightening to understand the
complete implications of a proposed alternative, from understand-
ing the exact demand to selecting a generation technology, operation
and transmission planning, and successful implementation.
• There is still much potential for using MCDM methods. While
analysing multiple high-level criteria has become more common in
the last 10 – 15 years, formalised MCDM approaches are still
relatively rare and could easily increase the stagnating number of
average high-level criteria analysed. This would have the potential to
yield more in-depth, accurate and robust decision-making support.
Similarly, LCA approaches appear underrepresented and could be
pursued more vigorously.
• Slightly more than 50% of qualitative research papers have ad-
dressed political factors of electrification in sub-Saharan Africa.
However, only 6% of quantitative papers have done so. While some
political aspects may be challenging to model, ignoring such factors
does not appear to be the best solution, given their striking relevance
evident from the qualitative analyses. Combining quantitative with
qualitative analyses is potentially a more holistic approach to tackle
this problem.
• Several reviewed articles point to the general lack and unreliability
of data necessary for electricity planning. This is especially so with
respect to energy potential data, which is scarce. Even in comparably
advanced countries such as Mauritius, scholars have only just begun
to close some of these data gaps, with detailed wind [330] and solar
[331] potential studies published in 2015. Those energy potential
studies that exist tend to receive many citations, as electricity
planners rely on them for their models.
These gaps are numerous and certainly challenging to fill. However,
the work included in this paper, as well as other relevant research that
could not be included, provides an important stepping stone for
grasping the opportunity to fill these voids. Global goals to eradicate
poverty, achieve more sustainable development, improve health care
and mitigate climate change all warrant immediate action.
Increasingly, further high quality research on energy provision in
sub-Saharan Africa is one of the many positive steps that could
contribute to coming closer to realising such goals.
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Appendix A. Logistic regressions
Table A1 presents panel data logistic regressions examining statistical associations between the occurrence of domestically or internationally
authored research in a given country-year and a variety of explanatory variables. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation
consistent and clustered by countries. Year fixed-effects are included to eliminate initial technological development and other unobserved aggregate
time-series effects, and a lagged dependent variable is included to control for snowball effects of publishing papers on an increasingly popular topic
over time. Where not indicated otherwise, data for the independent variables are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Extrapolations were used for missing data where error margins could be expected to be small. Firth regressions to account for the rare positive event
structure of the dependent variables showed no effect on the results, nor did limiting papers to those published in the last 15 years.
Table A1
Logistic fixed-effects panel data models for origin of research (international versus national).
Independent variables Dependent variable
Internationally authored article Domestically authored article
Lagged dependenta 0.700** 0.954**
(3.48) (2.66)
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Regional scope of reviewed articles.












Independent variables Dependent variable
Internationally authored article Domestically authored article
Population [million people] 0.0152*** 0.0172***
(4.43) (4.44)











Notes: The two dependent variables are binary and coded “1” for country-years in which at least one reviewed article has been published by an international or national author,
respectively. Both models include unreported country fixed-effects. Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent z-statistics clustered by countries are in parentheses. Estimations
performed using Stata 14.0. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at p=0.05, p=0.01 and p=0.001, respectively.
a Respective dependent variable lagged by one year.
b World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator for political instability, ranging from −2.5 for politically highly unstable to 2.5 for politically highly stable countries.
c Binary variable coded 1 if a given country uses English as an official language.
Table C1
Number of different generation technologies addressed in reviewed articles.














































Number of different decision alternatives considered in reviewed articles.











Total articles classified 169
Table F1
Units of analysis across the different DCA archetypes.
DCA type Sub-national ∑ National ∑ Internat. ∑ Tot.a
Type 1 [45,58,176,215,233] 5 [114,240] 2 – 7
Type 2 [52,105,290] 3 [108] 1 [314] 1 5
Type 3 [68,100,103,192,197,205,210,247,252,2-
62,264,276,278]
13 [34,59,115,131,144,209,229,231] 8 [322] 1 22
Type 4 [88,141,149,150,234,246,251,255,317] 9 [65,77,101,102,133,143,173,218,234,317] 10 [298,317] 2 18
Type 5 [60,78,90,91,120,161–163] 8 [90,120,161–163] 5 – 8









36 [99,142,194,204,217,227,258,286,295,324,327] 11 [301,304,305,319,327] 5 49
Total articles classified 169
a Shows the sum of distinctly different articles, for example an article that addresses both a sub-national and national unit of analysis is counted only once.
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2.4 Conclusion Paper 1: Research gaps and questions to be addressed in this thesis 
The review paper has identified a number of glaring research gaps in terms of electricity 
planning in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the extent of existent research gaps far exceeds what 
can be covered in a single PhD thesis. Rather, informed by the author’s skill-set and the desire 
to contribute to multiple understudied areas, the following five gaps are chosen to be addressed 
in this thesis, giving rise to a set of specific research questions: 
i. Negligence of social and political criteria in planning models - While practically all 
quantitative models reviewed include system cost as a decision criterion, social 
objectives are seldom, and political objectives are found to be almost non-existent in 
the energy planning optimisation literature on sub-Saharan Africa (only 4 of the 306 
reviewed articles use any kind of political criterion when analysing generation 
technology choices). Yet qualitative research heavily relies on political analyses for 
explaining the failure or success of certain electrification initiatives or projects. 
Specifically, no comparative cross-country analysis was identified, which examines the 
association between rural electrification (where more than 80% of the unelectrified 
Africans live) and politics. This raises the question to which extent political factors 
actually matter in sub-Saharan African electrification, with the answer to this question 
implying potential consequences for energy planning model design. 
ii. Paucity of planning research on a continental, regional and national scale in Africa 
- On the African continent and in general, the different scales warrant different levels 
of details as well as different decision objectives. The research question following from 
this gap is how useful models can be designed and specifically tailored towards each of 
these different levels of analysis. 
iii. Lack of multi-criteria sustainability analyses - Although their potential benefit has 
been demonstrated in numerous instances, multi-criteria planning models applied to 
energy planning in sub-Saharan Africa remain underutilised. Only 9% of the reviewed 
articles have used formalised multi-criteria decision-making methods, with a minority 
of them deploying mathematical optimisation techniques. This is even more striking 
when considering that in the sub-Saharan African context, qualitative research finds 
social and political criteria, which go beyond traditional economic, environmental and 
technical ones, to be specifically salient. Hence, a research question arises how multi-
criteria models can be designed, which combine conventional and novel criteria to yield 
new and meaningful insights into the African power system. 
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iv. Narrow focus on potential technologies - While solar PV has received considerable 
attention by researchers, other renewable energy technologies such as wind, bioenergy, 
geothermal or solar concentrated power (CSP) are underrepresented (they are addressed 
by only 9% - 30% of the reviewed articles) in energy planning research. The review 
finds that on average, planning studies in sub-Saharan Africa have included less than 
three different generation technologies, only nine studies have included seven or more, 
and none has included more than nine different technologies. Given the region’s 
necessity to markedly increase capacity, the large potential of these renewable energy 
technologies for generation and their rapidly falling costs in the last few years [86], 
planning models should expand on how many technologies they include. 
v. Poor understanding of the current way of electrifying Africa - Finally, the review 
has documented a number of success factors for the implementation of electrification, 
oftentimes based on researcher’s recommendations following their analysis of failed 
projects. Yet, a comprehensive, high-level analysis of the implications of current 
African electrification initiatives is absent from the literature. Research questions that 
arise are how electrification in sub-Saharan Africa is currently implemented, why the 
current model seems to be failing to deliver, and what needs to happen to overcome the 
shortfalls. 
 
2.5  Objectives and approach of the PhD 
The identified research gaps and associated research questions in section 2.4 directly define the 
three core objectives of this PhD thesis, as presented in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: PhD objectives based on identified relevant research gaps 
No. and type Objective Gap addressed 
 Objective 1  
(Model preparation) 
Study the relevance of additional, political decision 
criteria for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. 
(i) 
 Objective 2  
(Model design and 
application) 
Create novel, relevant and encompassing 
infrastructure expansion insights for (a) continental, 
(b) regional and (c) national-level power systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
(ii), (iii), (iv) 
  Objective  3 
(Implementation) 
Suggest policy measures to improve the 
implementation of current electrification initiatives 





Figure 4 summarises the tasks arising from the three objectives. It presents the overall 
sequential approach of the PhD, listing the main tasks, which arise from the three objectives 
and providing a mapping of the six journal articles against these tasks, which are named in 
Table 1.  
 
 
Figure 4: Phases and main tasks of the PhD, and chapters where tasks are addressed 
 
To meet objective 1, journal article II examines the importance of political factors in sub-
Saharan African electrification in chapter 3, focusing on regime-type variables and institutional 
mechanisms. The paper uses econometric panel data as well as qualitative case study analyses 
to show that democratic countries with strong political institutions in Africa have fared 
considerably better in electrifying its rural population between 1990 and 2010. In terms of 
electricity expansion, these results suggest the potential merits of including political decision 
criteria in multi-criteria electricity planning models, which address several different countries 
in sub-Saharan.  
Meeting objective 2 requires the design and application of novel planning models on a 
continental, regional and national scale. Objectives 2a and 2b are considered by integrating 
political objectives as part of multi-criteria electricity planning optimisation models of the 
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continental African network (paper III in chapter 4) and of a regional power pool (paper IV in 
chapter 5). The models allow studying the optimal trade-off between minimising cost and 
minimising political risks of the network. In the case of a planning model restricted to a national 
case (objective 2c), political factors become less pronounced as their variation in different areas 
within a country is significantly smaller than between-country variations. Rather, social aspects 
around highly unequally distributed electricity access, as discussed in chapter 3, are highly 
salient on a sub-national level in sub-Saharan Africa. Social electrification inequality 
minimisation objectives are thus included in a multi-criteria planning model to understand how 
equal electrification in urban and rural areas and different parts within the same country can 
cost-optimally be achieved (paper V in chapter 6). The planning models to derive these insights 
are designed to build upon each other: as the model scale becomes more granular, the desired 
modelling detail to derive meaningful insights, as well as the associated mathematical 
complexity, increases. Table 3 below details this by characterising the modelling approach 
chosen in each of the three planning papers. While a continental-scale model is intended to 
provide overarching insights of Africa’s future generation mix, a regional case, while still 
comparably general given the infancy of regional African electricity trade, needs to include 
region-specific planning objectives and more geographical detail. Planning a national power 
sector is most useful when it closely matches the current national power grid on an increased 
geographical and technical granularity. Furthermore, while power plant capacities on a 
continental or regional level can be lumped together and assumed to be continuous and linear, 
on a national level, specific plants are modelled, which can either be built or not be built. As a 
result, binary decision variables have to be included for the national case, which considerably 
increases the complexity of the resulting model. Specifically, as the continental model in 
chapter 4 includes two objectives (cost and political risk), it is classified as a Bi-Objective 
Linear Programming (BOLP) model. The model in chapter 4 is a Multi-Objective Linear 
Programming (MOLP) optimisation problem with three objectives (cost, environmental impact 
and political risks). Finally, the national-level model introduced in chapter 6 is a Multi-
Objective Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MOMILP) problem. All three use similar 
multi-objective problem solution algorithms based on the ε-Constraint method [87], coded in 
IBM ILOG CPLEX 12. All three models are of the most complex DCA-type 8 as defined in 





Table 3: Increasing complexity of planning models in this thesis 
Category 
Continental-scale 
model (paper III, ch. 4) 
Regional-scale model 
(paper IV, ch. 5) 
National-scale model 
(paper V, ch. 6) 
Model type BOLP  MOLP MOMILP 
Value chain deptha 2 2 4 
Decision criteria 2 3 3 
- Economic Yes Yes Yes 
- Environmental No Yes Yes 
- Political Yes Yes No 




→∞ →∞ →∞ 
Number of 
technologies 
7 6 13 
Geographically 
explicit 
No Yes Yes 
Requirement to 
solve shortest path 
problem upfront 
No Yes Yes 
Transmission Yes Yes Yes 
Distribution No No Yes 
Off-grid No No Yes 
Demand nodes 46 12 112 
Planning horizon 2030 2030 2040 
a The review paper in section 2.3 defined 5 value chain elements, namely obtaining demand estimates, selecting 
electricity producing technologies, planning operations, designing transmission and distribution of electricity, and 
implementation. Value chain depth means how many of these elements each paper addresses. 
b Due to the continuous decision variables involved, optimisation models are technically able to evaluate an 
infinite amount of different network configurations and choose the best one. 
 
Finally, to meet objective 3, chapter 7 presents a high-level, qualitative analysis of 
electrification in sub-Saharan Africa in general. It provides evidence where the finance for 
generation capacity has come from in the last two decades and identifies a market-based 
approach towards electrification as currently dominating sub-Saharan Africa’s energy sector. 
It finds that such an approach is unlikely to result in universal electricity access in sub-Saharan 
Africa and uses case study evidence to suggest an alternative pro-poor approach with a focus 
on public sector involvement and local energy business development. 
 
While studying for the PhD, the author published four further papers in addition to the six 
included in this thesis (see Table 4). They address different aspects of all three core objectives 
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of the PhD. However, as these aspects can be considered to be of minor importance compared 
to the ones featured in this thesis with regards to meeting the objectives, and in order to 
maintain a sensible overall length of the PhD thesis, they are not included in this thesis. 
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3. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION, ELECTRIFICATION INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (PAPER II) 
3.1 Content overview and thesis context 
The qualitative literature on African electrification has frequently suggested that political 
factors have influenced the failure or success of energy access expansion programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, quantitative planning research has largely not incorporated such 
factors. While over 80% of the unelectrified Africans live in rural areas [2], the review did not 
identify a cross-country analysis of the importance of politics for rural electrification in sub-
Saharan Africa (gap (i) and objective 1 in sections 2.4 and 2.5). To address this gap, this chapter 
examines considerable and growing intracontinental rural electrification variations in sub-
Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2010 in terms of political explanatory variables. The paper’s 
theory section argues that rural electrification can be attributed to politicians’ actions, thereby 
fulfilling a crucial prerequisite for any statistical association between regime type and 
electrification to be meaningful.  
The econometric analyses include a variety of models to indicate the robustness of the results. 
While the main results are derived from fixed-effects models, the paper also features random-
effects, ordinary least squares estimations and several other econometric models. The results 
are independent of different economic and demographic control variables, which have 
previously been argued to have a potential association with electrification in Africa. This 
includes per capita income levels, share of agriculture of total GDP, national savings and 
foreign aid levels, as well as population density, urbanisation and rural population share. In 
order to support the econometric analyses, the paper includes qualitative case study evidence 
from 5 sub-Saharan African countries, namely Ghana, Swaziland, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Senegal. Their experience has differed significantly in terms of democratisation process and 
electrification rates, thereby offering a suitable mix of cases to support the quantitative 
findings. 
The paper is in part based on research the author conducted whilst being an MSc student. This 
work has been expanded during the PhD and turned into a publication. As an indication, 16 of 
the total 31 statistical models featured in the paper are a product of the research work during 
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The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in Sep-
tember 2015 includes the goal to end global energy poverty by provid-
ing universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all. In the academic literature, rural electrification, defined
as percentage of the rural population with access to electricity, has
been found to be a crucial part of socio-economic development (Cook,
2011). An increase in rural electrification is associated with higher
youth literacy rates by upgrading in-school and domestic learning facil-
ities (Kanagawa andNakata, 2008). It has been linked to improving am-
bulant and nursing care (Herrin, 1979). Furthermore, it has been found
to enhance employment, especially among women (Dinkelman, 2011),
enable additional agricultural and non-agricultural income generating
activities, and advance rural productivity (Kirubi et al., 2009). Where
complementary hard and soft infrastructure are present, access to elec-
tricity is generally accepted to result in such positive health, education
and income consequences (Cook, 2011).
Electrification rates diverge substantially in different world regions.
Fig. 1 shows rural and urban electrification rates for sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) and East Asia & Pacific. It exhibits two striking features. First,
sub-Saharan Africa's rural electrification of 14% is significantly lower
than in any other region of the world. Second, the evident urban bias
in electrification measured as ratio between rural and urban electrifica-
tion is 3.5 times greater in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else (cf.
Mandelli et al., 2014; Ahlborg et al., 2015).
However, within sub-Saharan Africa unparalleled and growing
cross-national variations exist in both rural electrification and rural
versus urban electrification inequality. The standard deviation of
rural electrification in the region has increased by almost 50% be-
tween 1990 and 2010. During this period, countries like Ghana and
Senegal managed to increase rural electrification and decrease the
urban electrification bias by an order of magnitude (World Bank,
2015). Yet they are contrasted by cases with more dubious trajecto-
ries. In Swaziland, electrification inequality has risen despite its
middle-income status. In Rwanda, a strong urban bias exists in elec-
trification. New rural electrification connections in Uganda have not
managed to grow quicker than the rural population, resulting in a
stagnation of rural electrification rates at less than 5% and a greater
total number of rural residents without electricity despite consistent
income growth rates (Bhattacharyya, 2013).
This paper contributes to a growing socio-politically orientated liter-
ature on electrification in developing countries (Ahlborg et al., 2015;
Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Kroth et al., 2014; Min, 2015). It explicitly
focuses on rural areas and the salient inequality between rural and
urban electrification, aiming to analyse the importance of respective po-
litical, economic and demographic variables. It further intends to pro-
vide explicit multi-variant evidence for the existence of potential
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political intervening mechanisms between democracy and the depen-
dent variables.
In the early 1990s, most sub-Saharan African countries introduced
multiparty elections, propelling the region's democratisation process
(Bates et al., 2012). Democracies have been found to spend more
money on public services such as education and health (Brown and
Hunter, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Stasavage, 2005).
A few studies have focused on tangible outcomes rather than budget al-
locations (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2013;
Kroth et al., 2014; Lake and Baum, 2001). They similarly observe that
democracies perform better at providing public services. Despite this
suggested link, the fact that around 60% of the sub-Saharan electorate
lives in rural areas, and the concurrence of increased cross-sectional
rural electrification and electrification inequality variations with a sa-
lient democratisation process, no previous study has jointly analysed
political, economic and demographic factors of rural electrification and
electricity access inequality in sub-Saharan Africa over time.
Econometric panel data and ordinary least squares (OLS) models in
this paper use electrification data from 46 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries between 1990 and 2010. The association between democracy
and rural electrification is studied in panel data models controlling for
a variety of political, economic and demographic variables. The multi-
variant approach then compares the democracy variable in econometric
basemodels to thosewhere additional political variables for opposition-
al strength in elections and institutional effectiveness are added to the
same observation set. A decrease in the democracy variable coefficient,
coupled with respective statistical significance levels, would constitute
explicit evidence for contested elections or institutional effectiveness
explaining parts of democracy's association with rural electrification.
The model results are reinforced by a series of econometric robustness
tests as well as by both factual and counterfactual case example evi-
dence from Ghana, Swaziland, Uganda, Senegal and Rwanda, the latter
two being provided in the Appendices B–C.
The Rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa section of this paper
deduces eight testable hypotheses regarding political, economic and de-
mographic drivers of rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. The
Data and descriptive statistics section discusses data sources and as-
sumptions, followed by the econometric analyses entailing modelling
approach, regression results and robustness tests in the Econometric
analyses section. Qualitative evidence for three country cases is present-
ed in the Case example analyses section, before the paper closes with a
conclusion and policy implications.
Rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa
Political drivers of rural electrification
Scholars have produced a range of studies showing a positive associ-
ation between democracy and public service provision (see for instance
Brown, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kaufman and
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Kudamatsu, 2012; Lake and Baum, 2001).
Harding and Stasavage (2014) point out that whether the provision of
a certain public good is attributable to politicians' actions is a crucial
prerequisite for such a positive association to have potential implica-
tions. They argue that in a context of democratisation, politicians tend
to prioritise actions on those public goods where their executive effort
can be clearly connected to actual benefits on the ground. While to
some extend dependent on context, following Harding's (2015) theory
on road networks in Ghana, three factors render rural electrification at-
tributable to executive efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. First, responsibility
for national electricity infrastructure is highly centralised and bundled
within the state apparatus (Barnes and Floor, 1996). To the best of the
author's knowledge, there is no sub-Saharan African country where
the state does not exercise a significant amount of control over its elec-
tricity infrastructure, often through state-owned enterprises, state-run
electrification agencies and public grid ownership (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; Karekezi andKimani, 2002). The engineering
problem ofmatching national electricity demand and supply via one in-
terconnected national grid demands such centralised control. Electrifi-
cation agencies tend to feature explicit and publically available
planning criteria (Eberhard et al., 2011). Despite their significant un-
tapped potential, decentralised electric capacity in sub-Saharan Africa,
often installed by non-governmental actors (MacLean et al., 2015), are
several orders of magnitude smaller than national grid extensions
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012).1 Second, somewhat
contrary to popular belief, the power sector in sub-Saharan Africa is
largely domestically financed, easing attribution of political electrifica-
tion promises for its citizens. The World Bank in their 2010 Africa's In-
frastructure report shows that between 2001 and 2006, 81% of the
total electricity infrastructure spend in sub-Saharan Africa came from
sub-Saharan African taxpayers and infrastructure users (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Only 6%, or $0.7 bn. annually, came from of-
ficial development assistance (ODA) which includes concessional loans.
Third, unlike other more qualitative public goods such as schooling
quality, rural electrification is easily verifiable for the affected popula-
tion as they have perfect information whether electric infrastructure is
available to themor not (Mani andMukand, 2007). As these factors gen-
erally suggest that rural electrification is attributable to political action
in sub-Saharan Africa, it represents an intriguing variable to study
across political systems in terms of its provision.
A small number of academic studies have addressed political drivers
of electrification in developing countries. Brown and Mobarak (2009)
argue that election-related incentives in low-income democracies in-
crease the relative share of electricity provided to residential versus in-
dustrial consumers. Yet they neither address electricity access nor do
they distinguish between rural and urban residential areas. Ahlborg
et al. (2015) use data from 44 sub-Saharan African countries over a
13-year time period and find democracy and institutional quality to be
positively associatedwith household electricity consumption. However,
albeit acknowledging their significance, they do not examine rural ver-
sus urban electrification disparities or rural electrification per se. Min
(2015) contends that electrification decisions in developing countries
are influenced by electoral considerations. His cross-sectional econo-
metric model for the year 2003 suggests a positive link between demo-
cratic history and country-wide electrification. Kroth et al. (2014) argue
that added voter enfranchisement during South Africa's post-Apartheid
democratisation increased rural electrification, mediated via citizenry
participation and the liberalisation of political organisations. Thesefind-
ings corroborate themore general positive association between democ-
racy and public service provision (Brown, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et
1 Harding and Stasavage (2014) furthermore express the general concern that when
implementation agents are required to deliver a government's promise, a non-delivery
of the promise is not directly attributable to the government butmay be due toweak state
capacity. However, if the delivery apparatus is centrally controlled under heavy state influ-
ence or run by the state itself, voters can attribute both a failure in delivery per se and the
failure to deliver on the promise in general to the government (see Harding, 2015; Min,
2015).
Fig. 1. Rural and urban electrification in 2010 (data source: World Bank, 2015).
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al., 2003; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Lake and Baum, 2001),
suggesting the below hypothesis.
HPol1. More democratic political systems should increase rural electrifi-
cation and decrease rural versus urban electrification inequality in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Amechanism often invoked regarding this argument is the presence
of contested elections creating incentives for governments to target
broad population shares. Electoral politics in democratising states
have long been employed to challenge urban-bias arguments, such as
those advocated by Bates (1981), as parties tend to ruralise over time
(see for instance Varshney (1993) or Colburn (1993) for empirical evi-
dence). Such a mechanism informs both the first and the second part
of HPol1. As the median voter in sub-Saharan African countries usually
lives in rural areas, rural public service demands rank higher on the po-
litical agenda (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) compared to authoritarian
regimes where distributive mechanisms often follow more narrow pa-
tronage networks (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In democracies,
this implies higher political incentives to extend electricity infrastruc-
ture to previously unserved rural areas with miniscule per capita de-
mand rather than improving existing grid infrastructure to improve
reliability of the comparably few citizens already served. In Min's
(2015) terms, the extension of rural infrastructure generates greater po-
litical externalities for politicians who wish to be re-elected. However,
such a mechanism of creating incentives for politicians through
contested elections is commonly not explicitlymodelled as an interven-
ing step between democracy and public service provision in economet-
ric analyses. Rather, it is deduced from either a single regime type
variable (Bates et al., 2012; Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Min, 2015) or
a single contested election variable (Stasavage, 2005).
This paper explicitly analyses such a mechanism. LeBas (2011, p.7)
in her book on party-building in Africa emphasises the role of opposi-
tional parties for inducing popular mobilization through electoral con-
tests, writing that “[s]trong party organizations are necessary to push
reluctant incumbents toward reform. … Without strong opposition,
elections in these contexts are unlikely to become competitive, and rep-
resentative links between governments and citizens will remain weak.”
Usually, incumbents will have a rough idea of the main opposition's
strength. A greater oppositional threat in a democracy could therefore
increase the necessity for incumbents to scramble for votes and provide
cost-intensive concessions to the rural population. Supporting evidence
for this argument is provided by Min (2015) who shows that
multipartism in India is associated with rural electrification increases.
Successful bids of local Bahujan Samaj Party legislators in state assembly
elections provided a mandate to further their mainly rural low-Caste
voters' demands. His electrification example illustrates Varshney's
(1998) wider explanation of India's relatively low levels of urban bias
due to strong democratic and multiparty politics from below that ad-
vanced rural empowerment.
HPol2. Greater oppositional strength should be associated with higher
rural electrification and lower rural versus urban electrification inequal-
ity in sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, effective implementation institutions have been ar-
gued to be a sine qua non for electrification in developing countries
(Cook, 2011). Policy implementation has been shown to greatly benefit
from incorporating local communities in tactical and operational leader-
ship (Bäck andHadenius, 2008; Isham et al., 1997). As democracies gen-
erally enhance accountability and citizen participation, institutional
implementation effectiveness is a second potential intervening variable
between democracy and electrification. Nanka-Bruce (2010) andOnyeji
et al. (2012) use cross-sectional socio-economic data to investigate rural
and overall electrification access in sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.
While neither study includes political regime type or electoral variables,
both find institutional effectiveness to be positively and statistically sig-
nificantly associated with electricity access. Similarly, Ahlborg et al.
(2015) find their indicator for institutional quality to be positively asso-
ciated with general average household electricity consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa. As the argument applies equally to rural and total elec-
trification, electrification inequality is unlikely to decrease by more
than what is due to the convergence to a common natural upper
bound (cf. Brown and Mobarak, 2009).
HPol3. More effective policy implementation institutions should in-
crease rural electrification, but have no significant effect on electrifica-
tion inequality.
There are a number of further interesting political variables regarding
rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. A growing number of quanti-
tative studies (Fenske, 2013; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Larcom et al.,
2016; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) suggest the importance
of pre-colonial political structures for a range of present-day economic
and institutional variables. This literature is grounded in work such as
by Herbst (2000) and Mamdani (1996) which analyses the prevalence
of traditional political institutions in rural areas in-depth. All of these
quantitative studies use data from Murdock’s (1967) “Jurisdictional Hi-
erarchy Beyond the Local Community Level” index to model pre-
colonial ethnic political centralisation and map the data onto present-
day political geography. The degree of pre-colonial centralisation has
been positively associated with recent satellite light density at night as
a proxy for economic activity (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).
As the vast majority of the economic activities proxied in this way
occur in cities due to their considerably higher emittance of light at
night, this result primarily suggests a positive association between pre-
colonial political centralisation and urban electrification.2 Yet the
strength of the spatial results warrants the inclusion of pre-colonial po-
litical centralisation in the analysis.
Herbst (2000) argues that a fundamental problem of African state-
building has been how to extend political power over vast and sparsely
settled land, an issue he asserts pre-dates colonialism and continues to
be highly salient. He separates sub-Saharan African countries by quality
of political geography. States with difficult political geographies face
greater centralisation challenges than do states with favourable geogra-
phies. This effect is controlled for in the analyses as favourable political
geographies might foster national grid extensions which benefit a
centralised approach and strong implementation institutions on the
ground. Mamdani (1996) shows how British indirect rule during
colonialization institutionalised decentralised despots in the form of
traditional local ethnic authorities, exacerbating the challenges of
centralised state consolidation. Following the above argument, such
an effect should be accounted for in the analyses.
Economic drivers of rural electrification
Providing electricity is highly capital intensive. Cost-efficient coal,
gas or nuclear power stations imply a high-cost construction and re-
quire continuous fuel supply. While oil-fired generation is practically
absent inmost developed countries, small-scale applicability and higher
availability have offset generation efficiency and sustainability concerns
in many low-income countries. However, related investment costs for
extensive electrification remain high. Matching electricity demand and
supply involves covering distances of several hundred kilometres. A
high-voltage transmission grid infrastructure is required where
decentralised systems are absent, and additional end-consumer distri-
bution equipment. Consequently, Barnes and Floor (1996, 519) write
that “no country … has ever completed rural electrification without
the financial support of its public companies and government.”
A variety of non-democratic countries have achieved broad rural
electrification. Kromm (1970) explains in detail how the Soviet Union
2 The centrality of largely state-controlled decision-making in electrification in sub-
Saharan Africa, though curiously absent in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou's (2013) ex-
planation of their findings, further strengthens such an expectation.
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placed electrification at the centre of the re-organisation of its industry
shortly after its founding. It managed to increase generation capacity by
a factor of 40 between the 1930s and 1960s, electrifying significant
portions of the population. Thailand electrified most of its rural pop-
ulation between the early 1970s and early 1990s during a spell of
multiple coups and ensuing military rule, albeit some institutional
democratisation. Its middle-income and steadily improving econom-
ic situation enabled a system of cross-subsidies from large to small
customers as well as a well-planned continuous electricity genera-
tion expansion (Barnes and Floor, 1996). Van Gevelt (2014) shows
how South Korea electrified the vast majority of its rural population
between 1965 and 1979 during the military rule of Park Chung-hee.
His government combined a top-down state-controlled approach of
large-scale investments and cross-subsidy schemes with local par-
ticipatory approaches to ensure effective implementation.
As such economically powered electrification has been achieved in a
variety of different political regimes, political analyses of electrification
typically include income variables to enable the assessment of political
system effects at constant levels of overall economic performance. Sev-
eral studies have found positive associations between both rural and
urban electrification and GDP per capita (Mandelli et al., 2014;
Ahlborg et al., 2015; Min, 2015). Brown and Mobarak (2009) find no
distributive effect of different GDP per capita levels between residential
and industrial consumers. In case of low electrification rates such as in
sub-Saharan Africa, a potential catch-up effect of higher income levels
by fostering both rural and urban electrification can be expected to be
negligible in terms of affecting electrification inequality.
HEcon1. Higher GDP per capita should increase rural electrification, but
should have no significant effect on rural versus urban electrification in-
equality in sub-Saharan Africa.
While urban electrification has been argued to have a positive GDP
per capita effect, suggesting a two-way causality, this argument is
muchmore disputed for rural electrification (Cook, 2011). Additionally,
electrifying rural areas is more capital-intense than cities due to vast
economies of scale differences, implying a much smaller business case.
Herbst (2000) points to the numerous challenges of sparsely populated
African states and explains that infrastructure investments commonly
require sufficient domestic savings. As noted above, 81% of power sector
infrastructure spend in sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2006
came from domestic sources (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010).
Quantitative research suggests a positive relationship between domes-
tic savings and domestic investment in general in sub-Saharan Africa
(Ndikumana, 2000). Onyeji et al. (2012) show that this association
holds true for electricity access particularly and that national savings
are the dominant financial resource for national infrastructure projects.
This is especially true for infrastructure projects with small and insecure
investment returns. The savings requirement is thus expected to be sa-
lient for rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa and particularly sa-
lient for decreasing electrification inequality.
HEcon2. Higher domestic savings should be associated with higher rural
electrification and lower rural versus urban electrification inequality in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Official development assistance accounts for only 6% of sub-Saharan
African infrastructure spend (Foster andBriceño-Garmendia, 2010). The
effects of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa have been passionately de-
bated with conflicting results (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly
et al., 2003). While the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the
1980s and 1990s saw conditional aid as a central tool for development,
recent research has been considerably more critical (e.g. Moyo, 2009;
Stein, 2008). Neoliberal SAPs are criticised for favouring the urban pop-
ulation and assuming that the rural poor would automatically gain
through trickle-down effects. Recent poverty reduction orientation of
foreign aid is marred by slow progress and a lack of structural change
(Stein, 2008). Quantitative research shows nopositive effect of repeated
adjustment loans on economic growth or favourable policy change
(Easterly, 2005). Chang (2002) in his book “Kicking Away the Ladder”
argues that in the last 500 years, significant state interventions have
been necessary for now-developed countries to catch up with more ad-
vanced economies at the time by developing their infant industries. Yet
the conditions imposed by international donor agencies through SAPs in
Africa have called for a significant reduction of state influence. Thus,
these conditional aid programmes have been making previously suc-
cessful rural electrification programmes in developing countries such
as subsidy-oriented state-interventionist policies in Thailand or South
Korea considerably more difficult.
Moreover, Knack (2001) and others have pointed out that states
obtaining substantial shares of their revenue from international donors
are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure tomaintain
popular legitimacy. This mechanism directly opposes the effect of de-
mocracy on rural electrification argued above. Stasavage (2005) finds
a statistically and substantially significant negative association between
aid and primary education spending in sub-Saharan Africa. He similarly
argues that aid enables governments to cultivate support through other
channels than spending on education, reducing incentives for educa-
tional spending for this purpose ceteris paribus.
HEcon3. Higher aid levels should have an adverse effect on rural electri-
fication and might increase rural versus urban electrification inequality
in sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper controls for a number of additional economic variables.
Following Brown and Mobarak (2009), agriculture as percentage of
GDP as a potential driver of rural electrification is introduced in several
econometric models. A higher relative income contribution of agricul-
ture could imply additional incentives to electrify the rural population
to increase productivity while low agricultural GDP contributions may
lessen such incentives in favour of an often urbanised industry, ceteris
paribus (Kirubi et al., 2009). A primary energy resources variable cap-
tures different availabilities of raw materials for electricity production,
namely coal, oil, natural gas anduranium. If such rawmaterials are pres-
ent in a given country, electricity generation is arguably eased. As these
rawmaterials can be either used domestically or sold to generate natu-
ral resource rents, they furthermore constitute an interesting trade-off
for national electrification planners.Min (2015) includes such a variable
to control for the incentive to divert state resources towards resource
extraction and the diminishing accountability of governments towards
their population when natural resource rents are available. This indi-
cates the potential presence of two contrary effects of natural resources.
Industry as percentage of GDP is controlled for as higher values might
suggest a focus on urban over rural electrification due to the mostly
urban location of industry (see Brown and Mobarak, 2009). GDP per
capita growth is further used to control for temporal fluctuations of in-
comewhich could have an effect of short-term funding availabilities for
infrastructure projects.
Demographic drivers of rural electrification
In any given country, the more people live in rural areas, the more
people need access to electricity to reach the same rural electrification
rate. Thus, higher rural population percentages impede increases of
the national rural electrification rate. (Mandelli et al., 2014; Min,
2015; Nanka-Bruce, 2010; Onyeji et al., 2012). Similarly, low population
densities are a considerable barrier for expanding infrastructure in sub-
Saharan Africa. Marginal costs of penetrating large sparsely populated
areas are usually significantly higher than in urban areas, and state-
sponsored infrastructure projects are more difficult to implement
when the state apparatus is not well represented in certain areas
(Herbst, 2000). Several studies confirm a positive association between
population density and electrification in developing countries
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(Mandelli et al., 2014; Min, 2015; Onyeji et al., 2012). Both of these de-
mographic factors can be expected to be particularly salient when rural
and urban electrification are compared.
HDemo1. A lower percentage of rural population should increase rural
electrification and decrease rural versus urban electrification inequality
in sub-Saharan Africa.
HDemo2. Higher population density should increase rural electrification
and decrease rural versus urban electrification inequality in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Including both rural population share and population density in the
same econometric model may further function as a proxy to control for
Herbst's (2000) theory of favourable political geographies. His maps of
African countries discuss the degree of dispersion of the population
over the land to be governed by the state. Including both of these geo-
graphic variables enables an interpretation of the population density co-
efficient while holding the rural population share constant, which
together may function as a measure of dispersion. Herbst's (2000) the-
ory thus further supportsHDemo2when amodel also includes the rural
population share as an explanatory variable.
As constructing electricity infrastructure takes several years, govern-
ment decisions of future public service allocationsmay be influenced by
urbanisation. A growing urbanpopulation shifts themedian voter closer
to urban areas, therebypotentially shifting political attention in the con-
text of contested elections. Hence, a control variable measuring urban
population growth is added to the econometric models. Furthermore,
a population variable is controlled for to account for absolute scale
effects.
Data and descriptive statistics
Dependent variables
Two different dependent variables are used in this paper. First, Rural
electrificationmeasures the fraction of the rural population with access
to electricity, indicating a tangible rather than budgetary public good
provision. Second, Rural/urban electrification as a ratio of rural versus
urban electricity access describes electrification inequality. As no coun-
try in the sample has higher rural than urban electrification, this vari-
able ranges from 0% to 100% equality. The World Bank reports rural
and urban electrification rates most comprehensively (World Bank,
2015). Owed to its slow-movingnature, electrification data are available
once a decade for 1990, 2000 and 2010 for all 48 sub-Saharan African
countries. It coherently follows the above definition of electrification,
uses threemain data sources and applies an econometric modelling ap-
proach to smoothen any potentially remaining compatibility issues.
More than half of the data points are taken from standardized large-
scale surveys from the USAIDDemographic andHealth Survey Program,
each sampling 5000–10,000 households. A further third of the data
points are based on World Bank estimates backed by internal surveys
and triangulation methods. National censuses provide the remaining
data. Some surveys were not conducted in the reference year at the be-
ginning of a decade, a negligible effect given electrification's slow and
generally monotonous increase.
Some scholars have questioned the accuracy of electrification data
(e.g. Kroth et al., 2014). While infrastructure data from developing
countries should generally be handled with care, two independent
sources appear to back World Bank data. First, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) publishes rural and urban electrification rates in sub-
Saharan Africa and 22 of its countries since 2009. Data points are gath-
ered from industry, official government bodies and various surveys. For
2010, the IEA reports an overall electrification of 12.9%, similar to the
World Bank figure of 14.1% (International Energy Agency, 2012). A
country-by-country comparison reveals an overall deviation of 0.8 per-
centage points. Second, independent researchers and official government
publications confirm several data points. Some of these accounts are used
in the Case example analyses section. Recent literature has started to
match night time satellite images with geocoded population data to
proxy village electrification (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013;
Min, 2015). While this method carries several merits, Min points out ac-
curacy issues with electrification rates from satellite images deviating by
up to 50% diversions from Indian census data. Especially in terms of rural
electrification, he discusses problems regarding limited sensitivity of sat-
ellite sensors, measurement errors in rural areas close to big cities, bias
due to measurement of non-electricity induced light sources, limited
temporal data availability and the difficulties to infer specific household
as opposed to merely streetlight presence. This paper therefore uses
World Bank electrification data throughout.
Independent variables
Democracy models the degree of democracy in a specific country
using the standard 21-point Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers,
2014). One robustness test exchanges Polity IV for the 7-point Freedom
House Political Rights scale (Puddington, 2013). To test hypothesis
HPol2, Opposition denotes the fraction of votes the leading oppositional
party or challenger of the incumbent received in national elections. It
uses results from presidential elections in presidential, and parliamen-
tary elections in parliamentary government systems.3 Rather than di-
chotomously denoting if an election featured more than one
candidate (cf. Stasavage, 2005), Opposition indicates to what degree
the presence of electoral competition actually mattered. It quantifies
the credibility of the threat for incumbents to lose power, thereby
linking democracy to the need for incumbents to provide public services
to voters. Data were taken from Lindberg (2009), updated until 2010
through National Election Agency (NEA) data where applicable. For
those models that explicitly study the intervening effect of Opposition
on Democracy, data points are missing when either no elections oc-
curred during a specific decade or the opposition was banned from par-
ticipating. However, as most sub-Saharan African countries have held
elections between 1990 and 2010, 43 countries are still included in
the analyses. Where elections have been argued to be fraudulent, this
conceptualisation implicitly assumes that the threat to lose power is
lower where governments successfully manipulated the vote such
that the opposition received lower shares. To testHPol3, Government ef-
fectivenessmeasures how effective government policies are implement-
ed. The World Bank publishes such a measure in its annual World
Governance Indicators. Its continuous scale between−2.5 and 2.5 cap-
tures perceptions of the quality of public services and explicitly focuses
on policy implementation.
In terms of the political control variables, Centralisation models the
degree of pre-colonial political centralisation. The variable ranges be-
tween 0 (completely decentralised) and 1 (completely centralised)
and is taken from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). The data for Political ge-
ography is taken from Herbst (2000) and is modelled as an ordinal var-
iable with three of Herbst's categories (favourable, neutral, difficult),
excluding the four “Hinterland Countries” Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger. Small island states that Herbst does not include in his analysis
fit his description of favourable geography best (they are small and
have the largest concentration of people in and close to the capital)
and are thus included in the favourable category. Ziltener and Künzler
(2013) provide data for a binary Indirect rule variable to denotewhether
a country was subject to indirect rule.
Further economic and demographic variables included in themodels
are available from either the World Bank's World Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2015) or the IEA. To avoidmulticollinearity risks with
3 Lindberg's (2009) data set shows that of the 45 countries with available data, 39 are
governed by a presidential system, 5 by a parliamentary system, and 1 country has
switched between the two between 1990 and 2010.
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the rural population percentage variable, Urbanisation is modelled as
absolute urban population growth. Fuel per capita is measured in an-
nual gigatons of oil equivalent (Gtoe) and comprises domestic oil,
coal, natural gas and uranium mining. Fuel per capita as well as GDP
per capita are modelled as absolute values as the overall model fit
was found to be slightly better compared to log-transformations. In-
terpretation is also more straight-forward for non-transformed var-
iables. Log-transforming Population did slightly improve the model
fit, in addition to decreasing the number of orders of magnitudes
present in the model, which is why this variable is transformed in
the analyses. Whether or not log-transformations were used had
no significant effect on the main explanatory variables. Shapiro–
Wilk tests indicated that such log-transformations did not markedly
improve the normality of the variables. As dependent variable data
are available for 1990, 2000 and 2010, all independent and control
variables are calculated averages for three equally long time periods
from 1981–1990, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010. This yields an average
lag of 5 years for all independent variables, a suitable timeframe for
changes in independent variables to materialise as infrastructural
deltas. For each variable, years with missing data are omitted from
calculating decade averages. Table 1 summarises the descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables.
Fig. 2 illustrates indexed variations of key variables between 1981
and 2010. Rural electrification has almost doubled in sub-Saharan
Africa between 1990 and 2010, however starting from a low base of
7.7%. It grew slightly stronger than urban electrification, with higher
growth in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP per
capita declined in the 1980s and early 1990s amidst kick-started
Structural Adjustment Programme interventions. This development
has reversed towards the end of the decade, with a recent stronger
growth period in the 2000s. The switch to multiparty elections in al-
most all sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s caused de-
mocracy scores to rise rapidly. Additional yet reduced growth
occurred during the region's on-going democratisation process. The
rural population percentage constantly declined from 77.4% in
1981 to 64.8% in 2010. While they do not establish causality, these
overall patterns are broadly consistent with hypotheses HPol1,
HEcon1, and HDemo1.
Table 1
Summary statistics and data sources.




World Bank (WDI) 144 12.30 17.83 .10–.100
Rural/urban
electrification
World Bank (WDI) 144 21.61 25.84 .13–100
Politics
Democracy Polity IVa 135 −1.26 5.75 −10–10
Opposition Lindberg (2009),
NEA
90 22.43 11.07 0–47.41
Gov't
effectiveness
World Bank (WGI) 96 − .75 .62 −2.18–.72
Centralisation Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007)
126 53.73 31.85 0–100
Political
geography
Herbst (2000) 123 1.66 .85 1–3
Indirect rule Ziltener and
Künzler (2013)




World Bank (WDI) 140 1.061 1.73 .117–11.44
Aid (% GNI) World Bank (WDI) 137 13.36 11.56 .31–72.80
Fuel per capita
(Gtoe)
IEA 141 .75 3.03 0–28.40
Agriculture
(% GDP)
World Bank (WDI) 134 28.61 16.15 2.70–69.36
Savings (% GDP) World Bank (WDI) 126 13.75 11.91 −26.58–61.84
GDP p.c. growth World Bank (WDI) 138 1.16 3.98 −10.31–31.94




World Bank (WDI) 144 64.58 15.91 14.30–94.58
Population
density
World Bank (WDI) 144 76.47 108.14 1.71–631.00
Urbanisation
(% growth)
World Bank (WDI) 144 4.34 1.91 .26–13.40
Population (log) World Bank (WDI) 144 15.49 1.58 11.16–18.89
Notes: The summary statistics above refer to the models presented in all tables except
Table 3. Please refer to Table 7 in the Appendix A for summary statistics of themodels pre-
sented in Table 3.
All variables other than the dependents have been calculated as a 10-year average for each
country between the three time periods (i.e. 1981–1990, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010).
Missing values for particular years were omitted from decade averages.
a One robustness test uses Freedom House scores instead of Polity IV scores.
Fig. 2. Rural electrification, Rural/urban electrification, Democracy, GDP per capita and Rural Population against Time in sub-Saharan Africa a Reference year for Democracy, GDP per capita
and Rural population is 1981, reference year values are−5.05, 694 (2013 USD), and 77.4%, respectively. Reference year for Rural electrification and Rural/urban electrification is 1990, ref-
erence year values are 7.7% and 13.5%, respectively. All variables have been normalised to 100 for their respective reference years. b TheDemocracy variable ismodelled using the Polity IV
scale from −10 to 10. An increase on the scale denotes an improvement in the level of democracy. The scale has been linearly transformed to 0–1 in the above figure to allow an index
calculation. Therefore the reference value for 1981 is 0.2475, i.e. (−5.05 + 10)/20.
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Econometric analyses
Modelling approach
This paper estimates a series of panel data and pooled OLS models,
first using Rural electrification as the dependent variable, and later
switching toRural/urban electrification. Not surprisingly, the data exhibit
country-level autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, a Glejser's Test
following Machado and Silva (2000) is significant beyond 99.9%. All
models therefore estimate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors.
Models (1)–(5) present the main fixed-effects panel data models
with country-clustered standard errors, utilising 135 observations
from 46 sub-Saharan African countries. The country-decade data format
renders the panel noticeably short. Model (1) analyses the main hy-
potheses, including Democracy, GDP per capita and Rural population as
explanatory variables. Models (2)–(5) successively add several eco-
nomic (Aid, Fuel per capita and Agriculture) as well as demographic
(Population density, Urbanisation and Population) explanatory and con-
trol variables to demonstrate rigidity. A Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
test reveals that Population density and Population are highly
multicollinear with the country fixed-effects.4 Both sub-Saharan
African population, and with it, population densities, have slowly and
monotonously increased by at most a factor of 2 over the last 30 years,
yet lie within a range of several orders of magnitude across countries.
Therefore, they map relatively distinctively onto the country fixed-
effects, causing the high degree of multicollinearity. Models
(1)–(4) thus omit Population density and Population to allow direct in-
ference of all variables, while model (5) analyses the robustness of the
results in the presence of these two variables. In order to maximize
the number of usable observations, the intervening political variables
Opposition and Government effectiveness, as well as Savings are only in-
cluded in later models. In addition to the fixed-effects, decade dummy
variables for unobserved temporal effects were tested. While the De-
mocracy variable remained statistically significant, the temporal
dummy variables were neither independently nor jointly significant
andwere thus excluded.5 This result is not surprising as the dependents
havemonotonically increased (i.e. stayed constant or strictly increased)
for any 10-year time period in the sample, thus deemingmarginal tem-
poral effects close to constant and non-deterministic.
Asmodels (1)–(5) includefixed-effects to allowwithin-country var-
iation analyses, they account for all time-invariant country-level effects
by definition. This also includes the pre-colonial and colonial political
variables Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect Rule as they are
constant between the scope of the study, i.e. sub-Saharan Africa's
democratisation process between 1990 and 2010. In order to explicitly
estimate the association between rural electrification and the pre-
colonial and colonial political institutions, model (6) uses a Hausman–
Taylor estimator with country clustered standard errors (Hausman
and Taylor, 1981). Thismethod employs a randomeffect transformation
while using time-variant variables exogenous to the fixed effects as
instrumental variables to remove the correlation of endogenous time-
variant and time-invariant variables with the fixed effects. A Sargan–
Hansen test confirms the validity of using Rural Population and
Democracy as time-variant instrument variables to help to consistently
estimate Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect rule.
To strengthen the results of the econometric analysis, the panel
data models (7)–(12) repeat models (1)–(6) assuming piecewise
interpolability of the dependent variable, thereby increasing the amount
of usable observations to 468. As is common for infrastructure capacity
with several decade-long lifespans in developing countries (see for in-
stance Herbst (2000) with respect to road networks), rural electrifica-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa has monotonically increased for any country
in any 10-year period with available data as mentioned above. Large
spikes in short timeframes are generally absent in such data as
expanding the national grid infrastructure in vast territories is a gradual
process. This supports the assumption that the dependent can be piece-
wise interpolated between two dates that are reasonably close to each
other. For above reasons, the World Bank similarly makes such an as-
sumption in its rural electrification data (World Bank, 2015). If piecewise
interpolating in 2-year steps, four sets of observations each can be added
between 1990 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2010 based on existing
data. All independent and control variables are then calculated as a 2-
year average preceding the Rural electrification observation, thereby
shortening but maintaining their lag. The summary statistics for these
models are available in Appendix A. Different methods of interpolation,
i.e. piecewise linear, exponential and polynomial, as well as different
lengths of interpolated time periodswere tested. They have had no note-
worthy effect on statistical significance levels in any model. Models
(7)–(12) employ piecewise linear interpolation, robustness tests (25)
and (26) change to a 3-year step interpolation and compare linear to ex-
ponential interpolation of the form y = axb.
Models (13a)–(15b) and (16a)–(18b) use Rural electrification and
Rural/urban electrification as dependent variables, respectively. They
subsequently introduce the two intervening institutional political vari-
ables Opposition and Government effectiveness to compare models with
these intervening variables to base models that use the same observa-
tion set but includeDemocracy as sole political variable. A decreasedDe-
mocracy coefficient coupled with respective statistical significance
levels would suggest that parts of the Democracy association with the
dependents may be explained by Opposition and Government effective-
ness. Data availability is comparably scarce, the number of usable obser-
vations drops to 66 from 41 sub-Saharan African countries when all
relevant variables are included. Models (15a) and (15b), as well as
(18a) and (18b) re-run the previous models and exclude all insignifi-
cant variables. As several countries contribute only one observation, es-
timating country dummy fixed effects is not feasible, in addition to
likely biasing standard errors due to high numbers of estimated
coefficients.6 Models (13a)–(18b) cluster standard errors by countries
to account for country-level dependencies, Population density and Popu-
lation are now included in the models. Robustness test (22) repeats
model (4) to test the effect of running a pooled OLS model instead of
fixed-effects and adding Population density and Population.
The robustness test section furthermore examines different model-
ling and error term assumptions.Model (19) uses a Prais–WinstenGen-
eralized Least Squares (GLS) regression. This method adjusts for serial
correlation without losing the first observation in order to fully utilize
the short panel data. Model (20) deploys the Generalized Estimating
Equation (GEE) approach, which in contrast to models (1)–(3) is
based on quasilikelihood theory that assumes no particular response
observations distribution. A random-effects formulation, although of
secondary interest given the focus on within-country changes in this
study, is provided inmodel (21). The robustness test section further ad-
dresses potential issues of multicollinearity, endogeneity, measurement
errors, data source dependence, cross-sectional correlation as well as
different interpolation assumptions to support the resilience of the re-
sults. While quantitative research on electrification in sub-Saharan
Africa with small sample sizes has produced valuable insights before
4 In the presence of country dummy variables, the VIFs for both variables are above 50.
Hair et al. (2010) suggest that VIFs above 10 indicate severe multicollinearity risks.
5 Stasavage (2005) finds the same insignificance of year effects in his models on public
serviceprovision in sub-SaharanAfrica during a similar time frameand also excludes them
from all his models.
6 Estimates of error terms robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation commonly
need at least twice as many observations as variables (Varmuza and Filzmoser, 2009).
High observation-to-variable ratios are generally preferable, with recommended mini-
mum ratios starting around 2:1 and often higher (Arrindell and Van der Ende, 1985).
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(Onyeji et al., 2012), it should be noted that small numbers of observa-
tions raise the risk of producing erroneous econometric results. There-
fore, in addition to the various strategies in the econometric
modelling to circumvent this problem discussed above, this paper
complements the econometric analyses with in-depth qualitative ro-
bustness tests. It presents evidence from five country case-examples,
three of which are presented in the main text, two further ones in
Appendices B–C. These case studies further support the paper's overall
arguments.
Econometric model results
Estimates for rural electrification
Table 2 presents the main panel data model results (1)–(6), Table
3 re-runs these models under the interpolability assumption
(7)–(12). The statistical significance levels do not change markedly
between the two approaches, if anything they become slightly stron-
ger in models (7)–(12) as a greater portion of variability can be
absorbed by the explanatory variables. All explanatory variable
coefficients have the expected sign, Democracy, GDP per capita and
Rural population are the only statistically significant variables
throughout models (1)–(12).
Democracy is strongly positively associated with rural electrification
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is its strongest predictor together with rural
population percentages. This result supports the first half of HPol1.
Holding all other variables constant, a one standard-deviation of the
Democracy variable, i.e. 5.75 points or roughly a 25 percentage points
jump on the−10–10 Polity IV scale, would increase rural electrification
of a country at median electrification level by 31%, despite the
constraining presence of an upper and a lower bound on theDemocracy
value. The median country-year rural electrification in the data is
Djibouti in 2000 with 5.5% rural electrification, thus such a Democracy
score increase in the country is associated with an increase to 7.2%
rural electrification, ceteris paribus.7 The result is statistically and sub-
stantially robust to the inclusion of different political, economic and de-
mographic control variables as well as when interpolability of the
dependent is assumed. The Centralisation variable coefficient, denoting
the degree of pre-colonial political centralisation, is positive in both
models (6) and (12), and slightly statistically significant in the latter.
This finding is consistent with the results presented by Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013).8 The other two political control variables
have the expected sign, yet are not found to be statistically significant.
GDP per capita, a measure often used to proxy infrastructural
development, is similarly positively associated with higher rural
electrification, supporting the first part of HEcon1. It exhibits slightly
Table 2
Panel data models (dependent variable: rural electrification).
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N 135 133 125 125 125 115
R2 .489 .492 .506 .518 .520 .539
Number of countries 46 46 44 44 44 39
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Models (1) – (5) are fixed-effectsmodels with country-clustered standard errors to explorewithin-country variation. As the pre-colonial and colonial political variables Centralisation,
Political geography and Indirect Rule are time-invariant for the examined time period, like all other constant country effects they are accounted for in the fixed-effects models.
b Population density and Population are highly multicollinear with country fixed effects. Model (4) is only included to demonstrate robustness with further demographic controls. It
should not be used for inference for Population density and Population.
c To consistently estimate time-invariant variables in the panel data, model (6) uses an Hausman–Taylor estimator with country-clustered standard errors. Rural population and De-
mocracy function as instrumental variables, a Sargan–Hansen test clearly confirms the validity of the related exogeneity assumptions.
d Political geography is an ordinal variable with “difficult political geographies” (Herbst, 2000) as reference category.
7 In fact, Djiboutimanaged to increase its rural electrification from5.5% in 2000 to 10.2%
in 2010 while its average Polity IV score increased by 8 points.
8 The comparably lower statistical significance levels could be expected as most of their
results are based on the few, predominantly urban areas that appear lit in their data.
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weaker statistical evidence than for Democracy. A one standard devi-
ation GDP per capita change would increase the median rural electri-
fication by 53%. Djibouti in 2000 is thus estimated to increase its rural
electrification from 5.5% to 7.8% if the per capita GDP were $1730
higher. The other economic independent and control variables
examined in the panel data models are not consistently statistically
significant.
SupportingHDemo1, Rural population is strongly negatively associat-
ed with rural electrification, suggesting its relative impeding effect for
reaching a given rural electrification level. While models (5) and (11)
should not be used for inference for the Population density variable
due to the severe multicollinearity with the country fixed-effects
discussed in the Modelling approach section, the models do find weak
evidence that Urbanisation is associated with lower rural electrification.
Only models (10) and (11) attribute statistical significance to the
coefficient.
Table 4 shows models (13a)–(15b) to analyse the two intervening
variables of oppositional strength and government effectiveness as
well as additional economic controls. Model (13a) introduces Oppo-
sition, model (14a) adds Government effectiveness. Both variables de-
crease the number of usable observations considerably. Once the
sparse intervening political variables are included, Savings does not
greatly affect the number of usable observations. All explanatory
variables have the expected sign. Democracy, GDP per capita and
Rural electrification are again statistically significant throughout. As
the available data points in models (13a)–(15b) are strongly clus-
tered in the most recent 2001–2010 time period where rural electri-
fication has generally been higher than in the 1980s and 1990s, the
absolute value of all three coefficients increases compared to the earlier
panel data models.
The significance of Democracy is stronger in the base models (13b),
(14b) and (15b) compared to when the intervening variables are
added tomodels (13a), (14a) and (15a), however the variable stays sig-
nificant throughout evenwhen both intervening variables are included.
Opposition and Government effectiveness are both statistically significant
in these models, the latter slightly stronger than the former. Democracy
is the only significant variable where their introduction markedly af-
fects the coefficient. TheOpposition variable alone lowers theDemocracy
coefficient by 16.7%, when Opposition and Government effectiveness are
added it decreases by 22.4%, suggesting that both oppositional strength
and effective implementation institutions may explains parts of
democracy's positive association with rural electrification. This effect
Table 3
Panel data models assuming piecewise interpolability of the dependent (dependent variable: rural electrification).












































































N 468 463 439 439 439 399
R2 .454 .454 .478 .487 .503 .465
Number of countries 46 46 44 44 44 39
The above models assume that the dependent variable, Rural electrification, can be interpolated in 2-year steps based on observations from 1990, 2000 and 2010. This assumption stems
from themonotonically increasing nature of rural electrification and the predominate absence of large spikes in short timeframes common to such infrastructure measures. This assump-
tion is also used by the World Bank. All independent and control variables are now calculated as a 2-year average preceding the Rural electrification observation, thereby shortening but
maintaining their lag. Different methods of interpolation have had no noteworthy effect on statistical significance levels in any model (see robustness tests). The above models employ
piecewise linear interpolation, adding four sets of observations between 1990 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2010, respectively. Please refer to Table 7 in Appendix A for summary
statistics.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Models (7)–(11) are fixed-effects models to explorewithin-country variation. As the pre-colonial and colonial political variables Centralisation, Political geography and Indirect Rule are
time-invariant for the examined time period, like all other constant country effects they are accounted for in the fixed-effects models.
b Population density and Population are highlymulticollinear with the countryfixed effects.Model (11) is only included to demonstrate robustnesswith further demographic controls. It
should not be used for inference for Population density and Population.
c To consistently estimate time-invariant variables in the panel data, model (12) uses an Hausman–Taylor estimator with country-clustered standard errors. Rural population and De-
mocracy function as instrumental variables, a Sargan–Hansen test clearly confirms the validity of the related exogeneity assumptions.
d Political geography is an ordinal variable with “difficult political geographies” (Herbst, 2000) as reference category.
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is even stronger when all insignificant variables are dropped and the
models are re-run with and without the two intervening variables. In
model (15a), the presence of Opposition and Government effectiveness
lower the Democracy coefficient by 28.6%. These results support the
first parts of HPol2 and HPol3, and furthermore suggest that due to the
continued significance of Democracy there are additional, unobserved
intervening mechanisms that positively associate democracy with
rural electrification.
In terms of economic variables, models (13a) and (13b) find that
apart from unchanged GDP per capita results, Aid and Fuel per capita
are statistically significantly andnegatively associatedwith rural electri-
fication. This confirms the negative signs for the Aid variable coefficient
present inmodels (2)–(5) and (8)–(11). The strength of this association
decreases inmodels (14a) and (14b)where the number of observations
is further reduced, however is salient again in models (15a) and (15b).
Together, this provides positive, yet somewhat weak evidence for the
first half ofHEcon3. The similarity of Dutch disease effects of aid and nat-
ural resources on sub-Saharan African economies finds resemblance in
their respective negative association with rural electrification. All
other things being equal, the presence of such rents, which are subject
to limited public scrutiny, enable governments to attract support differ-
ently than by making rural infrastructure concessions, thereby decreas-
ing incentives to do so. As explained above, the conditionality of aid
might additionally hinder successful electrification policies that have
worked in other regions.
Both demographic independent variables Rural population and Pop-
ulation density are highly statistically and substantially significant, con-
stituting further evidence for the first parts of HDemo1 and HDemo2.
Doubling the population density from its mean of 76 people per square
kilometre to 152 more than doubles the median country's rural
electrification, ceteris paribus. In this sample, the median country-year
is Madagascar in 2000 with 6.6% rural electrification. Increasing its
population density by 76 people per square kilometre is associated with
a rural electrification rate of 13.4% instead of 6.6%. Urbanisation again is
weakly negatively associated with rural electrification, while marginal
scale effects of larger populations are also confirmed. As the data set
becomes more skewed towards the most recent 2001–2010 period,
overall and urban scale effects are more salient due to their exponential
nature.
Estimates for rural versus urban electrification inequality
Models (16a)–(18b) in Table 5 use Rural/urban electrification as their
dependent variable. Values closer to 100% indicate higher equality of
electrification. The models use the same political, economic and demo-
graphic independent and control variables as above.
The Democracy variable is highly statistically and substantially sig-
nificant in all models, again its statistical significance level decreases
only slightly when the intervening variables are added. A one-
standard Democracy deviation is estimated to increase the rural versus
urban electrification ratio of the median country by 70%. In the sample,
Benin in 2000 has themedium rural versus urban electrification ratio of
11%. Thus, a jump of 5.75 on the Polity IV Democracy scale is associated
with a rural versus urban electrification rate of 18.7%. Similarly to
models (13a)–(15b), its coefficient decreases when the intervening po-
litical variables are introduced. The addition of the Opposition again af-
fects the Democracy coefficient most of all significant variables,
decreasing it by 14.1%. There is little additional effect of introducing
Government effectiveness, the Democracy coefficient is 16.9% smaller in
(16a) compared to its base model (16b). While the Opposition variable
is strongly significant in statistic and substantive terms, Government
Table 4
Pooled-OLS analyses of intervening and additional economic control variables (dependent variable: rural electrification).


































































































































N 73 73 66 66 78 78
R2 .837 .826 .881 .863 .814 .786
Number of countries 41 41 40 40 43 43
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
120 P.A. Trotter / Energy for Sustainable Development 34 (2016) 111–129
effectiveness is not statistically significant and decreases substantively
compared to the Rural electrification models. This supports that strong
oppositions in democracies could pressure governments to shift their
public service focus toward the rural majority electorate, while imple-
mentation effectiveness could influence both rural and urban service
provision positively with limited effects on inequality. These findings
are consistent with the second parts of HPol1–HPol3, and similarly to
the results from models (13a)–(15b) suggest that additional unob-
served intervening mechanisms between democracy and decreased
electrification inequality exist.
Concurring with HEcon1, GDP per capita is no longer statistically sig-
nificantly associated with rural electrification when the dependent
changes to Rural/urban electrification, suggesting that high income levels
may favour both rural and urban electrification rather than rural areas
specifically. Two other economic variables are statistically significant
throughout models (16a)–(18b). First, Savings is strongly associated
with lower electrification inequality, providing evidence for the second
part ofHEcon2. A one-standard deviation increase in national savings as
a GDP percentage is associated with increasing the rural versus urban
electrification ratio of the median level country-year, Benin in 2000,
from 11% to 18.3%. As 81% of funding for the power infrastructure in
sub-Saharan Africa comes from domestic governments (Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010), higher savings can be expected to benefit
rural versus urban electrification as they make rural electrification
more feasible, ceteris paribus. Second, in contrast to national savings,
Aid again is negatively associated with the dependent, as hypothesised
in HEcon3, at slightly higher significance levels compared to the rural
electrification models. As argued in the Economic drivers of rural
electrification section, direct aid payments in the form of official develop-
ment assistance, while only constituting 6% of the financial resources for
the power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa, have imposed heavy
and at times counterproductive policy conditions on sub-Saharan
African countries. Liberalisation as a guiding principle closes down
options known to have helped countries like Thailand or South Korea to
successfully electrify their rural citizens. Additionally, aid payments may
relatively decrease government requirements to win elections through
physical rural infrastructure provision with limited economic return.
Rural population and Population density are highly statistically signif-
icant, supporting the latter parts of HDemo1 and HDemo2, respectively.
Their significance indicates the importance of demographic disadvan-
tages and barriers of rural residents for development. Control variables
Urbanisation and Population are insignificant in all models.
Model robustness
There are multiple robustness concerns of the presented results that
deserve attention. This section subsequently addresses potential issues
regarding multicollinearity, cross-sectional dependence, endogeneity,
adequacy of model choice, data source dependence, and the presence
of short panel data.
All econometric models have been tested for variable
multicollinearity. After accounting for the multicollinearity issue be-
tween country fixed-effects and both Population density and Population,
the maximum VIF in any model was 5.5, all others were below 4, the av-
erage is 2.0. All of these values are considerably below the common criti-
cal value of 10 which would indicate multicollinearity risks. The
individual VIFs for the three political variables in all models are below 3.
The degree of cross-sectional dependence was analysed using a
Pesaran test to ensure independence of observations between countries.
It was found to be highly insignificant for the panel data models in
Table 5
Pooled OLS analyses of electrification inequality (dependent variable: rural versus urban electrification).
































































































































N 73 73 66 66 73 73
R2 .792 .777 .829 .807 .727 .714
Number of countries 41 41 40 40 41 41
Country-clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models in-
clude unreported constants.
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Table 2, and slightly less insignificant for the interpolated models in
Table 3. To ensure that the estimation is consistent even when cross-
sectional correlation should be present, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
were used for the interpolated models which in addition to being
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent also are cross-
sectional correlation consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). The general
insignificance of the Pesaran test confirms the presumption that rural
electrification variations in the last 20 years are mainly driven by
country-internal rather than external factors. Regional dependencies
appear to be small. The dependent variable varies considerably between
many neighbouring countries across sub-Saharan Africa. This also sup-
ports the idea that country-specific policies have considerable impact
on electrification.
Furthermore, both a statistical and a substantive argument render
the risk of endogeneity small in this study. First, all independent vari-
ables have been lagged by an average of 5 years to represent past decade
averages. For the interpolated models, while the lag reduces, it still is
positive. Unbounded variables that are modelled by past data are im-
probable to be caused by future occurrences. Second, rural electrifica-
tion and electrification inequality arguably have limited impact on
past assessments of the degree of democracy in a country, strengths of
the opposition,9 and continuous demographic developments. While
rural electrification may introduce new opportunities of income gener-
ation, its measureable GDP contribution has been argued to be minor
(Cook, 2011).
Robustness tests (19), (20) and (21) in Table 6 re-estimate panel
datamodel (4) using differentmodelling approaches. The results are ro-
bust to a fixed-effects GLS approach as well as to a fixed-effects GEE
approach. A random-effects formulation similarly does not affect the re-
sults markedly. The OLS-basedmodels (13a)–(18b) have omitted coun-
try dummy variables. Robustness test (22) investigates the adequacy of
choosing pooled OLS models for the analysis. It omits fixed-effects,
allowing for the inclusion of Population density and Population, and esti-
mates country-clustered standard errors. All statistically significant var-
iables from the panel data models remain significant in model (22).
Remarkably, its R2 does not greatly decrease when 43 country dummy
variables are excluded, remaining at 78% without dummy variables.
The high R2-value is thus achieved by modelling 125 observations
with 9 instead of 52 variables. This indicates the relevance of the cho-
sen political, economic and demographic variables for explaining the
variations of rural electrification in sub-Saharan African countries.
Consistent with HDemo2, Population density becomes highly signifi-
cant in this and all other OLS specifications. Furthermore, several
coefficients increase in model (22) compared to the panel data
models. Brown andMobarak (2009) find a similar effect in their elec-
tricity distribution study between FE and OLS models. This suggests
that unobserved country effects account for some part of rural
electrification.
To ensure that the positive association of democracy on rural electri-
fication is not subject to measurement errors, model (23) changes the
Democracy variable data source from Polity IV to FreedomHouse's Polit-
ical Rights score. It uses the same data set as model (22) to maximize
observations and ease comparability.Democracy remains highly statisti-
cally and substantially significant. Its negative coefficient is due to de-
mocracies receiving lower scores on the Freedom House scale.
Notably, GDP per capita loses its significance and decreases in value in
this specification. One possible explanation for this effect is that GDP
per capita is stronger correlated to Freedom House than Polity IV scores
in the data set, indicating that higher GDP per capita appear to induce
lower Freedom House scores. A one standard deviation decrease on
the Freedom House scale increases rural electrification by almost 5 per-
centage points.
9 If there were any such association, it would likely be negative as voters choose oppo-
sitional parties because they anticipate that they will not be electrified in the future under
the current government.
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Fuel per capita (− .21) (− .20) (− .31) (−2.95) (.51) (1.43) (3.16)



















































N 125 123 125 125 129 285 285
R2 .983 .744 .780 .697 .486 .482
Number of countries 44 41 44 44 46 44 44
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent z-/t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include unreported
constants.
a Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent AR1 error term structure. Models include unreported country fixed effects.
b Random effects model.
c Democracy variable modelled using Freedom House data (lower scores indicate more democratic political system).
d Exponential interpolation of the dependent variable based on the data from 1990, 2000 and 2010.
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Models (24) and (25) change the interpolation approach, now inter-
polating Rural electrification in 3-year rather than 2-year steps. Model
(24) employs piecewise linear interpolation,model (25) uses piecewise
exponential interpolation instead. The significance of the main explan-
atory variables remains intact.
The longitudinal data used in this paper are not balanced and is con-
siderably short. To examine the severity of using short panel data, a fur-
ther unreported model was run using only observations from the most
recent time period from 2001 to 2010. Such a purely cross-sectional
specification avoids the dangers of serial correlation in short panel
data models at the expense of a further decrease in observations.
While the resulting sample size of 43 is prone to estimation errors, the
results are consistent with the main findings.
Case example analyses
This section provides qualitative evidence from three sub-Saharan
African countries to reinforce the plausibility of the econometric results.
To examine some of the most salient cross-country variations, rural
electrification success in Ghana, high electrification inequality in
Swaziland and almost absent rural electrification in Uganda are
analysed in turn. Two further case studies, namely Senegal's recent
rural electrification success and Rwanda's low rural electrification and
high electrification inequality, are analysed in Appendices B–C for fur-
ther reference. They similarly support the econometric analyses.
Ghana
An increase from 6% rural electrification in 1990 to almost 50% in
2014 renders Ghana a notable rural electrification success story in
sub-Saharan Africa. As urban electrification increased from 75% to 85%,
electrification inequality was reversed from one of the most severe to
one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.
Political factors
The democratisation process in Ghana in the 1990s and 2000s has
been highly salient in and beneficial to the country's approach to rural
electrification. Jerry John Rawlings had been ruling Ghana since a mili-
tary coup in 1981, and ran for president for his National Democratic
Congress (NDC) party in the country's first multiparty elections in
1992. Starting in the late 1980s, he positioned himself to receive wide-
spread support from Ghana's mainly rural electorate. Rural infrastruc-
ture endowments were a key strategy. Sandbrook (2000, p.105)
writes that “Rawlings had targeted the rural areas as a major base of
government support since 1988. He campaigned exclusively in the
countryside in 1992 and dispensed patronage to local communities in
the form of electricity extensions.” The National Electrification Scheme
(NES) was launched in 1989, ambitiously aiming to provide universal
electrification by 2020. This policy entailed a rural area focus entitled
Self-Help Electrification Project (SHEP), where priority was given to
communities with a population of 500 or more to maximise its reach
(Bhattacharyya, 2013). Ghanaians have been argued to exhibit a rela-
tivelymature democratic voting behaviour in their first multiparty elec-
tions. Swing voters have been consciously evaluating government
performance (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). The NDC won the 1992
election in mainly free and fair elections, although some irregularities
were recorded. Ensuring widespread publicity, rawlings intensified
the NES ahead of the fiercely contested 1996 election, launching Phase
2 of SHEP in 1995. Thepolicy integrated community leadership in its im-
plementation and had a noticeable short-term goal of bringing electric-
ity immediately to one thousand towns and villages (Sandbrook, 2000).
Rural electrification skyrocketed bymore than 350% in the 1990s to 21%.
Briggs (2012) shows that constituencies targeted by the NES in the
1990s were significantly more likely to vote for the NDC than others.
In turn, between 1992 and 1996 the NDC specifically targeted constitu-
encies that had predominantly voted for the NDC in 1992. Briggs argues
that this helped to retain high NDC vote shares in the 1996 elections
won by the NDC against John Kufuor and his New Patriotic Party (NPP).
The NPP, benefiting from a severe economic crisis, narrowly
defeated the NDC for Ghana's first ballot-box induced power transfer
in 2000 and intensified rural electrification. In 2001, it re-launched
SHEP to construct low voltage distribution poles in villages within a dis-
tance of 20 km from the grid. Crucially, this initiative manifested demo-
cratic institutions such as strong public participation and local
leadership. Communities were encouraged to initiate own village elec-
trification projects. To maximise dissemination and policy approval, the
government required proof from communities that a minimum of one
third of communal houseswere being connected to the grid in order to re-
ceive SHEP funds for the project (Vanderpuye, 2010). Arguably, such a re-
quirement has helped the government to achieve a maximum spread of
its initiative to secure broad political backing. Throughout the decade,
SHEPwas the subject of intense electoral campaigning. It was instrumen-
tal in allowing the NES to electrify a total of 4800 communities by 2009
(Bhattacharyya, 2013). While a small regional bias exists towards the
cocoa-rich Ashanti region, no region in Ghana had an overall electrifica-
tion of below 49% in 2010. Remarkably, the economically least developed
northern Ghanaian region ranks at national average levels of rural electri-
fication (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).
Economic and demographic factors
Since the 1990s, Ghana has united all positively associated variables
of rural electrification evident from the econometric analyses above.
Apart from apparent political incentives to provide rural electrification
in the face of repeated fiercely contested elections and effective SHEP
implementation institutions, economic and demographic factors addi-
tionally benefitted Ghana's rural electrification. Its per capita income
level more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, closing the gap to the
sub-Saharan average level which stood at 50% in 1990. It managed to
amount close to double the region's average savings as GDP percentage.
The financial source for the NES, the National Electrification Fund, was
primarily being financed through national savings. In the 2000s,
Ghana invested considerably in a diversified electricity generation infra-
structure. Older large-scale power stations such as the Akosombo hy-
dropower plant and the Takoradi oil plant were expanded, new
facilities such as the 400MWBui hydropower plant and several smaller
fossil fuel plants were added to the grid. As a consequence, Ghana im-
ports less than 10% of its electricity. Aid dependency was halved to
less than 10% of GDP albeit a decreasing amount of conditionalities es-
pecially since the 2000s. Instead, considerable shares of local financing
are used in rural infrastructure projects.
Herbst (2000) classifies Ghana as a country with a neutral political
geography. While not high initially, Ghana's population density has al-
most doubled to more than 100 people per square kilometre between
1990 and 2010. At the same time, its rural population percentage de-
clined to close to 50%. Both of these factors have decreased the costs
of reaching close to 50% rural electrification.
Together, these political, economic and demographic factors, evident
from the econometric analyses above, suggest Ghana's remarkable rural
electrification success.
Swaziland
Rural electrification in Swaziland increased from 13% in 1990 to 21%
in 2010. While these electrification values are above the region's aver-
ages, they are considerably below average when controlling for
Swaziland's relatively high GDP per capita. Of all sub-Saharan countries
with a rural electrification of at least 10% in 1990, Swaziland has the
lowest percentage point growth in rural electrification, and ranks
among the lowest overall in terms of percent growth. Its urban electri-
fication, however, escalated from 35% in 1990 to 63% in 2010, thereby
outgrowing rural electrification by one third despite its higher base. It
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is thus one of only four countries in the sample where electrification in-
equality has grown between 1990 and 2010.10
Political factors
Swaziland's political structure between 1990 and 2010 has provided
limited incentives to electrify the rural population. The country is
governed by a modified absolute monarchy. King Mswati III has been
ruling the country since age 18 in 1986. Despite constitutional reforms
in 2005, all executive, legislative, and limited judicial powers are vested
in the king. Oppositional movements have been violently broken up in
the past, political parties remain prohibited unless they are pro-
royalist. Swaziland's Polity IV score of −9 in 2010 is the lowest in sub-
Saharan Africa. The monarchy has executed tight control of the rural
population using widespread intimidation, media control and surveil-
lance. The successful depoliticisation of the rural population has helped
to decrease governmental incentives to provide endowments to rural
areas (Motsamai, 2011). Swaziland's urban–rural divide is highly sa-
lient. Its average GINI coefficient of 52.4 in the 2000s ranks it within
the top 10% of most unequal countries in the world and in sub-
Saharan Africa. Daniel (2007) asserts that the urban–rural bias is illus-
trated by Swaziland's dual land right system. A minority of mainly
urban residents enjoys freehold rights under the Title Deed Land regime
guaranteeing state-protected land ownership and trade. Yet the vast
majority of the rural population is subject to the Swazi Nation Land
leasehold system where permission to buy and sell land depends on
local chiefs or companies administering the land on behalf of the mon-
archy (Levin, 1997).
The urban–rural bias is furthermore exemplified by Swaziland's con-
tinued uneven electrification. The state-owned utility company
Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC) is controlled by the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Energy (MNRE) and possesses de facto monopo-
lies on import, production and distribution of electricity. Unlike Ghana,
Swaziland does not have a designated rural electrification body. In 1997,
theMNRE commissioned a detailed feasibility study to assess rural elec-
trification in Swaziland. This study noticeably lists more negative than
positive effects of rural electrification (cf. Jansen et al., 1997). While it
acknowledges an improvement in the quality of life for the rural popu-
lation, it repeatedly warns the government against overspending on
rural electrification. The study (Jansen et al., 1997, p.11) states that
“[e]conomic feasibility (i.e. feasibility from the national-economic
point of view) should be a key pre-condition for government support
to implementation of rural electrification.” It presents unattested and
peculiar concerns of rural electrification allegedly increasing socioeco-
nomic disparities, exhibiting negative environmental effects and
slowing the implementation of renewable energies. These beliefs,
coupled with limited political incentives for rural endowments due to
the political marginalisation of the rural population and the lack of a
strong opposition, do not favour achieving electrification equality be-
tween urban and rural areas. The MNRE's 2003 National Energy Policy
has thus almost exclusively focused on urban electrification. It grew
from 43% to 63% between 2003 and 2010, compared to a modest in-
crease from 18% to 21% in rural Swaziland.
Economic and demographic factors
In comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries, Swaziland's
economic and demographic situation benefits rural electrification. It is
a lower-middle income country with GDP per capita levels consistently
between double and triple of the sub-Saharan African average between
1990 and 2010. It is one of the least aid dependent countries on the con-
tinentwith a relatively diversified economy albeit a large governmental
sector, and national savings of more than 20% of GDP. However,
Swaziland has failed to use its income status to address rural electrifica-
tion. An important aspect is its neglect of investment in domestic elec-
tricity production and distribution infrastructure. Consequently, it is
forced to import 90% of its electricity and due to its unchanged high de-
mand has the highest electricity tariffs in the region (African Develop-
ment Bank, 2013). This has affected rural areas the most, both because
of the considerable urban–rural income gap and the requirement of
high voltage transmission lines to import themainly South African pro-
duced electricity, which aremainly used to connect demand hubs in cit-
ies where per capita cost are lowest. Swaziland has committed to avoid
overcharging industry at the expense of domestic users, instead
intending to not cross-subsidise tariffs (Swazi Ministry of Natural
Resources and Energy, 2003). This behaviour illustrates Brown and
Mobarak's (2009) findings which suggest that authoritarian regimes
in the presence of supply constraints tend to reduce residential provi-
sion of electricity in favour of industry through concomitant pricing
mechanisms. They see a lack of political incentives as the main reason
that prevents a differing intervention.
In terms of demographic factors, Herbst (2000) describes Swaziland
as a country with a favourable geography. Its population density is
above-median levels, with relatively short distances between highly
populated areas. While the relatively high rural population percentage
of 77% hasmadewidespread rural electrification challenging, the ability
to add 20 percentage points in urban electrification in just 7 years ren-
ders a lack of developmental and infrastructural capabilities to increase
electrification an unlikely explanation.
Thus, consistent with the econometric analysis, the Swazi experi-
ence shows that comparably high income levels alone do not neces-
sarily lead to greater electrification equality. Rather, the Swazi case
can be argued to be a lucid counterfactual of the main argument of
this paper. Had the rural Swazi population been able to politically
participate and voice their concerns instead of being marginalised,
government incentives for rural endowments may have been con-
siderably greater, especially if a strong political opposition to chan-
nel rural grievances had existed. Favourable economic and
demographic situations imply that implementing such rural endow-
ments would have been possible at least to some extent. Thus, the
absence of such a political mechanism and, instead, the presence of
different incentives for the monarchy to favour urban electrification
may have helped urban electrification to be prioritised and to out-
grow its rural counterpart.
Uganda
With rural electrification at 2% in 1990 and 5% in 2010, Uganda has
thus far been largely unable to provide access to electricity to its rural
residents. Slightly more than half of its urban population is electrified,
but urban electrification growth rates have similarly been small. The
electrification inequality ratio in Uganda has therefore changed little
and stood at roughly one to ten in 2010.
Political factors
Uganda's political development between 1990 and 2010 has created
a systemof non-democratic and individualised rule supported by a large
patronage networkwhich has made it difficult for ameaningful opposi-
tion to arise and represent the demands of large population shares left
out by the regime. Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni and his Na-
tional Resistance Movement (NRM) have managed to advance a
personalisation of the state, amidst widespread intimidation of the op-
position. Museveni did not introduce multiparty elections until 2006,
and then used the permission of political parties as part of a quid pro
quo strategy to simultaneously increase presidential powers including
the lifting of term limits (Tripp, 2010). Mwenda (2007, p.24) calls
these constitutional amendments “a license for the creation of a presi-
dential monarchy.” Polity IV scores have remained negative throughout
10 The other three countries are Burundi, Chad and Liberia, where rural electrification is
all but absent.
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the NRM's rule. Elections in Uganda, especially the no-party elections in
1996 and 2001 that securedMuseveni above two-thirdmajorities, have
been corrupted by executive-orchestrated irregularities, including ar-
resting and violently attacking opposition leaders. Consequently, there
has been no strong opposition in either of these elections. While elec-
tionsmay have functioned as a source of legitimacy, the regime's source
of power lies in Museveni's strong status and the extensive state-based
network to distribute jobs, resources, contracts, licenses and permis-
sions to political allies. Museveni used decentralisation to implement
patronage distribution, the military leadership and the cabinet have
drawn heavily from Museveni's home region in Western Uganda
(Tripp, 2010).
Important nodes of the patronage network are close to 100 semi-
autonomous government agencies, all with major officers and boards
appointed by the government, overseeing different economic develop-
ment initiatives. The Rural Electrification Agency (REA), established
following the Electricity Act in 1999, is one of these organisations,
and it combines two common features. First, many of the agencies
have not had significant effects on their nominal tasks.11 During
the first 15 years of REA's existence, despite rising budgets, rural
electrification did not materialise. In its recent 10-year strategy paper,
Uganda’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (2012) ac-
knowledged this shortcoming and publicised a goal of 22% rural electri-
fication by 2022, requiring a total investment of $951 million without
additional generation investment. Yet according to its official 2014 fi-
nancial report, the government has only budgeted a combined $85.8
million for rural electrification between 2013 and 2016, merely 22% of
what would be required to meet the target (Ugandan Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2014).
Second, the limited progress achieved has exhibited regional bias.
The 2010 Ugandan National Household Survey shows that electricity
as the primary source of lighting has increased by 48% from 4.2% in
2005 to 6.2% in 2009 in Western Uganda, while it has stagnated at
around 1.5% in Northern, and even decreased by 30% to 3.5% in Eastern
Uganda during this time (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Western
Uganda possesses a greater absolute and relative amount of high and
medium voltage electricity transmission lines. Furthermore, REA's pro-
posed strategy to reach 22% rural electrification by 2022 plans to invest
46% of regional expansion funds inWestern Uganda (UgandanMinistry
of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012), despite a relatively even
population distribution between Western, Eastern, Northern and Cen-
tral Uganda.
As a result of grossly missing the comparably modest goal of 10%
rural electrification in 2012, the government further increased the
influence of the REA. Under a “government must lead” (Ugandan
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2012, p.2) maxim, it
consolidated all private and public rural electrification initiatives
and funding within the REA. Arguably, if Uganda possessed stronger
democratic institutions that incorporated robust checks and balances
on its government aswell as public scrutiny, a further expansion of pre-
viously ineffective agencies like REA would be considerably more diffi-
cult to justify. If free and fair policy-oriented elections had been well-
established, acting on demands of a neglected rural electorate to
achieve tangible rural development would have most likely yielded
higher political rewards than narrowly distributing favours to political
allies.
Economic and demographic factors
Consistent with the econometric findings, Uganda's low income
levels as well as challenging demographics have further exacerbated
rural electrification. Uganda exemplifies that rapid GDP per capita
growth alone is not decisive for rural electrification. While the country
grew at close to 4% per capita annually between 1990 and 2000, it did
so from a small base following the economic collapse under Idi Amin
and the 1980s Bush War. In 2010, GDP per capita remained at one
third of the sub-Saharan African average.
National savings have similarly been below average. More than half
of the budget to achieve the electrification goals set out in 10-year strat-
egy paper (Uganda's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development,
2012) is financed directly by donor aid, bypassing both the civil service
apparatus and the scrutiny of the Ugandan citizenry. Uganda is known
for being among the top recipients of conditional structural adjustment
loans in the world, leading to a considerable variety of neoliberal policy
constraints imposed on its leadership (Easterly, 2005). As only 19% of
the electrification budget comes from national funds, Uganda has effec-
tively reversed the average ratio between national and foreign funds for
power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). Strikingly, the Ugandan government approved to
spend 18%more of its national power infrastructure funds on the Ener-
gy Ministry's “Policy, Planning and Support Services,” which mainly
comprises buying and equipping Energy Ministry and REA buildings,
than on rural electrification for the whole country combined in 2013/
14 (cf. UgandanMinistry of Finance, 2014, p. 202–3, 211–2). Limited na-
tional savings have further impeded the capital-intensive construction
of new electricity generation units in Uganda, making load shedding a
common problem across the country. Plans for the two largest hydro-
power plants in north-western Uganda, the 600 MW units in Karuma
and Ayago, have both been delayed bymore than a decade and estimat-
ed costs have significantly increased.
Furthermore, 85% of Ugandans live in rural areas, constituting a so-
cioeconomic obstacle of comparably high costs to achieve higher rural
electrification rates. As Herbst (2000) shows, there are several areas
with considerable distances from the capital Kampala with sizeable
population densities, exacerbating a centralised electrification ap-
proach. Thus, Uganda's poor track record can be understood in light of
significant political, economic and demographic barriers for rural elec-
trification salient in the econometric findings.
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has presented both quantitative and qualitative evi-
dence to support its theoretically developed hypotheses. Its central
argument comprises two main points. First, the econometric and
case-example analyses show a strong positive association between
democracy and rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa between
1990 and 2010. Rural electrification appears to be attributable to pol-
iticians' actions, a crucial prerequisite for such an association to be
meaningful. While electrification has been possible in the absence
of democratic institutions, the analyses suggest that rural electrifica-
tion has been more successful in sub-Saharan African states with
more democratic institutions, thereby challenging classical work on
democracy and development such as by Huntington and Nelson
(1976). The positive association is robust against a number of pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial political control variables as
well as per capita GDP and a variety of other economic and demo-
graphic variables. Democracy was also found to be positively associ-
ated with reducing rural versus urban electrification inequality
markedly quicker in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, using an interven-
ing variable modelling approach, this paper has provided novel
multi-variant evidence which suggests that heavily contested elec-
tions featuring an influential opposition as well as an enhanced ef-
fectiveness of policy implementation may constitute institutional
explanations of parts of democracy's association with rural electrifi-
cation. The case studies further support this argument. Countries like
Ghana have been able to achieve impressive electrification gains,
where election-induced concessions delivered through well
11 Mwenda (2007) estimates that semi-autonomous agencies are funded with more
than 3% of GDP, most of these funds from international donors, yet attests them a greater
meaning for distributing individual endowments than achieving impact in their respective
fields.
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executed policies have combined with manageable economic and
demographic circumstances. Where such political incentives have
been largely absent, like in Swaziland, or may have helped to estab-
lish patronage networks with narrowly defined endowment recipi-
ents, like in Uganda, rural versus urban electrification inequality
and rural electrification, respectively, have suffered.
Additional findings include that, not surprisingly, higher income
levels and favourable demographic factors were found to be posi-
tively associated with rural electrification. Consistent with World
Bank data supporting that over 80% of sub-Saharan Africa's power in-
frastructure is financed through domestic funds (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010), national savings were found to be positively asso-
ciated with rural electrification. Direct aid payments, constituting
only 6% of funds for sub-Saharan Africa's electricity infrastructure,
were found to be slightly negatively correlated with rural electrifica-
tion and more strongly negatively correlated with rural versus urban
electrification equality.
A number of different policy implications result from this study.
Political systems appear tomatter for rural electrification and electri-
fication inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. Fostering democratisation may
create important windfall effects via more inclusive institutional frame-
works and providing incentives for governments to improve living stan-
dards of the poor in the form of infrastructure endowments. As the
econometric analysis have suggested, such gains can be substantive.
The example of Ghana showshowparticipatory approaches in rural elec-
trification policies can significantly benefit their success, a result which
resembles VanGevelt's (2014)finding for SouthKorea. Strengthening in-
stitutional ties between the government and rural constituencies eases
the usually centrally planned approach to rural electrification, ameasure
that carries further political incentives in democracies with contested
elections.
The negative association between the rural and urban electrification
gap and foreign aid has two potential implications. First, while countries
like Thailand and South Korea have successfully used heavy state-
interventionist policies to electrify its rural population built on cross-
subsidies from large to small customers, such policies are considerably
more difficult to implement for African governments subject to condi-
tional adjustment loans informed by neoliberal theories. Yet, as the
business case for rural over urban electrification is usually negative,
state interventions seem necessary to compensate for such effects as
historic examples have shown (cf. Chang, 2002). Senegal's successful
approach of using cross-subsidy schemes illustrates this implication.
Second, a re-evaluation of how aid money is spent may prove fruitful.
Non-monetary aid such as technical and educational assistance may
be more suitable for targeted infrastructure interventions as opposed
to continued funding of parastatal agencies with little track record of
success.
Furthermore, there are considerable national and sub-national vari-
ations in both electrification and the presence or absence of related
drivers and challenges across sub-Saharan Africa. As there is no quick
fix to the rural electrification problem, policies should be conscious of
these variations and should iteratively tailor solutions to the complexity
of particular contexts, rather than applying broad brush dogmatic ap-
proaches with universalistic targets and timelines.
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Appendix A. Summary statistics for interpolation model
Table 7
Summary statistics and data sources for models with interpolated dependent.




World Bank (WDI) 528 12.22 17.52 .10–.100
Politics
Democracy Polity IV 468 .20 5.83 −10–10
Centralisation Gennaioli and
Rainer (2007)
462 53.73 31.76 0–100
Political geography Herbst (2000) 451 1.66 .85 0–1
Indirect Rule Ziltener and Künzler
(2013)




World Bank (WDI) 512 1.21 2.08 .07–19.71
Aid (% GNI) World Bank (WDI) 489 13.12 13.20 .14–150.56
Fuel per capita
(Gtoe)
IEA 524 .96 3.83 0–35.96
Agriculture (%
GDP)




World Bank (WDI) 528 64.59 15.72 14.30–94.58
Population density World Bank (WDI) 528 75.47 105.80 1.72–631.00
Urbanisation (%
growth)
World Bank (WDI) 528 3.97 1.97 −5.87–18.66
Population (log) World Bank (WDI) 528 15.49 1.57 11.16–18.89
Notes: The summary statistics above refer to models where the dependent variable has
been interpolated based on existing data. All variables other than the dependents have
been calculated as an average for each country in the two years preceding the 11 years
with available or interpolated data (1990, 92, 94, 96, 98, 2000, 02, 04, 06, 08, 2010). Miss-
ing values for particular years were omitted from the averages.
Appendix B. The Senegalese Case
Senegal's rural electrification stood at 3% in 1990, and only slightly
increased to 5% by 1997. Both figures were significantly below the
sub-Saharan African average. Yet between 1998 and 2010, Senegal
managed to catapult rural electrification to around 30%, double the
sub-continent's average. Its urban electrification has steadily grown
from 60% to close to 90%. While still considerable, the rural versus
urban electrification ratio thereby improved from one to twenty to
one to three.
B.1. Political factors
Senegal's democratisation process with peaceful election-induced
transition of power in 2000 created incentives for the government to
electrify considerable shares of the rural population. The country
was ruled by Abdou Diouf and his Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (PS) be-
tween 1981 and 2000. Diouf took various democratisation steps in
the second half of his rule, including widespread political reforms
that granted oppositional parties more rights, levelled the electoral
playing field and improved freedom of speech (Vengroff and
Magala, 2001). However, Diouf's poor economic track record since
1981 forced him into a runoff with Abdoulaye Wade of the main op-
positional party Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) in the 2000
general elections. While rural voters in Senegal have been found to
generally favour the incumbent (Koter, 2013), Vengroff and Magala
(2001) argue that rural opposition was fundamental in securing
Wade's win in the runoff. It constituted Senegal's first peaceful tran-
sition of power from one party to another in elections judged free
and fair by the international community.
To solidify rural support, the PDS government was quick to greatly
expand the dedicated rural electrification agency, the Agence
Sénégalaise d'Électrification Rurale (ASER), created in 1998 by the PS
under growing political pressure of the main oppositional. The PDS
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increased funding for ASER and introduced a variety of rural electrifica-
tion initiatives. It set out an ambitious rural electrification target of 30%
by 2015 in 2002. Among the newly introduced initiatives were innova-
tive policies such as the Senegalese Rural Electrification Action Plan
(Plan d'Action Sénégalais d'Électrification Rurale, PASER) in 2002
(Mawhood andGross, 2014). PASER focuses on establishing concessions
via private sector participation, dividing Senegal into 18 concessions
available for competitive bidding. Private concessionaires individually
develop specific local and cost-effective electrification plans and are re-
quired to bear at least 20% of the investment cost. Similarly to the
Ghanaian case, the Senegalese government needs to centrally approve
all decentral rural electrification projects, a policy design that helps it
to ensure that broad population shares benefit from electrification rath-
er than concentrating the infrastructure to support a few. Despite the
remarkable gains achieved, Mawhood and Gross (2014) point out that
the PASER policy in particular would have been more successful if gov-
ernmental effectiveness had been higher, evident in poor project man-
agement, protracted consultations and limited capacities. Despite such
criticism, success stories such as the considerable increase of rural elec-
trificationmanifested the rural support for the PDS government, the lat-
ter helped secured a clear victory in the 2007 elections, albeit
oppositional allegations of electoral fraud.
B.2. Economic and demographic factors
The newly elected PDS government's move to re-nationalise the en-
ergy utility in 2000 enabled a cross-subsidy scheme financedmainly by
the positive economic development of the country and domestic sav-
ings which greatly benefited rural electrification. World Bank and IMF
conditionalities required the previous Diouf government to embark on
a privatisation-focused electricity sector reform in the late 1990s
(Gökgür and Jones, 2006). Shares of the state-owned utility SENELEC
were sold to a Canadian-French consortium which started to manage
the utility in 1999. Measures included rises in tariffs to close financial
gaps of electricity provision, posing risks for the rural population to af-
ford electricity. After its election in 2000, the Wade government, much
to the surprise of the World Bank, was quick to buy back all SENELEC
shares to fully reverse privatisation of the utility (Gökgür and Jones,
2006). As a second push for privatisation with improved conditions
for the Senegalese governments failed, SENELEC has remained fully
state-owned. Working against World Bank and IMF loan conditions,
the government introduced a tariff-system based on a large-scale
cross-subsidising scheme to cover the deficits of electrification
(Boccanfuso et al., 2008) which enabled considerably broader electrifi-
cation. Consistent with the econometric results in this paper, it greatly
benefitted from a threefold increase of Senegalese GDP per capita levels
in the 2000s and above sub-SaharanAfricanmeannational per GDP sav-
ings, averaging 16% during the 2000s instead of relying heavily on con-
ditional aid. ASER's designated Rural Electrification Fund, much in line
forfigures for the sub-SaharanAfrican sub-continent, ismainly financed
through a tax on electricity usage, functioning itself as a re-distributive
mechanism (Mawhood and Gross, 2014).
Demographic factors have posed both challenges and opportunities
for Senegal. While a quickly growing population density and a rural
population of only 55% relatively ease rural electrification, Herbst
(2000) notes that Senegal has a difficult political geography where the
Southern part of the country is separated from the rest by The
Gambia. During Wade's government, a secessionist movement erupted
in the southern Casamance area.
The success of the rural electrification programme in Senegal is thus
not solely due to demographically favourable conditions and an improv-
ing economic situation, but has furthermore benefited from political in-
centives for the PDS government to increase rural electrification. Cross-
subsidising policies together with private funds attracted through
PASER have helped to finance the significant broadening of electricity
access to rural areas, reaching the ambitious 30% target in 2010, five
years earlier than planned (Bhattacharyya, 2013).
Appendix C. The Rwandan case
Rural electrification in Rwanda has consistently been in the bottom
quartile of sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2010, re-
maining markedly under 5%.12 At the same time, urban electrification
has slightly increased to connect around half of urban households to
the grid, resulting in a rural versus urban electrification inequality
ratio that lies in the top quartile of sub-Saharan African countries.
C.1. Political factors
The political development in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide
formed an autocratic regime built on narrow urban elites, providing po-
litical incentives for urban over broad rural electrification. Despite a rhe-
toric of democracy and national reconciliation after the genocide which
gainedwidespread support, the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) im-
plemented a de-facto dictatorship and widespread political exclusion
(Reyntjens, 2004, 2011). After assuming a military victory to end the
genocide committed by extremist Hutus in July 1994, the RPF under
its leader Paul Kagame quickly consolidated power. In the following de-
cade, the RPF exiled, imprisoned and killed Hutu elites from early 1995,
reversed previous attempts of inclusion inside the RPF, which replaced
the largely ceremonial Hutu president Pasteur Bizimunguwith Kagame,
and banned the main opposition party, the Mouvement Démocratique
Républicain (MDR). Desrosiers and Thomson (2011) point out that
while the regime was grounded in contrary ideological narratives, the
RPF greatly favoured Tutsi, especially those who were anglophone,
with regards to access to power, income and education. While the pop-
ulation was mainly Hutu, by 1996 the vast majority of MPs, Supreme
Court judges, mayors, university students and professors, the army
and the intelligence service was Tutsi.
At the same time, “the Tutsization of urban Rwanda… had become
the sociological and economic foundation of the RPF” (Reyntjens,
2004, p.188). The Rwandan government made consistently weak bud-
getary commitments for rural development, instead favouring the
urban elite. Ansoms (2008, p.6-8) shows in-depth how “the Rwandan
government presents spending targeted at the urban elite as pro-poor
priority expenditure,” a tactic that resonates well with Desrosiers and
Thomson's (2011) analysis of the differences between benevolent lead-
ership narratives of the RPF regime elites and actual socio-political real-
ities. The banning of anymeaningful opposition (Kagamewon the 2003
presidential elections with 95.1% of the vote and an alleged turnout of
96.6%) made challenges to such urban–rural biases close to impossible
and provided no considerable incentives for rural endowments. Rural
electrification serves as a vivid example.
Studying a number of seminal government policy documents re-
veals a lack of political push for rural electrification. The government's
“Rwanda Vision 2020” issued in 2000 does not feature rural electrifica-
tion as a priority area (Republic of Rwanda, 2000). The document does
not include a rural electrification goal. It only states that it aims to elec-
trify 25% of its population by 2010 (a goal the government has missed
by more than 50%), and 35% of the population by 2020. However, as
electrification in urban areas is considerably more cost effective,
reaching a such broadly defined goal implies an almost automatic
focus on urban over rural electrification. Similarly, the Ministry of
Infrastructure's Electricity Access Rollout Programme (EARP) started
in 2009does not distinguish between urban and rural electrification tar-
gets either but implicitly favours urban centres for electrification. The
government's 2013 IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) re-
peats the de-prioritisation of rural electrification in a more lucid way.
It asserts that electrification, at the time still at only 14% of the total
12 The World Bank reports a rural electrification rate of 4.0% for 2010, the IEA does not
provide rural electrification data for Rwanda in 2010 and instead reports 4.7% for 2012.
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population, “will focus initially on viable clients, i.e. thosewho canmake
productive use of energy and those who can afford to pay for the cost-
covering connection fee” (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.51–52), and
that “the levels of consumption for some are too low to justify a grid
connection” (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.40). Its vague claims to use
decentralised technologies on a large scale for rural areas is not based
on any significant experience with the technology in Rwanda or the
greater region and would require enormous technological leapfrogging
within a few years to become a reality.13 It is thus not surprising that the
electrification gains achieved by the EARP by 2013, an increase to 16% of
overall electricity access, are largely limited to urban areas (Republic of
Rwanda, 2013). Yet the Rwandan government chose to increase its
overall electricity access target to 70% by 2017, a magnitude which
may again be best understood in light of Desrosiers and Thomson's
(2011) work on the high importance of maintaining benevolent leader-
ship narratives for the RPF regime elites towards the international com-
munity (the IMF in this case) and its own population, regardless of how
meaningful they are on the ground.
C.2. Economic and demographic factors
While favourable demographics have aided the rapid consolidation
of power, income declines have forced the Rwandan regime to trade-
off different options where to spend its energy infrastructure budget.
GDP per capita has been considerably below the sub-Saharan African
average. Income per capita levels fell in the 1990s, mainly driven by
the halving of GDP in a single year during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
National savings in Rwanda are well below sub-Saharan African aver-
ages, exacerbating the usage of the usually domestic chancel to finance
electrification infrastructure. With increasing industrialisation in urban
areas, Rwanda has experienced severe electricity supply shortages due
to failure to invest in new generation capacity (Safari, 2010). The cost
of electricity increased by 900% between 1995 and 2006, deeming elec-
tricity largely economically inaccessible for the majority of the poor
population, especially where flexible payment schemes are absent
(Van Gevelt et al., 2016). Resource allocation for electrification infra-
structure has favoured urban over rural areas, keeping the urban versus
rural electrification high.
At the same time, the donor community has regarded Rwanda as a
‘donor darling’ and ensured greatly above regional average aid payments
despite the country's significant human rights abuses (Reyntjens, 2011).
Up to 50% of the national budget were aid financed, thereby bypassing
the scrutiny of the Rwandan people, a situation exacerbated by the ab-
sence of political opposition which could have exercised potential
checks and balances.
The favourable geographic conditions have helped the RPF to effec-
tively concentrate power, yet have not furthered rural electrification
challenges. Rwanda has the highest population density of all continen-
tal sub-Saharan African countries at 439 people per square kilometre in
2010. Its rural population share, while still high at around 75% in 2010,
has decreased at the fastest absolute rate of all sub-Saharan African
countries, apparent in its considerable urbanisation rates. Herbst
(2000) classifies Rwanda as a country with favourable political geogra-
phy. Centralised control over the country, a beneficial factor for state-
driven electrification programmes, is greatly eased by its demographic
conditions. It allowed Kagame and his regime to consolidate political
power relatively quickly after the genocide and aided the regime in
building a pervasive bureaucratic apparatus. Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007) calculate a pre-colonial political centralisation index of close to
1, indicating that state control in Rwanda has traditionally been
centralised.
While these geographic conditions favour large-scale state-
driven electrification programmes in general, such initiatives tend
to require political commitment to be extended to the rural popula-
tion. Yet, in the context of considerable economic constraints, the
well-consolidated Rwandan regime's urban-based elite system of
patronage (Green, 2011) has worked to substantially de-prioritise
rural electrification over elite endowments in the absence of democracy
and a strong opposition. This provides a lucid political counterfactual
case to the econometric analysis in this paper, as arguably a context of
contested elections in a strong democracy would have forced the RPF
to lend more credibility to its fictional claims to inclusion by reversing
its salient urban and elite bias in endowment allocation.
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3.4 Conclusion and implications of Paper II for the PhD thesis 
The econometric and case study analyses in this chapter have indicated that political regime 
type and institutional effectiveness help explain why some countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
have fared better to electrify their rural citizens than others. While electrification has been 
possible in the absence of democratic institutions, the analyses suggest that rural electrification 
has been more successful in sub-Saharan African states with more democratic institutions. 
Democracy was also found to be positively associated with reducing rural versus urban 
electrification inequality markedly quicker in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper furthermore 
provides novel multi-variant evidence which suggests that heavily contested elections featuring 
an influential opposition as well as an enhanced effectiveness of policy implementation may 
constitute institutional explanations of parts of democracy’s association with rural 
electrification. Countries like Ghana have been able to achieve impressive electrification gains, 
where election-induced concessions delivered through well executed policies have combined 
with manageable economic and demographic circumstances. Where such political incentives 
have been largely absent like in Swaziland or may have helped to establish patronage networks 
with narrowly defined endowment recipients like in Uganda, rural versus urban electrification 
inequality and rural electrification, respectively, have been neglected. 
There are several crucial implications of this chapter for the remainder of this PhD thesis. 
Firstly, the paper’s panel data and comparative approach indicate that large variations between 
different African countries in terms of regime type and institutional effectiveness exist at any 
one time. These are significantly greater than sub-national regime type variations as they are 
often defined on a country-level and thus mostly an exogenous given for a specific country at 
a given time. In terms of relevance for energy planning, this means that political risks are likely 
to be especially salient when international system of interconnected countries are studied: 
different international network designs have different overall political risk implications. If an 
international network relies heavily on exports from politically volatile or unaccountable 
countries, the network’s political risk is arguably higher compared to where such a reliance 
does not exist. As no planning model, which considers such regime-type political risk factors, 
has existed prior to this PhD, the ensuing chapters 4 and 5 present multi-objective optimisation 
models to minimise political risks for energy infrastructure expansions in international African 
networks. Chapter 4 addresses a continental case with 46 countries, chapter 5 a regional case 
with 12 countries. 
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Secondly, on a national level, this chapter has shown that high and rising electrification 
inequalities exist within many sub-Saharan African countries. The Ugandan case indicated that 
such sub-national inequalities are not only limited to rural versus urban zones, but also between 
different geographical areas within the same country. The national-level energy planning 
model in chapter 6 includes optimisation objectives to minimise sub-national electrification 
equalities to alleviate the social tensions that come with them. 
Finally, although constituting a secondary finding with somewhat dubious results, the chapter 
did find a negative association between foreign aid levels and especially rural electrification 
inequality. In going beyond the development of planning models and analysing current modes 
of electrification implementation in Africa, chapter 7 focuses its analyses on the implications 
of the current foreign donor-driven electrification programmes in Africa and, among other 





4. SOLAR ENERGY'S POTENTIAL TO MITIGATE POLITICAL RISKS: THE CASE OF 
AN OPTIMISED AFRICA-WIDE NETWORK (PAPER III) 
4.1 Content overview and thesis context 
The paper featured in this chapter is intended to generate novel insights into the continental 
case of the African electricity network (objective 2a in section 2.5). In general terms, the 
planning model yields the non-dominated set of different electricity generation capacities (in 
terms of location, type and size) to be built within a set of countries to meet demand (cf. 
research gaps (ii) and (iii) in section 2.4). The model is motivated by the importance of political 
factors for electrification and electricity trade in Africa (as suggested in chapter 2 and shown 
in chapter 3), with no previous generation expansion planning optimisation has included 
political factors as an objective. In the continental case, the relevance of political risks is 
especially salient when current real-life electricity trade plans are considered. These aim to 
make several African countries reliant on electricity exported from politically highly vulnerable 
countries with cheap generation potential such as hydro power from the Grand Inga dam in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and wind power from Sudan. Hence, the model studies 
the effect a consideration and mitigation of political risks can have on the electricity generation 
and network design in Africa. 
While both the literature review in chapter 2 and the econometric analyses in chapter 3 have 
suggested the importance of institutional and regime-type political factors for electrification, 
there has not been a comprehensive review about which other potential types of political factors 
are salient for electrification in Africa. Hence, drawing from qualitative social science research 
as well as non-academic public sector agency reports, the paper in this chapter first identifies 
a concrete set of six political risk factors that have influenced decisions for different electricity 
generating technologies in sub-Saharan Africa in the past. In addition to regime-type and 
institutional aspects discussed in chapter 3, it finds macro-level aspects such as external 
political commitments and national energy sovereignty, as well as micro-level aspects such as 
politicised land access to be relevant political criteria for network design. To keep the political 
risk of a network low, politically stable countries with solid democratic institutions, no recent 
history of civil war, little corruption as well as abundant fallow and accessible land like 
Botswana appear to be preferable for generating electricity for export compared to countries 
with an autocratic and high corrupt leadership, multiple ongoing armed insurgencies, largely 
ineffective institutions and constrained land access like DRC.  
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The paper then shows how these factors can be modelled in a comparably straight-forward 
mathematical optimisation electricity planning model. The political factors are incorporated 
into the decision-making model by assigning a political risk value of between 0-100 for all 
individual political factors, using entirely linear equations. For instance, in terms of political 
instability, a linear constraint is included where the risk of a network due to political instability 
is the sum of all exports per country multiplied by the individual political instability rating of 
the respective exporting countries, divided by total electricity demand. The model is then 
applied to the case example of the continental African electricity network. Several model 
instances are solved in terms of the least-cost solution for different maximum allowed political 
risk values ranging between 0 and 100 (also known as the ε-constraint method for solving 
multi-criteria optimisation problems). Thereby, the optimal trade-off between cost and political 
risk is produced, de facto assigning a price to political risk mitigation in the network. The model 
includes seven different generation technologies (cf. research gap (iv) in section 2.4).  
As section 4.4 will show, several methodological insights from this paper lay the basis for the 
further, more detailed planning models in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
Finally, I wish to mention that on page 29 of the paper, there is a typo, which could lead to 
misunderstandings. In section 3 of the paper, in the third paragraph, it should be “hourly 
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Generation and transmission expansion
planning
Political risk management
A B S T R A C T
Electricity generation expansion planning in Africa has focused almost exclusively on minimising costs. Yet
infrastructure projects in Africa have been frequently shown to fail because planners have neglected their socio-
political realm. Using the social science literature, this paper derives six political factors that are crucial for
African electrification, and incorporates them into a linear, renewable-energy focused bi-criteria optimisation
planning model of the African electricity network. The results reveal a significant degree of preventable political
risk in the network if the only optimisation criterion is cost minimisation. This cost-minimal solution highly
depends on large-scale exports from some of Africa's most politically volatile countries, such as hydroelectric
energy from the Democratic Republic of Congo and wind energy from Sudan, Somalia, Chad and Mauritania.
However, the model demonstrates that raising the levelised cost of electrification in 2030 by 4% allows to cut
preventable political risks of the network by 50%. Crucially, the optimal, most cost-effective risk mitigation
strategy is to gradually replace large-scale exports with domestic solar energy abundant in most African coun-
tries. High solar energy shares increase national energy sovereignty, meet international climate commitments,
and decrease the network's dependence on politically unstable and/or inefficacious countries for generation and
transmission.
1. Introduction
The 7th United Nation's Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) aims
to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy
for all by 2030. While this objective is challenging in a number of world
regions, it seems most significant in Africa. Roughly 650 million people
in sub-Saharan Africa alone are without electricity access, a number
paralleled by no other region in the world (International Energy
Agency, 2015). The associated overall electrification rate in sub-Sa-
haran Africa was 35% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017).
A multitude of donor countries and international organisations have
set up African energy programmes. These policy efforts are convinced
of the developmental benefits of African electrification (Cook, 2011;
Tiwari et al., 2015), acknowledge the necessity of a joint effort to ac-
cumulate sufficient capital to meet demand, and agree that renewable
energy technologies will play a considerable role in Africa's electricity
future (Sustainable Energy for All Initiative, 2012; United States Agency
for International Development, 2015; World Bank, 2010). However,
they suffer from an increasingly complex coordination requirement,
and lack multi-faceted quantitative decision support analyses regarding
where to optimally install which technologies exactly across Africa.
In helping to specify a suitable supply mix able to meet future
African demand, the recent quantitative academic planning literature
has focused almost entirely on minimising cost, in some cases for a
discrete set of environmentally different scenarios (Gnansounou et al.,
2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015b; Mentis et al.,
2017; Ohiare, 2015; Ohijeagbon and Ajayi, 2015; Ouedraogo, 2017;
Rose et al., 2016; Sanoh et al., 2014; Taliotis et al., 2014; Taliotis et al.,
2016; Zeyringer et al., 2015). While the relevance of environmental,
technological and social decision criteria have been well documented
(Bhattacharyya, 2012; Loken, 2007; Mirakyan and De Guio, 2013;
Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004; Rojas-Zerpa and Yusta, 2014;
Trotter et al., 2017a; Wang et al., 2009), it seems imperative that policy
makers also consider the politics of African electrification in energy
planning (Trotter et al., 2017b). For instance, favourable cost and en-
vironmental factors have led to appraisals of large-scale electricity ex-
port projects such as hydroelectric energy from the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC) to power significant parts of sub-Saharan Africa
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015b; Sanoh et al., 2014;
Taliotis et al., 2014; Taliotis et al., 2016; Tshombe et al., 2007). South
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Africa has signed an agreement with DRC, two countries separated by
3000 km and multiple other countries, to supply 2500MW peak from
DRC's Grand Inga dam to South Africa by 2021. Yet politically, overly
relying on a highly volatile country marred by dysfunctional political
institutions and violent conflict involving at least 81 different armed
groups (Stearns and Vogel, 2015) appears to be a sub-optimal choice.
Other political aspects influencing African electricity trade are un-
favourable political dependencies from overly relying on imports (for
example, the Swazi dependence on imports from South African), or
politicised land access which is holding up crucial transmission line
construction (for example in Uganda).
The investment risk management literature has convincingly de-
monstrated the relevance of political risk assessment for investment
decisions in general. Countries have been found to receive more foreign
direct investments when political risks are low (Asiedu, 2006; Barry,
2016; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Erb et al., 1996; Jensen, 2008;
Koojaroenprasit, 2016), with investors often ranking political concerns
as their main investment risk in developing countries (Al Khattab et al.,
2008; Komendantova et al., 2012). In terms of electrification, the merits
of political risk insurance for risk-laden projects have been pointed out
(Chowdhury et al., 2015), and renewable energy investments have been
argued to increase energy security due to their de-central applicability
(Frances et al., 2013). Yet despite these achievements, a formalised
incorporation of the political dimension of electrification, including a
discussion on which political risk factors are actually important, is
absent from the quantitative electricity planning literature.
This paper makes three novel contributions. First, based on relevant
social science research and various agency reports in Africa, it distils six
specific political factors that matter for electricity planning. As this is
based on a systematic review of the larger African electricity planning
literature published elsewhere by the authors (Trotter et al., 2017b),
the frequency with which the these factors are discussed indicates their
relative importance. Second, the paper illustrates how these six political
factors can be integrated into a generation expansion planning model
using entirely linear constraints. The resulting bi-criteria model is able
to quantify the optimal trade-off between cost and political risk mini-
misation. Third, using this model, this paper is the first to present a
continuous optimisation of the African generation and transmission
network with multiple decision criteria, extending the previous work
focused on cost-minimisation (in some cases for a discrete number of
different environmental scenarios). Its cost minimisation solution, a
special case where no political risk constraints are active, corrects and
remedies the multiples flaws present in Sanoh et al.’s (2014) original
work (see Trotter, 2017 for a discussion). Political factors of elec-
trification are particularly salient on a continent-wide scale, where
some of the greatest potential for cost-effective renewable energy is
located in some of the most politically risk-laden countries in Africa.
The model results challenge hasty recommendations for large-scale
export-driven projects in politically highly volatile countries, and
identify increased solar energy shares as the optimal political risk mi-
tigation strategy.1
Section 2 develops the six different political factors relevant for
electricity planning in Africa, illustrating the strong link between po-
litical risk and electricity in the region. Section 3 discusses the methods
and data sources necessary to incorporate the six political factors into a
bi-criteria linear electricity planning optimisation model. Modelling
results for the Africa-wide network and risk mitigation strategies are
presented in Section 4, while Section 5 offers a conclusion and policy
implications.
2. Political factors of African electrification for energy planning
Political science and policy research on African electrification, often
qualitative in nature, has detailed a large set of cases where politics
have crucially influenced technology choice and implementation.
Table 1 categorises these works along six different political factors,
sorted from macro to micro-level politics. It is based on a systematic
literature review discribed in detail by (Trotter et al., 2017b), involving
all African countries as well as regional power pools and a combination
of different relevant keywords such as “energy” and “electricity” with
full-text searches of the stem of the word “politics”. International, na-
tional and project-level politics were all included, whether of structural
or agency-related nature. Imposing a limit of five journal articles per
country and region, as well as only including peer-reviewed journal
articles published in English, the search identified 84 relevant papers
and 21 agency reports on electrification in Africa that have addressed
political factors. While the list in Table 1 is not exhaustive, it offers an
insightful evidence base. Its bottom-up approach avoids over-general-
isation of political risks and goes considerably beyond generic country-
level risk indices such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
(Erb et al., 1996), or one-dimensional proxies to evaluate general po-
litical risks frequently used in the investment risk management litera-
ture (see for instance (Henisz, 2000; Koojaroenprasit, 2016; Kucukali,
2011)). Sections 2.2–2.6 briefly discuss each political factor.
2.1. External political pressure/commitments
All African countries except Libya have submitted their Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) on climate change to the
UN following the 2016 Paris agreements (see Appendix A). While sev-
eral intended contributions were entirely conditional on receiving in-
ternational financial support, the majority of countries described at
least part of their contributions as “unconditional” in the INDCs, im-
plying a firm commitment to realise them. Apart from the inherent
political motivation of such worldwide agreements for all signees to do
their part, many INDCs submitted by developing countries have been
found to be strongly influenced by international development organi-
sations (Energising Development Initiative, 2016).
External influence on African electrification is not new. Neoliberal
‘conditionalities’ associated with international loans have considerably
influenced energy policy in Africa. For instance, following its 1991
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Zimbabwe gradually changed
its electrification strategy from a socialist “electricity-for-all” paradigm
to a market-focused financial self-sufficiency approach (Söderholm,
1999). The World Bank effectively decided which generation technol-
ogies to use (Rowlands, 1994). A 2012 World Bank report corroborates
this finding, stating that generation installations in general are subject
to international financial institutions’ viewpoints (The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012). Several scholars
have criticised the effects of neoliberal policy on Africa's power sector
(Pineau, 2002, 2007; Wamukonya, 2003). Issues of external political
commitments tend to multiply in the case of multinational electricity
transmission where severe political complexities can arise depending on
the history of different countries involved in the network (United States
Agency for International Development, 2015). For instance, Namibia's
committed greenhouse gas savings in its INDC are likely to have an
effect on coal-fired electricity imports from South Africa which are
responsible for a major part of greenhouse gases in Namibia's electricity
consumption.
2.2. National energy security/sovereignty
In a politically volatile environment, using domestically resources to
meet energy demands increase both national energy and political
1 This paper does not attempt to present modelling approaches that capture all political
aspects of electrification. On the contrary, the complexity of African electrification pol-
itics makes it virtually impossible to capture all relevant aspects through quantitative
modelling alone. However, by including some fundamental political factors in quantita-
tive energy planning models, there is much greater potential for more resilient energy
initiatives to be developed, which includes important qualitative discussions focusing on
infrastructure decision-making.
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sovereignty. National energy security and sovereignty merits have been
discussed for a number of African cases, including Botswana (Fagbenle,
2001), DRC (Green et al., 2015), Ethiopia (Mulugetta, 2007), Mauritius
(Welsch et al., 2014), Nigeria (Aliyu et al., 2013), and Africa more
broadly (Wamukonya, 2003). Abundant renewable energy is often fa-
voured over scarce fossil resources in terms of sustainable supply se-
curity, although exceptions such as relying on small and large-scale
hydroelectric energy during protracted drought periods exist (see
Tenenbaum et al., 2014 for an East African case).
Desiring energy sovereignty can have considerable implications for
electricity trade. For instance, South African state-owned utility
Eskom's significant electricity exports to Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have cre-
ated political dependencies (Castellano et al., 2015). Swaziland, land-
locked within South Africa, imports over 80% of its electricity from
South Africa, resulting in the highest energy tariffs in the region
(African Development Bank, 2013). Consequentially, the Swazi gov-
ernment has made an ambitious commitment to obtaining 32% of
electricity from renewable energy in its INDC by 2030, a move likely to
be primarily motivated by the inherent energy sovereignty increase as
domestic production would replace imports. In West Africa, political
incentives are expected to drive Nigeria to prioritise meeting domestic
supply over exporting energy (International Energy Agency, 2014).
2.3. Efficacy of political institutions
The efficacy of political institutions comprises both institutional
capacity and type. First, institutional capacity is often seen as a key
prerequisite for successful electrification in developing countries
(World Bank, 2014). As electricity planning is usually carried out cen-
trally (Trotter, 2016), functioning institutions exerting control over its
national territories facilitate implementing large-scale electrification
programmes (World Bank, 2010). An important part of institutional
capacity is the ability to exert political leadership (Energising
Development Initiative, 2016). For example, strong state leadership has
been found to be crucial for ensuring that utilities cooperate effectively
with governments in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as for enabling
electricity trade beyond state borders (Malgas and Eberhard, 2011).
Where it has been absent, electrification projects have frequently failed
(Africa Progress Panel, 2015).
Second, several studies demonstrate the merits of democratic in-
stitutions for electrification in Africa as infrastructure endowments
appear to be used to win over voters (Ahlborg et al., 2015; Trotter,
2016). The increasing number of democratic elections in sub-Saharan
Africa in the early 1990s have produced more pro-active administra-
tions willing to adopt encompassing energy policies (Karekezi, 1994).
In Nigeria, contested elections have sped up electricity sector reforms
and reduced tariffs to broaden political support (Eberhard et al., 2016).
Vice versa, electrification is argued to be key for the political empow-
erment of decentralised rural communities as it eases political partici-
pation, fostering democracy ‘from below’ (Kaijuka, 2007).
2.4. Political instability
Political instability is a significant barrier to electrification as ca-
pacity upgrades are often suspended during politically highly volatile
periods. For example, Idi Amin's presidency in Uganda or Liberia's civil
wars have been shown to follow such trajectories (Engurait, 2005).
Political instability furthermore has important implications for inter-
national energy trade. The Grand Inga dam in DRC, the largest pro-
posed hydropower station in the world at 44 GW, has been criticised for
bundling network risks (Green et al., 2015). The International Energy
Agency (IEA) states that cross-border trade requires political stability
over several decades to flourish (International Energy Agency, 2014).
Its report links low East African energy exports to political uncertainties
in South Sudan, a major regional hub for crude oil. Similarly, it argues
that Madagascar has so far failed to use its considerable energy re-
sources for export due to political instabilities. Another example con-
cerns the 200MW Manantali dam in Mali (Gnansounou et al., 2007).
While it has produced electricity for Mali, Mauritania and Senegal since
2001, thereby providing an example of successful regional electricity
trade between countries with notably different political risk profiles in
sub-Saharan Africa, the 1989 Mauritania – Senegal Border War delayed
the construction of the dam and its international electricity transmis-
sion by more than a decade (Niasse, 2005).
Different generation technologies have considerably different poli-
tical instability risk implications. While scarce fossil resources such as
oil have long been known to function as a monetary source to fund
armed conflicts (Collier et al., 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), Ohu-
nakin et al. call solar energy a “conflict neutral energy source”
((Ohunakin et al., 2014) p.298). Being abundant, free of charge and
inexhaustible for any relevant time frame, solar insulation can neither
be used to finance conflict nor will it be the subject of conflict.
2.5. Private political interests
African electrification has frequently been the subject of politicians’
private interest (Acker and Kammen, 1996). Electrification policies in
Zambia in the 1970s have openly favoured urban over rural dwellers,
increasing the urban-rural electrification gap and consolidating the
urban elites’ power (Mihalyi, 1977). In Ethiopia in the 1990s, Tigray
Province, home of long-term president Meles Zenawi, was favoured in
receiving electrification endowments (Teferra, 2002). Excessive cor-
ruption has occurred in the power sector. Managers from Tanzania's
state utility TANESCO irregularly withdrew electrification funds
amounting to USD 124 million and wired them into several off-shore
accounts, forcing the resignation of several senior politicians (Africa
Progress Panel, 2015). Ironically, the formal parliamentary discussion
of these allegations was interrupted by a power cut.
Certain generation technologies and electricity transmission con-
tracts have been implemented based solely on politicians’ preferences.
For example, as hydropower resources were located in northern Nigeria
as opposed to the fossil resources in the south, northern Nigerian po-
liticians in government in the 1970s prioritised hydropower over fossil
fuels to focus electrification on northern Nigeria (Ayodele, 1982).
Government changes have since reverted energy favouritism, now
benefiting Southern over Northern Nigeria (Emodi and Yusuf, 2015).
The geographical relocation is affecting trade with Nigeria's northern
neighbour Niger and its southern neighbour Benin. While in recent
years, Nigerian imports have been increasingly unable to supply de-
mand in Niger (Gado, 2015), Nigeria has built new high-voltage
transmission lines to export electricity to Benin which is closer to its
fossil fuel resources in the south. Furthermore, as the state can manage
national and cross-country extensions of the grid via centralised poli-
tical structures, they have been preferred over decentralised approaches
involving a loss of control for central state institutions in Uganda and
Ethiopia (Buchholz and Da Silva, 2010; Verhoeven, 2013).
2.6. Politicised land access
African land access can be highly politicised (Boone, 2014). Less
than 10% of land can be marketed freely in sub-Saharan Africa, with
the vast majority being subject to complex socio-cultural customary
user rights. Land usage in Africa is known to have been at the root of
several armed conflicts and continuing political struggles (Boone,
2007). Land conflicts can be a severe hindrance for renewables as they
generally require more land than fossil fuels to generate a unit of
electricity (Wesseh and Lin, 2016). The International Renewable En-
ergy Agency (IRENA) points out that large-scale land acquisitions by
foreign companies have become increasingly contentious in Africa
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015a). For example, se-
curing permits for solar power plants in new locations can be a
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considerable challenge in Nigeria due to complex land tenure regimes
(Ohunakin et al., 2014). Communities have prevented foreigners from
owning land for fear of destruction of their heritage, constituting a
socio-political barrier to decentralised technologies. In Uganda, the
expansion of the transmission network required for international trade
in East Africa continues to be delayed in several locations due to pro-
blems of developers to gain land access rights (Republic of Uganda,
2015).
3. Methods and data
This section shows how the six relevant political factors can be used
in a bi-criteria optimisation model. Section 3.1 discussess modelling
assumptions, Section 3.2 briefly presents a linear programming (LP)
single-criterion cost minimisation model of the African generation and
transmission network, building on previously published research
(Sanoh et al., 2014; Taliotis et al., 2016). The novel bi-criteria extension
is presented in Section 3.3 which features a set of entirely linear con-
straints that incorporate the six political factors discussed in Section 2.
These constraints are designed to capture the general notion of each of
the six factors rather than attempting to model all their complex facets.
Section 3.4 describes the solution algorithm.
3.1. Modelling assumptions
Recent previous work has explicitly modelled the African network
in detail (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015b; Ouedraogo,
2017; Taliotis et al., 2016), and presented an instructive, spatially ex-
plicit least-cost analysis of electrification technologies in Africa (Mentis
et al., 2017). Rather than re-attempting an overly detailed model of the
African electrification network, the intention of the bi-objective model
presented in this paper is to showcase the significant impact political
risks can have on the optimal solution. Therefore, the modelling ex-
ercise is focused on how to include the six political factors discussed in
Section 2 into a relatively simple electricity trade planning model. The
electricity trade part of the model is highly similar to what Sanoh et al.
(2014) presented, with a number of minor necessary modifications. The
simplicity of the model implies a number of limiting assumptions. The
model is solely concerned with optimally matching additional annual
electricity demand (arising after a certain baseline time period) with
different supply options. All demand and supply before the baseline is
considered sunk, any installed capacity which has to be retired before
the final planning time period is reflected as a demand increase. Each
country is modelled as a single demand node (see Sanoh et al., 2014;
Trotter et al., 2017a) with several, technologically specific potential
supply nodes. Consequentially, the costs of delivering electricity to the
end user, either incurred as distribution costs through the national grid
or by paying for off-grid solutions in communities far removed from the
grid, are exogenous to the model and only reflected in constant added
cost premiums to all unit transmission cost. The model therefore does
not explicitly differ between on-grid and off-grid solutions, the latter
accounting for 5–10% of the chosen capacity in the IRENA study
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015b). Furthermore, fol-
lowing common practice in the planning literature (International
Renewable Energy Agency, 2012, 2013, 2015b; Sanoh et al., 2014,
Trotter et al., 2017), the model uses levelised cost of electrification
(LCOE) per unit of produced MWh for all cost parameters. These costs
can be calculated by assuming an interest rate, a lifetime of the plant,
capital and annual operational costs and the plant's capacity factor. The
costs are time-dependent in accordance with projected capital and op-
erational cost developments until 2030 (International Renewable
Energy Agency, 2013).
Furthermore, this paper does not explicitly model primary energy
but only electricity trade, instead focusing on renewable energy ex-
pansion. Building on assumptions made by Sanoh et al. (2014), it caps
new fossil fuel generation capacity additions at future domestic demand
levels. A country can therefore only export additional electricity to
what has been exported in the past if it installs excess renewable energy
capacity to enable this export. Three factors serve to justify this as-
sumption. Firstly, international electrification initiatives and academia
are both increasingly convinced that new capacity additions in Africa
will be dominated by renewable energy by 2030 (European Union
Energy Initiative, 2016; International Renewable Energy Agency,
2015b; Power Africa, 2017; Taliotis et al., 2016). Much of the new
international electrifiication initiatives' investments specifically target
renewables. Secondly, by focusing on renewables, this paper con-
tributes to the literature on energy leapfrogging, showing its feasibility
and implementation suggestions for the electricity transmission infra-
structure which is yet to be built (see Amankwah-Amoah, 2015;
Murphy, 2001; Perkins, 2003; Szabo et al., 2013). Thirdly, the applic-
ability of the assumption has been demonstrated in previous work
(Sanoh et al., 2014). Trotter (2017) comments on several errors in other
areas of Sanoh et al.’s (2014) original work. By basing the electricity
trade model on Sanoh et al.’s (2014) work, the single-objective case in
this paper where no political risk constraint is active thus also corrects
and remedies the flaws in this previous study.
While these limitations exist, the goal of this paper is to demonstrate
how political factors can be introduced to quantitative planning models
covering different political entities, generation technologies and time
frames, as well as to which degree they change the solution. In contrast
to regions with more homogenous political risk profiles, including po-
litical risks in planning models for Africa appears to be highly relevant
as they can be expected to considerably alter cost-optimal solutions.
Africa's political risk landscape ranges from firm and peaceful democ-
racies with comparably small external pressures like Botswana or Benin
to instable, corrupt regimes with high international commitments to-
wards a sustainable energy transitions like Sudan or Guinea. This
warrants the usage of new, multi-criteria planning models to enable
better informed infrastructure decisions. The model's linearity allows
for a straight-forward interpretation of adding the additional political
risk criterion to the model.
3.2. Single-criteria optimisation model of the African generation and
transmission network
Expressions (3.1) – (3.5) below represent the LP generation expan-
sion planning model. It optimally meets the additional demand of ∈d D
demand nodes using a mix of ∈g G different generation technologies
from ∈s S supply nodes over ∈t T time periods. In the numeric African
electricity network example, the LP consists of 46 countries, i.e. 45 of
the 48 continental African countries (data for The Gambia, South Sudan
and Equatorial Guinea were not comprehensively available) as well as
Madagascar. The year 2010 is defined as a baseline and all new demand
arises in 4 discrete time periods 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 versus
2010, with all 2010 electricity demand and existing production meeting
this demand considered sunk and not included in the model. The ex-
ample includes 7 different generation technologies, namely solar PV,
onshore wind, hydro, geothermal, coal, centralised oil and natural gas.
All data sources are given in Appendix B.
The objective is to minimise LCOE which consists of lifetime gen-
eration and transmission cost (Sanoh et al., 2014).
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ +gencost x transcost xmin
sϵS dϵD gϵG tϵT
sgt sdgt sdgt sdgt
(3.1)
The concepts of modelling parameters gencostsgt and transcostsdgt are
taken from Sanoh et al. (2014). Parameter gencostsgt denotes the leve-
lised generation cost in supply country s of a unit of electricity pro-
duced by generation technology g at time t (in 2010 USD/GWh).
Parameter transcostsdgt is the levelised transmission cost from supply
node s to demand node d of a unit of electricity produced by generation
technology g at time t (in 2010 USD/GWh). It explicitly includes costs
due to energy losses. Cost data from Sanoh et al. (2014) were used,
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adjusted where they were imprecise and updated to reflect price re-
ductions of renewable energy technologies (relying on (Buys et al.,
2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2011, 2012, 2013)). If
annual energy flows are used, the capacity factor of each generation
technology directly impacts the transmission costs: a solar-PV plant
producing 1 TWh electricity annually requires larger transmission ca-
pacities to evacuate this electricity than a 1 TWh hydroelectric dam.
While a 200MW dam can generate 1 TWh per year (using capacity
factors in Table 2), the significant difference between solar PV's peak
production (at noon, it could generate 570MW peak) and no produc-
tion at night requires a transmission line for the solar PV plant with
greater capacity. The transmission costs are based on a GIS approach,
assigning geo-referenced costs that depend on the location of the pri-
mary energy supply and are non-linear with distance due to exponential
system losses (Sanoh et al., 2014). It should be noted that these trans-
mission costs are calculated and fixed before being fed into the opti-
misation model as a parameter to ensure the latter's linearity.
Decision variable xsdgt describes the amount of electricity produced
at supply node s sent to demand node d produced by generation tech-
nology g in year t (in GWh).
The objective function is subject to the following constraints.














∈ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈≥x R s S d D g G t T, , ,sdgt 0 (3.5)
Parameter demanddt indicates the electricity demand projection for
node d at time t (in GWh) which has to be met at all times. Demand
projections are taken from Sanoh et al. (2014).2 Parameter supplysgt
denotes the maximum potential from supply node s of electricity pro-
duced by generation technology g at time t (in GWh) in addition to
what has been installed in 2010 (3.3). Supply potentials and calculation
assumptions are taken from Buys et al. (Buys et al., 2007). The de-
ployable capacity by 2030 is assumed to be 25% of the total theoretical
maximum potential for renewable energies (see Sanoh et al., 2014), and
10% for fossil fuels to account for the greater availability of funding for
renewable energies.3 The maximum deployable capacity is assumed to
increase linearly between until 2030. Constraint (3.4) forces the model
to use newly built infrastructure between 2015 and 2025 to be fully
utilised in subsequent time periods to enforce the assumption of using
unit LCOE costs.
In order to derive installed capacity values from the model's energy
values, Table 2 lists the assumed conversion efficiencies and capacity
factors. Where available, these values are taken from Africa-specific
reports, explaining the deviation from common technological stan-
dards. Capacity needs further increase due to an assumed 3.5% loss per
1000 km transmission (Sanoh et al., 2014).
3.3. Bi-criteria model extension: incorporating preventable political risk
To extend the cost minimisation model (3.1) – (3.5) to a bi-objective
linear programming (BOLP) model, a maximum preventable political risk
constraint is added. Solving the resulting model multiple times for dif-
ferent allowed political risk values yields the minimum cost as a function
of political risk, i.e. the optimal trade-off between the two (see Section
3.4). Preventable political risk is defined as solely the kind of political
risk in the network that can be avoided by designing the network dif-
ferently (e.g. by avoiding a reliance on politically volatile countries for
electricity export). All six individual political risk factors are modelled to
be bound between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100 (see Sections
3.3.1, 3.2.3-3.2.4, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.4, 3.3.2, 3.2.6), which makes it pos-
sible to combine all factors into one overall political risk constraint
(constraint (3.6)). This allows to study not only the cumulative effect of
political risk on the network, but also how the different risk factors in-
teract with each other and which political risks are more expensive to
mitigate versus others (see Section 4.3 for results). An alternative mod-
elling approach where each risk category would be individually con-
strained would not allow any insights into the relative cost of individual
risk mitigation, but would lead to the same overall results as neither the
cost-minimal nor the political risk-minimal solution would be affected.
The maximum preventable political risk maxPrevPolRiskt is again
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To assign values to weights …w w, ,PR PR1 6, this paper uses the fre-
quency with which the political risks are mentioned in the literature as
a proxy of their relative relevance for African electricity planning (in
accordance to Table 1). The literature in Table 1 is based on a sys-
tematic review of the African electrification planning literature (Trotter
et al., 2017b). While we acknowledge that the resulting body of lit-
erature is not a complete representation of African electricity planning,
it is highly encompassing and constitutes a varied and in-depth re-
presentation of the relevant literature. The main idea is that the more a
certain political risk is mentioned in the wider African electricity
Table 2
Assumed conversion efficiency and capacity factors for different technologies in sub-Saharan Africa.
Technology Conversion efficiency Capacity factora Sources
Solar PV 0.15 0.20 (Buys et al., 2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012; US Energy Information Administration, 2016)
Onshore wind 0.27 0.33 (Buys et al., 2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012; US Energy Information Administration, 2016)
Hydro 0.80 0.56 (Buys et al., 2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2013)
Geothermal 0.05 0.58 (Buys et al., 2007; International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012)
Coal 0.37 0.73 (International Energy Agency, 2008; US Energy Information Administration, 2016)
Natural gas 0.35 0.44 (International Energy Agency, 2008; Oyedepo et al., 2015; US Energy Information Administration, 2016)
Oil 0.36 0.54 (International Energy Agency, 2008; US Energy Information Administration, 2016)
a Capacity factors for renewable energy technologies are subject to resource availability. For example, the capacity factor for hydro is affected by droughts and for wind depends on
annual mean wind speed at the potential sites.
2 Different demand projections all foresee an additional demand of around 1100 TWh
in Africa between 2010 and 2030 (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015a; Sanoh
et al., 2014; Taliotis et al., 2016).
3 There is little difference in the optimal model results between using the same 25%
deployable potential constraints for all technologies and the case where fossil fuels are
more restricted. The LCOE in 2030 is only 7% smaller in the former scenario as the total
available capacity of power from fossil fuels is usually much greater than the demand
within reasonable distance from this supply. Hence further constraining the maximum
fossil fuel potential does not greatly change the results.
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planning literature, the more relevant this specific risk is. To determine
the weights …w w, ,PR PR1 6, the number of citations in Table 1 for each of
the six political risks is divided by the total number of citations in the
table. For instance, of the total 202 citations in Table 1, 20 concern
external political pressures. The related weight is thus
= =w 20/202 0.099PR1 , and so forth. This approach alleviates the pro-
blem of arbitrarily assigning weights, and reduces the importance of the
problem of how the political categories are defined, as more encom-
passing definitions will be mentioned more frequently and thus be
weighted more strongly than more detailed factors. To demonstrate the
model's robustness, Section 4.3 includes a scenario analysis with dif-
ferent weights wPRi.
3.3.1. External political pressure/commitments
Variable PR ExtPressure1 t models the political risk arising from not
fulfilling commitments made as part of the 2016 Paris agreement (see
Appendix A). Only firm and unconstrained commitments are considered
to potentially give rise to political risk, commitments entirely condi-
tional on external support are not considered here. When all commit-
ments are met by a country, no political risk emerges. If 50% of a
commitment is reached, say 50MW of renewable energy is installed
where 100MW were promised, the political risk of this alternative is
defined to be 50 out of 100. Committed renewable energy supply ca-
pacity additions were transformed to a domestic supply commitment,
ExtSupplyCommits, using standard capacity factors from Table 2. Simi-
larly, a green energy commitment like a minimum level of renewables
in the electricity mix or a GHG reduction target was transformed to a
demand-side commitment, ExtDemandCommitd using the current elec-
tricity mix of a country (available from (Central Intelligence Agency,
2016)).
The following expressions quantify PR ExtPressure1 t. It is 0 for all
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Variable PR ExtPressureSup1 s is 0 if the sum of all electricity pro-
duced by renewable energy systems (RES) in country s is at least as
much as its committed RES supply ExtSupplyCommits due to the non-
negativity constraint (3.12). PR ExtPressureSup1 s is 100 if the sum of all
electricity produced by RES in country s is 0 despite a non-zero com-
mitted value ExtSupplyCommits. ExtPressureSups will not exceed 100 as
soon as (3.6) is active.4 Adding a small constant ε, say 0.1, to the de-
nominator prevents division by 0 where no commitments exist. The
logic follows analogously for PR ExtPressureDem1 d. For all countries, the
maximum commitment per country (a supply commitment, a demand
commitment or neither) is modelled and used to determine
PR ExtPressure1 2030 in (3.11). Appendix C provides the numerical results
of translating the INDC commitments in Appendix A to electricity re-
quirements from renewables.
3.3.2. National energy security/sovereignty
Variable PR EnergySov2 t denotes the political risk arising from not
meeting the national energy sovereignty target EnergySovd at time t,
defined as the desirable fraction of the total electricity demand in a
country to be supplied domestically.
≥ ∙























∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈≥ ≥PR EnergySovDem R PR EnergySov R d D t T2 , 2 ,dt t0 0
(3.15)
Variable PR EnergySovDem2 dt is 0 if at least fraction EnergySovd of the
demand is produced domestically, i.e. where supply country s equals
demand country d. It is 100 if a country imports all of its electricity
demand and has a sovereognty target greater 0. Eq. (3.14) calculates
the overall political risk from lacking national energy sovereignty as a
simple arithmetic average over all countries.
Data for the desired fraction EnergySovd are generally difficult to
obtain and are subject to government preferences. The literature dis-
cusses values between 40% and 80% of demand (Sanoh et al., 2014).
For the numerical example in this paper, the value of 50% has been set
for all countries.
3.3.3. Efficacy of political institutions
Variable PR InstEffic3 t models the political risk associated with a
network relying on electricity exports produced in countries with poor
political institutions.
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∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈≥ ≥PR InstEfficSup R PR InstEffic R s S t T3 , 3 ,st t0 0 (3.18)
Eq. (3.16) considers the two effects argued to be relevant in Section
3.2.3, namely institutional capacity and regime type. The respective
measures InstIneffects and Autocracys are averaged and multiplied with
exported electricity, i.e. xsdgt where ≠s d. The resulting metric does not
measure a country's actual performance but quantifies the institutional
inefficacy risk of a country. The approach of averaging these two values
can be justified by their correlation for the countries included in this
study: in the African countries modelled, they are strongly positively
associated, with a simple linear regression showing statistical sig-
nificance beyond a p < 0.0001 level. This positive association is evi-
dent in the literature which frequently jointly discusses both regime
type and institutional effectiveness (Trotter, 2016). It furthermore im-
plies that different methods to construct a joint measure for instruc-
tional inefficacy from autocracy and institutional ineffectiveness scores
has a minimal impact on the institutional inefficacy risk. InstIneffects is
available for all African countries up to the year 2014 on a − 2.5
(lowest institutional effectiveness) to 2.5 (highest institutional effec-
tiveness) scale from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
4 To force the upper bound of 100 to be applied even if (3.6) is inactive and without
explicitly assigning the upper bound for every political risk variable, one could add the 6
individual political risk factors multiplied by a small positive factor, say 0.01, to the
objective function to force the political risks to be as small as possible. As the order of
magnitude for the total LCOE is billion USD, assigning a maximum value of 1 USD in such
a way does not noticeably affect the outcome.
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(WGI) (World Bank, 2016). To compute its governance scores, the WGI
uses a total of 31 different individual secondary data sources in a sta-
tistical unobserved components model (Kaufmann et al., 2011). The
scale has been transformed to 0–100 for the purpose of this paper. Data
for Autocracys can be taken from the −10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full
democracy) Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015), again trans-
formed to a 0–100 scale. Both InstIneffects and Autocracys have been
calculated as 10-year averages between 2005 and 2014 to smooth-out
potential short-term volatility in the data (see Appendix C for numerical
values). This approach assumes that institutional efficacy does not
change markedly in the short term, hence relying on past indications for
the model. For instance, Botswana, an established democracy since the
1960s, has a low autocracy risk of 23.2, whereas Somalia, which has not
had a functioning government since the early 1990s, has a risk of 95.5.
Section 4.3 contains a scenario analysis where this assumption is re-
placed by one where institutional efficacy improves until 2030 due to
increased capacity building and learning efforts (the results are not
largely affected by this change).
Political risk PR InstEffic3 t is calculated as a weighted average of the
total demand in time period t. Its (theoretical) value is 100 if all de-
mand in the network is served by electricity generated in countries that
have the lowest possible institutional capacities and are full auto-
cracies. It approaches 0 if all exported electricity is generated in
countries with extremely strong institutions, or if no electricity is ex-
ported.
3.3.4. Political instability
Variable PR PolInst4 t denotes the political risk of relying on politi-
cally instable countries for electricity exports.
∑ ∑= ∀ ∈ ∈
≠ ∈
PR PolInstSup PolInst x s S t T4 ,st s















d D dt (3.20)
∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈≥ ≥PR PolInstSup R PR PolInst R s S t T4 , 4 ,st t0 0 (3.21)
Expressions (3.19) – (3.21) follow an analogous logic to those dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.3. Parameter PolInsts again is available from the
WGI and is calculated as an average between 2005 and 2014. For ex-
ample, DRC with its long and current history of armed conflicts has a
political instability risk of 93.6. This is contrasted by cases such as
Namibia, which, following its successful policy of national reconcilia-
tion after its war of independence (1966–1990) and establishment of an
inclusive and stable multiparty democracy, has a risk of 32.6.5
3.3.5. Private political interests
Variable PR PolInterest5 t describes political risk from private political
interference in policy decisions and implementation. While many of
such aspects are difficult to capture, this paper uses a measure for
corruption as a proxy.
∑ ∑= ∀ ∈ ∈
≠ ∈
PR PolInterestSup Corruption x s S t T5 ,st s















d D dt (3.23)
∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈≥ ≥PR PolInterestSup R PR PolInterest R s S t T5 , 5 ,st t0 0
(3.24)
Expressions (3.22) – (3.24) repeat the modelling approach used in
Sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.2, with the defining risk parameter Corruptions si-
milarly available from the World Bank's WGI. As can be seen in Appendix
C, numerous African countries possess relatively high corruption scores,
with an unweighted average score of 63.4 out of 100 for all 46 countries in
the model. Botswana with a score of 31.0 again is a notable exception with
its high level of legal checks and balances and relatively successful, albeit
not perfect, anti-corruption policies (Manga Fombad, 1999).
3.3.6. Politicised land access
Finally, variable PR LandAcc6 t accounts for restrictive politicised
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∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈≥ ≥PR LandAccSup R PR LandAcc R s S t T6 , 6 ,st t0 0
(3.28)
To some degree, the maximum supply potentials used in this study
have already factored in land availability issues, assuming that only
0.1% of the land with high solar radiation is theoretically available
long-term, and only 0.025% until 2030, representing a mere 15% of the
relative land area the much more densely populated Germany currently
uses for solar PV (Buys et al., 2007). Expressions (3.25) and (3.26)
calculate a risk if the land requirements for solar and wind energy
supply exceed fraction LandAccs of the theoretically available land in
country s, respectively. This risk is 0 if electricity from solar and from
wind can be generated using only the fraction LandAccs of the theore-
tically available land. If LandAccs is chosen to equal 50%, which it is in
this study, the maximum resulting risk is 100. This occurs if all theo-
retically available land of either solar or wind in country s is required to
meet demand, i.e. where ∑ =∈ x supplyd D sd solar t s solar t, , , ,
∑ =∈ x supplyd D sd wind t s wind t, , , , , while any land required above
LandAccs is defined as being associated with political risk.
3.4. Solution approach
Fig. 1 illustrates the solution algorithm for the bi-criteria optimi-
sation model (3.1) – (3.28). First, all input data are supplied to the
model (see Appendix B for all data sources). When the maximum pre-
ventable risk maxPrevPolRiskt is chosen to be a fixed value, the model
becomes a simple LP which can be solved with the optimisation soft-
ware CPLEX with a standard desktop computer in a few seconds of
computational time. The algorithm first sets maxPrevPolRiskt to its
upper bound 100 and solves the resulting LP which equals the single-
criterion cost optimisation as political risk is unconstrained. After re-
cording this solution, maxPrevPolRiskt is set to the political risk value
present in the unconstrained case minus a small number, say 1. The
resulting LP (3.1) – (3.28) is solved again and the solution recorded.
The overall political risk constraint (3.6) will become active, from now
on the model is solved while constraining the preventable political risk
by a small number in every iteration until either an instance of the
model with zero political risk is solved, or until no solution for a given
political risk value exists anymore. As the solution space becomes more
and more constrained, the cost minimum necessarily increases
5 The World Bank assigned a score of slightly below the minimum −2.5 value to
Somalia in its WGI dataset during most of the last 10 years, as the country did not meet
the basic criteria of having any kind of government in place for which one could judge its
stability.
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monotonously. Plotting all cost minima versus the corresponding al-
lowed political risk values yields the Pareto-efficient set of non-domi-
nated cost-political risk solutions.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Quantification of the cost versus political risk trade-off
Fig. 2 presents the solution in terms of non-dominated LCOE and
political risk tuples. The political risk in the network for a pure cost-
optimisation that does not constrain political risk is 29.1, corresponding
to a LCOE of 128.6 bn. USD in 2030. Given that the maximum pre-
ventable political risk value of 100 is highly theoretical (see Section
3.3), this value indicates a significant amount of political risk in the
minimum-cost solution. One of the main reasons for this is the abun-
dant amount of some of the cheapest renewable energy potential in
Africa in some of the continent's most politically risky countries. Hydro
potential in DRC and onshore wind in Sudan and Somalia stand out in
this regard, with high-demand countries Egypt (for Sudan) and Kenya,
Ethiopia and Tanzania (for Somalia) close by. Taking together institu-
tional efficacy, political stability and anti-corruption scores, DRC,
Sudan and Somalia rank at number 44, 45 and 46 of all 46 countries in
the model, respectively. At the same time, 53.4% or 226.5 TWh of all
exported electricity in the cost-minimal solution originates from these
three countries.
Fig. 2 further shows the price of reducing the political risk in the
network in terms of LCOE. Initially, considerable portions of the pre-
ventable political risk in the network can be mitigated at little extra
cost. Cutting the risk by 50% to an overall value of 14.6 increases the
LCOE by only 4%. As Section 4.2 illustrates, this is entirely achieved by
substituting international wind for domestic solar energy in key pro-
jects. Due to marginal cost increases, a political risk value of 10 raises
the LCOE by 8.0% to 138.9 bn. USD, and a value of 1 by 29.5% to 166.5
bn. USD. Preventable political risks can be reduced to 0.15, beyond
which there is no feasible solution. Again, this 0.15 figure does not
include any system-inherent risks which inevitably arise when a poli-
tically volatile country oversees the electrification for its own people.
4.2. Political risk mitigation strategies: primary energy mix and trade
Fig. 3 shows the optimal amount of electricity produced by different
primary energy sources. In the cost-minimal scenario, 37% of the
electricity is produced from fossil fuels, 34% from hydro, 19% from
onshore wind, 7% from solar and 3% from geothermal energy. As the
maximum allowed political risk decreases, the optimisation model
chooses electricity from solar PV to gradually substitute first wind and
then hydro energy. Despite its relative high costs, solar PV is thus the
most cost-efficient technology to reduce political risk in the network at
any given political risk value allowed. Cutting the first 50% of political
risk can be achieved by substituting wind export projects based in So-
malia, Mauritania, Madagascar, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, Chad and
Western Sahara through domestic solar PV increases in 21 different
countries, increasing costs by only 4%. At a political risk value of 5 (one
sixth of the cost-minimal value), solar energy accounts for 32% of
electricity while hydro and wind have decreased to 25% and 4%,
Fig. 1. Bi-criteria optimisation model solution algorithm.
Fig. 2. Pareto-front of non-dominated solutions for the bi-criteria model.
Fig. 3. Source of additional electricity generation between 2011 and 2030 for different
maximum political risk values.
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respectively. This result adds a novel, more international dimension to
the notion of solar energy being a “conflict neutral energy source” in
Ohunakin et al.’s (2014) work on Nigeria. Solar energy limits overall
political risks in the international African trade network in several
ways. Due to abundant resources, it is cost-efficient to produce solar
electricity in Africa locally rather than relying on exports, thereby
increasing national energy sovereignty. Solar energy furthermore meets
international commitments to renewable energies. It effectively di-
versifies the risk of relying on a few (politically volatile) countries to
produce large electricity exports by domesticizing generation and
downscaling project sizes. The share of electricity demand that is met
through imports in 2030 falls from 38.6% in the cost-minimal scenario
to 8.1% when the maximum political risk value is 5.
Fig. 3 furthermore shows the total amount of GHG emissions is
practically constant for all political risk values greater than 1 in the
model. This is mainly due to the modelling assumption that electricity
exports from fossil fuels are not permitted and strictly national political
risks are not seen as being preventable by different network designs (see
Section 3.2). In the cost-minimal solution with no political risk con-
straint, the model chooses domestic electricity generation from fossil
fuels where countries possess cheap resources. The modelling feature of
restricting exports to renewable energy technologies therefore makes it
possible to study the trade-offs between cost and political risk at ap-
proximately constant environmental impact level in the African net-
work.
The dominance of solar PV for low political risk becomes most
salient when comparing installed capacity additions in Fig. 4A – D. As
solar PV has a lower capacity factor than the technologies it is sub-
stituting, more total installed capacity (in GW) is needed to meet the
same new demand. While the cost-minimal solution meets the new
demand of 1099 TWh by adding a total of 283.2 GW capacity, the op-
timal solution for a preventable political risk of 10 requires 321.5 GW.
Fig. 4. Optimal capacity additions between 2011 and 2030 for different maximum preventable political risk values.
Fig. 5. Electricity exports from the five top exporting countries.
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This trend continues exponentially.
Fig. 5 displays exported electricity in DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan
and Libya, the 5 countries with the largest exports in the cost-minimal
solution. Exports from DRC to Zambia, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda
and the Central African Republic originate from the abundant and
cheap hydro potential at the Inga Falls. The cost-minimal solution in-
stalls a 38 GW hydroelectric dam at the site by 2030, a magnitude that
is frequently discussed and recommended (Green et al., 2015;
International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015b; Sanoh et al., 2014;
Taliotis et al., 2014; Taliotis et al., 2016; Tshombe et al., 2007). While
Ethiopia's exports also mainly stem from hydro sources, Somalia, Sudan
and Libya export mainly wind energy.
Not surprisingly, the graph shows that reducing electricity exports
from Somalia is the cheapest way of decreasing political risks via trade
measures. Somalia possesses the worst institutional effectiveness,
corruption and political instability scores of all African countries
(World Bank, 2016), allowing the optimisation to decrease overall po-
litical risk by limiting the reliance on Somalia's wind capacity. Sudan's
and Libya's exports decrease shortly after, while electricity exports from
DRC start to fall rapidly from a political risk of 12 onwards (i.e. when
40% of the original preventable political risk is left in the network). In
the cost-minimal solution, 28% of all network exports originate from
DRC. If the model is solved with no maximum political risk constraint
but prohibiting hydro exports from DRC, the LCOE of the whole net-
work rises by 11% to 142.7 bn. USD in 2030 while the political risk
inherent in the entire network automatically falls by 13% to 25.3.
Whereas it is relatively costly to rid the network of the political risk
induced by heavily relying on exports from DRC, the findings never-
theless question the notion of constructing enormous hydro capacity at
the Grand Inga dam in DRC without considering its significant risk
Fig. 6. A: Schematic map of cost-minimal African transmission network in 2030. B: Schematic map of the optimal African transmission network in 2030 for preventable political risk = 10.
Note: The length of the transmission lines are indicative only, based solely on distance between capital cities. Depending on the location of energy potentials and demand hubs, some
transmission lines would be significantly shorter. The underwater distance required to export from Madagascar to Mozambique is 440 km, three quarters of the currently longest underwater
power connection in the world between the Netherlands and Norway. B: Schematic map of African transmission network for political risk =10 in 2030.
Fig. 7. Level of individual political risk factors at different maximum overall risk allowed.
Fig. 8. Pareto-front for different weights of political factors.
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implications.
As Ethiopia's political circumstances are more favourably relative to
countries like DRC, Somalia, Sudan or Libya, it continues to export until
the preventable political risk is close to 0. The graph confirms the in-
tuition that higher export levels increase political risk as stability and
effectiveness is required in more countries to meet the demand of an
importing country.
The optimal African transmission network in terms of electricity
transmitted across borders p.a. in 2030 is illustrated in Fig. 6A for the
cost-minimum and in Fig. 6B for a political risk value of 10. For sim-
plicity, all transmissions are depicted between capital cities. The cost-
minimal solution trades substantial amounts of electricity in most po-
pulous regions, with export spikes in Central and Eastern Africa. Of the
46 countries modelled, all countries except for Burkina Faso either
export or import electricity. 12 countries fully depend on electricity
imports to meet their additional demand between 2010 and 2030 (see
Appendix D). Individual country results are contingent on demand as-
sumptions, with relatively sharp demand increases projected to occur in
Zambia and Mozambique (see demand projection model in Sanoh et al.,
2014). It is cheapest for South Africa to meet most of its demand
through its domestic coal supply and transmit the hydro energy from
DRC to other Southern African and Western African countries.
Fig. 6B shows that political risk is decreased through both limiting
the number of electricity trades (fewer lines) as well as substituting
electricity imports with domestic generation (thinner lines). 14 of the
46 countries do not participate in any kind of electricity trade. No
country in the network is totally import-dependent, all but one country
generates at least 50% of its additional demand in 2030. The trends
visible when comparing Fig. 6A and B continue further as the maximum
preventable risk is further decreased. Appendix E features a map for a
risk value of 5.
4.3. Individual political risk factors
Fig. 7 illustrates how the 6 individual risk factors develop as the
overall maximum risk is reduced. It documents the existence of pre-
ventable political risks along all six factors. As high export levels
manage to significantly reduce costs, political risks arising from na-
tional energy sovereignty concerns are relatively high in the cost-
minimal solution. At least initially, however, it is relatively cheap to
reduce this risk. Its level can be halved if the LCOE is allowed to in-
crease by a mere 0.17%. This is contrasted by political instability, in-
stitutional efficacy and corruption risks which are considerably more
expensive to reduce in the network. The persistence of land access risks
even at low overall allowed risk has implications for long-term energy
planning, as land will become scarcer as future African populations rise.
It should be noted that all six political risks are monotonously falling
with reduced overall risk, indicating that the cost-optimal strategy is
not to compensate one political risk with another, but find measures
that simultaneously reduces several different risks.
Finally, in order to show the model's robustness to different weights
of the political factors in Eq. (3.6), Fig. 8 shows the solution of the BOLP
for five additional weight assumptions. One might argue that weights
solely based on frequency of occurrence in the literature (see Section
3.3) understate the relative impact that some risks may have over
others. Fig. 8 therefore includes a number of different weighting sce-
narios. The “Geometrical weights” cases assign weights where each




the most important political factor is weighted with =x 0.50411 , while
the least important is weighted with = =x 0.5041 0.0166 6 , less than 2%
of the highest weight. The “Geometric weights I” scenario assigns these
weights while keeping the order of relative importance of the political
factors as revealed by the literature review. “Geometric weights II”
instead assumes political instability has the largest impact (weight of
0.5041) due to the destructive force of conflict for infrastructure, and
all other factors follow as per their frequency in the literature review.
“Clustered weights I” assigns an equal weight of 0.2 to the four most
mentioned factors and 0.1 to the remaining two, “Clustered weights II”
assigns an equal weight of 0.3 to the three most mentioned factors and
0.0333 to the remaining three. Finally, one could expect that in the
future, processes of democratisation and institutional capacity building
will lower political risks. “Institutional improvement” thus assumes that
by 2030, the political risks arising from poor institutions and political
instability are reduced compared to present-day levels by 20% and
10%, each. Due to the linearity of the political risk constraint, this is
equivalent to reducing the respective weight coefficients of the asso-
ciated risk components in Eq. (3.6). It should be noted that for this
implementation, one has to deactivate constraint (3.7), or lower each
institutional and political instability risk accordingly.
As Fig. 8 indicates, different weights for political risks in the African
network do not greatly alter the BOLP results. Neither the minimal cost
solution of 128.6 bn. USD LCOE in 2030 nor the solution with (close to)
zero preventable political risk of around 190 bn. USD LCOE in 2030 can
be affected by different weights. In between these extreme values,
combined political risks due to poor institutions, corruption and in-
stability occurring in a country at the same time smooth out the relative
importance of individual risks. In the base case, a LCOE increase of
3.2% allowed a 50% reduction of the political risk in the network. This
value is only slightly higher (3.9%) in the other weighting scenarios on
average. The result of solar energy increases at the expense of first wind
and then hydro energy with decreasing political risk remains intact, and
in three of the five scenarios, this development is even slightly ac-
celerated. The overall trade effects similarly are little affected.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
Using the social science literature on African electrification, this
paper has distilled six political factors which have been documented to
affect electrification. It has shown how in general these political factors
can be used as part of linear bi-criteria optimisation models. The
model's application to the African generation and transmission network
has produced a number of novel findings which translate to several
notable policy implications.
First, the cost-minimal African generation and transmission network
focused on renewable energy expansion carries substantial amounts of
preventable political risk. This is mainly due to considerable portions of
the most cost-efficient abundant renewable resources in Africa being
located in some of the continent's most politically volatile countries, for
instance hydro resources in DRC as well as onshore wind in Somalia,
Sudan, Mauritania, Chad and Libya. It appears imperative that policy
makers consider the different political risk implications of international
electricity generation projects rather than continuing a historically
strong focus on short-term cost minimisation in African infrastructure
endowments.
Second, the bi-criteria model shows that domestic solar PV share
increases are the most cost-efficient technology to reduce preventable
political risks in the network. Despite solar PV's costs, this result holds
true for any given incremental political risk reduction step in the op-
timal network. As the solar PV share increases, energy sovereignty and
GHG emission goals are met while markedly decreasing renewable
energy generation for export in politically volatile countries. Initially, it
is relatively cheap to mitigate significant fractions of the political risk in
the network. Cutting political risk by 50% can be achieved by in-
creasing the LCOE in 2030 by 4%. Additional risk reductions become
more expensive the lower the overall allowed risk is. The result of solar
P.A. Trotter et al. Energy Policy 117 (2018) 108–126
119
energy decreasing the political risk of the network in Africa challenges
the often advocated push for hydroelectric energy megaprojects in
Africa (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2013, 2015b; Sanoh
et al., 2014), thereby adding to concerns discussed in Green et al.
(2015). This result that would be even stronger if the model accounted
for the often opaque and undemocratic structures of electricity mega-
projects themselves (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2014).
Third, the political risk factors mentioned most frequently in the
literature, namely weak political institutions, political instability and
corruption, also constitute the areas where political risk is most pro-
minent in the network. This is especially true when considering the
system-inherent risks of politically volatile countries delivering elec-
trification services to their domestic populations, a type of risk that is
not modlled in this paper as it cannot be influenced by different in-
ternational electricity network designs. While support to overcome such
political problems is expensive and may take decades to complete, the
potential pay-offs for Africa are considerable. If political realities al-
lowed large-scale usage of hydro and wind sources from DRC, Somalia,
Sudan and Libya without much concerns, achieving a continental sus-
tainable and resilient African electricity network based solely on
renewables would be greatly eased.
It is important to note that many political risks are qualitative and
complex in nature, and cannot be captured easily in quantitative
models. The value of the model presented in this paper is not to provide
a complete picture of the politics of electrification in Africa, but rather
to illustrate the implication such factors can have, and how different
technology choices have different risk mitigation potential. Future work
could integrate the political risk factors identified here into more de-
tailed engineering planning models which may contain non-linear
modelling elements, as well as different sub-national levels of analyses.
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Unconditional INDC commitments by continental African Countries by 2030 against Business-as-Usual Case (Parties of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, 2015).
Country INDC Commitments Country INDC Commitments
RES generation GHG reduction RES generation GHG reduction
Algeria 27% 7% Libya – –
Angola +880MW 35% Madagascar - (fully conditional: 79% by 2025) - (fully conditional: 14%)
Benin +20MW 3% Malawi +371MW - (fully conditional: 47%)
Botswana – 15% Mali 10% by 2020 12%
Burkina Faso 11% GHG reduction in generation 7% Mauritania 1% GHG reduction in generation 2%
Burundi – 3% Morocco 42% by 2020 (of installed capacity) 13%
Cameroon 25% by 2035 - (fully conditional: 32% by 2035) Mozambique – - (fully conditional: 76 MtCO2)
CAR – - (fully conditional: 5%) Namibia 70% 9%
Chad +160MW 18% against BAU Niger +25MW 4%
Congo, Rep. - (fully conditional: 90% by 2025) - (fully conditional: 48% by 2025) Nigeria +13,000MW 20%
Cote d'Ivoire 42% 28% Rwanda – - (fully conditional: ~8 MtCO2)
Djibouti +250MW 40% Senegal +304MW 5%
DRC – - (fully conditional: 17%) Sierra Leone – - (fully conditional: 25%)
Egypt – – Somalia – –
Eritrea 70% 39% South Africa +5200MW –
Ethiopia 3% GHG reduction in generation 64% (partly conditional) Sudan 20% –
Gabon 80% hydropower in 2025 50% by 2025 Swaziland 32% –
Ghana 10% 15% Tanzania – 10%
Guinea +1697MW RES 13% Togo 4% 11%
Guinea-Bissau - (fully conditional: 80% by 2025) – Tunisia 30% 13% carbon intensity reduction
Kenya – - (fully conditional: 30%) Uganda +330MW 6%
Lesotho – 10% Zambia – 25%
Liberia 30% 10% Zimbabwe - (fully conditional: ~+400MW) - (fully conditional: 33%)





List of model sets, parameters and variables including data sources.
Model-elements Description Source
Sets
s Sϵ 46 electricity-supplying countries in the network (for a full list see Appendix A) –
d Dϵ 46 electricity-demanding countries in the network (for a full list see Appendix A) –
g Gϵ 7 generation technologies (solar PV, wind, hydro, geothermal, coal, oil, gas) –
t Tϵ 4 time periods (2015, 2020, 2025, 2030) –
Parameters
gencostsgt Generation cost in supply country s of electricity produced with generation technology g
at time t
(Buys et al., 2007; International Renewable Energy Agency,
2011, 2012, 2013; Sanoh et al., 2014)
transcostsdgt Transmission cost from supply country s to demand country d of electricity produced
with generation technology g at time t
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012; Sanoh et al.,
2014)
demanddt Electricity demand projection in MWh of country d at time t (Sanoh et al., 2014)
supplysgt Maximum potential supply in MWh cost in country s of electricity produced with
generation technology g at time t
(Buys et al., 2007)
maxPolRisk Maximum allowed political risk in the network, ranging between a theoretical maximum
value of 100 and a theoretical minimum level of 0
(this paper)
ExtSupplyCommits Committed additional annual amount of generated electricity in GWh of country s
supplied through renewable energies by 2030, calculated based on the country's INDC
(Parties of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change
Conference, 2015)
ExtDemandCommitd Committed additional annual amount of consumed electricity in GWh of country s from
renewable energy sources by 2030, calculated based on the country's INDC and its
current electricity mix
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2016; Parties of the 2015 United
Nations Climate Change Conference, 2015)
EnergySovd Percentage of consumed electricity in demand country d that is desired to be produced
domestically
(Sanoh et al., 2014), (this paper)
InstIneffects Degree of institutional ineffectiveness in country s on a 0 – 100 scale, transformed from
WGI Government Effectiveness index
(World Bank, 2016)
Autocracys Degree of autocracy in country s on a 0 – 100 scale, transformed from the Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015)
PolInsts Degree of political instability in country s on a 0 – 100 scale, transformed from WGI
Political Stability and Absence of Violence index
(World Bank, 2016)
Corruptions Degree of corruption in country s on a 0 – 100 scale, transformed from WGI Control of
Corruption index
(World Bank, 2016)
LandAccs Percentage of the technologically and socially available land in country s that is also
politically available for deploying solar and wind energy
(this paper)
Variables
xsdgt Amount of electricity in MWh produced in supply country s shipped to demand country d
produced with generation technology g at time t
–
PR1ExtPressureSups Political risk on a 0 – 100 scale if country s misses its INDC green supply commitments –
PR1ExtPressureDemd Political risk on a 0 – 100 scale if country d misses its INDC green consumption
commitments
–
PR1ExtPressuret Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale for missing INDC commitments –
PR2EnergySovDemdt Political risk on a 0 – 100 scale if country d misses its energy sovereignty target at time t –
PR2EnergySovt Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale for missing energy sovereignty targets at time t –
PR3InstEfficSupst Amount of exported electricity multiplied by the degree of institutional inefficacy of
country s
–
PR3InstEffict Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale at time t based on the degree of institutional
inefficacy of electricity exporting countries
–
PR4PolInstSupst Amount of exported electricity multiplied by the degree of political instability of country
s
–
PR4PolInstt Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale at time t based on the degree of political instability
of electricity exporting countries
–
PR5PolInterestSupst Amount of exported electricity multiplied by the degree of corruption of country s –
PR5PolInterestt Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale at time t based on the degree of corruption of
electricity exporting countries
–
PR6LandAccSupst Political risk on a 0 – 100 scale if country s requires an amount of land that may not be
available for political reasons at time t
–
PR6LandAcct Network-wide risk on a 0 – 100 scale for requiring amounts of land for solar and wind
power that may not be available for political reasons at time t
–




















Algeria 0 17,086 50 60.9 64.5 73.6 60.1 50
Angola 4320 0 50 73.0 70.1 58.9 76.6 50
Benin 98 0 50 60.8 19.3 43.7 64.4 50
Botswana 0 1073 50 40.2 23.2 29.8 31.0 50
Burkina Faso 0 578 50 62.2 47.6 54.9 57.8 50
Burundi 0 1 50 72.6 60.6 78.8 72.8 50
Cameroon 0 1613 50 67.1 75.4 60.5 71.4 50
CAR 0 0 50 79.8 64.4 88.7 69.7 50
Chad 372 0 50 79.1 78.2 80.5 76.3 50
Congo, Rep. 0 0 50 74.7 67.5 61.6 72.5 50
Djibouti 1227 0 50 68.8 66.8 51.0 58.4 50
DRC 0 0 50 83.0 78.4 93.6 76.9 50
Egypt 0 0 50 60.6 71.2 70.6 61.9 50
Eritrea 0 979 50 77.5 90.6 65.9 60.1 50
Ethiopia 0 893 50 60.1 72.4 81.4 62.6 50
Gabon 0 2474 50 65.7 63.6 44.7 65.6 50
Ghana 0 0 50 51.1 16.2 49.3 51.3 50
Guinea 8331 0 50 73.7 67.9 82.3 72.0 50
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 50 74.2 53.5 63.6 73.2 50
Côte d'Ivoire 0 6212 50 72.6 73.9 80.9 69.7 50
Kenya 0 0 50 60.7 41.9 75.2 69.7 50
Lesotho 0 0 50 57.1 28.6 48.4 48.4 50
Liberia 0 642 50 75.6 43.4 67.5 62.6 50
Libya 0 0 50 75.3 84.5 57.7 73.9 50
Madagascar 0 0 50 66.5 50.7 59.5 56.2 50
Malawi 1821 0 50 61.5 41.7 49.7 60.6 50
Mali 0 51 50 66.5 35.2 61.0 61.4 50
Mauritania 0 12 50 67.3 63.0 63.6 63.0 50
Morocco 12,387 0 50 52.7 56.8 59.3 56.7 50
Mozambique 0 0 50 61.6 41.2 45.6 60.7 50
Namibia 0 5349 50 47.5 24.1 32.6 44.3 50
Niger 58 0 50 64.4 44.2 67.6 63.6 50
Nigeria 62,376 0 50 71.0 52.5 89.8 71.5 50
Rwanda 0 0 50 53.3 70.0 56.9 45.2 50
Senegal 706 0 50 57.9 25.9 54.3 57.7 50
Sierra Leone 0 0 50 74.2 36.3 54.6 68.7 50
Somalia 0 0 50 95.8 95.5 109.3b 84.7 50
South Africa 23,716 0 50 41.1 15.6 50.2 47.5 50
Sudan 0 570 50 77.0 91.7 97.2 77.2 50
Swaziland 0 714 50 64.0 78.1 55.2 55.8 50
Tanzania 0 1251 50 60.9 39.5 54.3 61.3 50
Togo 0 0 50 78.2 61.7 58.1 69.5 50
Tunisia 0 7237 50 45.6 65.5 54.7 52.5 50
Uganda 1413 0 50 60.4 56.7 70.2 68.1 50
Zambia 0 76 50 63.9 40.5 42.2 60.5 50
Zimbabwe 0 0 50 76.6 81.6 69.6 76.6 50
a Values calculated from the World Bank WGI as average between 2005 and 2014 to smooth out short-term volatility.
b In Somalia, the long-standing absence of a central government impedes a straight-forward assessment of political instability, prompting the World Bank to assign the equivalent of a
value greater than 100 for this category.









Political risk =29.1 Political risk =20 Political risk =10 Political risk =1
Add. domest.
production [GWh]
Imports [%] Add. domest.
production [GWh]
Imports [%] Add domest.
production [GWh]
Imports [%] Add domest.
production [GWh]
Imports [%]
Algeria 33,559 34,386 0 34,386 0 33,559 0 33,559 0
Angola 12,937 20,001 3 20,001 0 20,001 0 12,937 0
Benin 3394 0 100 1697 50 1697 50 3394 0
Botswana 4214 1454 66 2107 50 2107 50 4214 0
Burkina Faso 5373 5373 0 2686 50 5373 0 5373 0
Burundi 1687 0 100 0 100 843 50 1687 0
Cameroon 19,045 25,864 3 25,864 0 25,864 0 19,045 0
CAR 595 0 100 298 50 298 50 298 50
Chad 589 1182 0 589 0 589 0 589 0
Congo, Rep. 1563 11,374 0 11374 0 11,374 0 1563 0
Djibouti 675 0 100 1227 4 1227 0 1227 0
DRC 62,640 182,177 0 182,177 0 171,487 0 62,640 0
Egypt 148,456 52,392 65 52,392 65 136,548 8 148,456 0
Eritrea 1166 0 100 583 50 583 50 1166 0
Ethiopiaa 26,255 58,479 100 57,835 100 57,804 0 26,255 0
Gabon 3334 18,399 0 18,399 0 18,399 0 3632 0
Ghana 14,314 710 100 710 95 7157 50 14,314 0
Guinea 4140 4204 7 4204 0 4204 0 4204 0
Guinea-Bissau 360 0 100 180 50 180 50 360 0
Côte d'Ivoire 10,877 2166 80 2166 80 5439 50 10,877 0
Kenya 39,221 18,193 97 18,193 54 19,611 50 39,221 0
Lesotho 3089 3282 9 2809 9 2809 9 2809 9
Liberia 1738 4355 0 2617 0 2617 0 1963 0
Libya 19,461 43,291 3 43,291 0 19,461 0 19,461 0
Madagascar 7060 21,016 0 7060 0 7060 0 7060 0
Malawi 20,091 21,177 0 20,091 0 15,108 25 20,091 0
Mali 2954 971 100 1079 63 1477 50 1477 50
Mauritania 1345 21,516 0 18,631 0 1345 0 1345 0
Morocco 30,723 16,936 45 20,149 34 30,723 0 30,723 0
Mozambique 84,710 11,633 93 36,829 57 42,355 50 84,365 0
Namibia 7549 2871 85 3164 58 3774 50 7549 0
Niger 4400 0 100 2200 50 2200 50 4400 0
Nigeria 72,702 72,855 0 72,855 0 72,702 0 72,702 0
Rwanda 1869 0 100 0 100 1869 0 1869 0
Senegal 4883 872 82 2441 50 4883 0 4883 0
Sierra Leone 453 1678 0 1678 0 1678 0 1641 0
Somalia 1896 65,629 0 28,732 0 1896 0 1896 0
South Africa 257,828 259,171 0 259,026 0 259,026 0 259,026 0
Sudan 12902 56,166 0 56,166 0 12,902 0 12,902 0
Swaziland 2608 4071 0 2035 22 2035 22 2035 22
Tanzania 33,338 6397 81 6397 81 16,669 50 33,338 0
Togo 3634 502 100 1817 50 1817 50 3634 0
Tunisia 12,637 11,809 7 11,809 7 12,637 0 12,637 0
Uganda 18,991 1222 94 18,991 0 18,991 0 18,991 0
Zambia 64,668 5544 91 5544 91 5544 91 64,668 0
Zimbabwe 33,206 29,231 21 27,165 18 33,206 0 33,206 0
a Network-wide, it is cost-optimal for Ethiopia to export to its neighbours and import wind energy from Somalia's close-by coast.
b Demand data from (Sanoh et al., 2014).
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4.4 Conclusion and implications of Paper III for the PhD thesis 
The paper has several methodological and content-related implications for the PhD thesis. 
Methodologically, the paper helps to lay the foundation for the models used in chapters 5 and 
6 in four general ways. Firstly, the basic structure of the planning model (minimise objective 
functions subject to meeting demand, not exceeding supply potential, and allowing 
transmission) presented in the paper is the same for all planning models in this thesis. It can be 
expanded to include more detailed technical constraints for more granular cases (see chapters 
5 and 6).  
Secondly, the paper has shown a way how qualitative political factors can be approximated in 
a quantitative way and model in terms of linear optimisation objectives and constraints. The 
paper has combined existing indices from the World Bank and other data sources with sets of 
linear equations to assign political risk scores to different network configurations.  
Thirdly, modelling non-monetary optimisation objectives such that they are bounded between 
0 and 100 allows for a straight-forward way to apply the ε-constraint solution approach for 
multi-objective models by turning such models into a  single-objective problem, which is then 
solved repeatedly: The non-monetary (e.g. political or social) objective can be converted to a 
constraint, which is not allowed to exceed a certain degree of risk R, and the model with a 
remaining single cost-minimisation objective can be solved multiple times for different values 
of R ranging between 0 and 100. This is both an effective and comprehensive way to produce 
the Pareto-Front of non-dominated solutions. As the numerical complexity increases with the 
introduction of binary decision variables in chapter 6, this structure, furthermore, allows for a 
solution algorithm that utilises solutions from a previous run k-1 with Rk-1 as a feasible and 
tight initial solution in the k-th run (see the paper in chapter 6).  
Fourthly, the presented structure of assuming demand and supply options to occur at the 
centroid of a set of geographical units (in this case, a country) is applicable to different scales 
and can be used for international cases on a country-level (see chapter 5) as well as for national 
cases on a sub-national district level (see chapter 6). Crucially, this structure scales well for 
including more generation technologies as the number of additional transmission line variables 
is not affected by including more generation technologies, limiting the additional 
computational efforts required. 
As far as the results from the paper are concerned, three overarching themes start to evolve, 
which will be shown to remain valid in the two subsequent case studies. First, a pure cost-
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minimisation approach is likely to produce unfavourable outcomes in more qualitative factors 
such as political risk. In the case of the Africa-wide network, some of the cheapest renewable 
energy resources primed for export are located in some of its politically most vulnerable (DRC, 
Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Mauretania), implying that a trade network marred by high political 
risk is cost-optimal. Second, however, the inclusion of political risk as an objective shows that 
there are comparably cheap ways to mitigate some of these risks. A 3% increase in cost allows 
a network design, which eliminates 50% of the associated political risks. Third, solar energy is 
the dominant political risk-mitigating technology at any level of political risk in the network. 
Its decentral abundance and locational flexibility, coupled with rapidly falling costs and the 
scattered population pattern on the continent make it an optimal technology to decrease reliance 
on imports from political volatile countries, meet climate change-related targets and provide a 





5. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ON OPTIMAL ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN POWER POOL 
(PAPER IV) 
5.1 Content overview and thesis context 
This chapter presents an expanded multi-criteria optimisation model from what has been 
developed in chapter 4. It is aimed at generating insights into international electricity trade 
within the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) network (objective 2b in section 2.5). The 
SAPP, a regional association of 12 Southern and Central African countries, is the institutionally 
most profound such association on the continent. Similar to chapter 4, the present chapter is 
motivated by both the importance and paucity of research addressing multiple decision 
objectives in general, and political factors specifically for international electricity trade in 
Africa (chapter 2 and chapter 3).  
Informed by the findings in chapter 3, the paper in this chapter includes three distinct scenarios 
for a political risk proxy containing institutional indices on political volatility, institutional 
effectiveness, democracy and corruption. The paper argues that given the dominance of South 
Africa’s energy utility Eskom, which controls the vast majority of international electricity trade 
within the SAPP, national energy sovereignty issues, as documented in chapter 4, are 
particularly salient in the SAPP. The multi-criteria analyses thus focus on this latter aspect of 
political risk by declaring it as a separate objective in its own right. Furthermore, given South 
Africa’s reliance on coal for power generation, this paper adds an environmental objective, 
which minimises carbon emissions. The model thus becomes a Multi-Objective Linear 
Programming (MOLP) problem with 3 main objectives (costs, national energy sovereignty, 
emissions), studying the respective two-way and three-way optimal trade-offs between these 
decision criteria for different regime-type political risk scenarios. The paper is the first to 
perform a long-term energy planning optimisation in any regional African power pool with 
more than one objective (cf. research gaps (ii) and (iii) in section 2.4).  
Compared to chapter 4, in addition to including more objective functions, the most important 
expansion of the model in this chapter (cf. the supplementary information attached directly 
behind the main paper in section 5.3) is that transmission is modelled in a geographically 
explicit way. While the model in chapter 4 did not specify the transmission route exported 
electricity would take to reach its destination, the model in this chapter requires all transmission 
lines, both those from any power plant in the network and those between countries, to be 
connected to the centroid locations of a set of geographic cells, i.e. in this case, one of the 12 
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countries in the SAPP. Technical losses are calculated endogenously and depend on the length 
of the transmission lines. In order to determine the shortest way to send electricity from any 
one cell to another, prior to solving the MOLP, an all-pair shortest path (APSP) problem is 
solved from each cell to each cell in the model. The result of the APSP indicates the least-cost 
connection between any two countries. The results of the APSP feed into the main model as 
fixed parameters. The different political risk scenarios allow transmission through different 
countries: the more the allowed political risk in the network is constrained, the more countries 
characterised as being politically risky are not permitted to function as transmitter countries 
and have to be bypassed. Thus, for each political risk scenario, one APSP has to be solved 
before the MOLP is solved. 
Similar to the approach between chapter 4 and 5, this paper shows the applicability of a number 
of new methodological choices, which form the foundation for the national-level planning 
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Southern Africa’s electrification is at odds with
United Nations goals to provide modern energy for
all by 2030. Electricity planning, a crucial tool to
optimally match future supply and demand, has
largely focused on minimising costs in southern
Africa, sometimes complemented by a discussion of
a discrete set of environmental scenarios. Political
objectives, although their significance is well docu-
mented, have been overlooked in Southern African
Power Pool (SAPP) quantitative electrification plan-
ning research. This study created a novel geo–refer-
enced, multi–objective linear programming (MOLP)
model that combined continuous cost and carbon
dioxide (CO2) emission minimisation objectives
with the political goal of achieving national electric-
ity self–sufficiency, yielding the optimal trade–off
between these three objectives. It solved the MOLP
for three different political risk scenarios in order to
examine a further political objective. The results
revealed a sharp monetary trade–off between CO2
emission reductions and national electricity
sovereignty objectives in the SAPP. Furthermore,
curtailing international political risks has significant
consequences for trade and the optimal generation
mix. While the optimal size of the frequently recom-
mended Grand Inga dam in the Democratic
Republic of Congo was considerably reduced when
either national electricity sovereignty or political risk
constraints were imposed on the model, solar ener-
gy shares increased significantly in both cases. This
was the case especially when CO2 emissions were
simultaneously curtailed. Increased technological,
institutional and policy–making efforts to implement
solar PV at scale would therefore imply immediate
political and environmental merits for national gov-
ernments in the SAPP, and present a sustainable
development opportunity for the region.
Keywords: multi–criteria optimisation, political risk
analysis, Grand Inga dam, energy security, renew-
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1. Introduction
The United Nations (UN) aims to ensure access to
modern energy for all by 2030. Some 630 million
people in sub–Saharan Africa currently do not have
access to electricity (International Energy Agency
2015b). Despite its promising renewable energy
resources, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)
is no exception. Its electrification rate was 33% in
2012, matching the sub–Saharan Africa average.
World Bank figures suggest that nine out of the
twelve SAPP countries have a rural electrification
rate of under 20% (World Bank 2017).
Robust and multi–criteria electricity planning
has been argued to be a crucial prerequisite in
Africa (Trotter et al. 2017) to help achieve the UN
Sustainable Development Goals. Several previous
studies examined adequate Southern African elec-
tricity supply options to satisfy the growing demand
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; Graeber et al. 2005;
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
2013; Graeber and Spalding–Fecher 2000; Bowen
et al. 1999; Sparrow and Bowen 2005; Bhagavan
1985; Nziramasanga et al. 2013). These studies
constitute a part of the growing literature on inter-
national African electricity planning optimisation
(Rose et al. 2016; Zeyringer et al. 2015; Ohiare
2015; Ohijeagbon and Ajayi 2015; Gnansounou et
al. 2007; Taliotis et al. 2016; Sanoh et al. 2014;
Taliotis et al. 2014; Trotter 2017). Yet, while this lit-
erature has greatly fostered a better understanding
of optimal future African electricity options, their
underlying optimisation objective functions focused
almost entirely on cost minimisation. Environmen-
tal aspects, where modelled explicitly, were either
analysed qualitatively (Barnard 2014; Resnick et al.
2012), or by constructing a discrete set of environ-
mental scenarios (Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017;
Graeber et al. 2005; IRENA 2013). A continuous
multi–criteria approach with the merit of unfolding
relative shifts between different renewable energy
technologies for different degrees of greenhouse gas
(GHG) restrictions, however, is absent in this litera-
ture. 
What is more, the relevance of political objec-
tives for Southern African electricity expansion
planning is well documented (Davidson and
Mwakasonda 2004; Resnick et al. 2012) but cur-
rently not part of quantitative international electric-
ity network expansion models in the academic liter-
ature. Two political factors are highly salient. First,
national governments wish to achieve high levels of
national electricity self–sufficiency to secure stable
and reliable supply, a topic that has received a
growing recent scholarly attention (Van de Graaf
and Colgan 2017; Hawker et al. 2017; Moore
2017). National electricity sovereignty in the SAPP
is an important issue with regards to the political
dependencies created by high levels of electricity
exports from South Africa to Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Current efforts such as Swaziland’s
ambitious renewable energy expansion goals fol-
lowing the 2016 Paris Agreement are likely to be
partly motivated by reducing these dependencies,
which led to the highest electricity tariffs in the
region (African Development Bank 2013). Second,
different levels of institutional weakness and politi-
cal instability in the twelve SAPP countries imply
that different international network designs lead to
greatly differing political risk characteristics of the
network. Large–scale renewable electricity export
projects, such as the Grand Inga hydroelectric plant
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have
been frequently advertised to power significant
parts of sub–Saharan Africa (Taliotis et al. 2016;
Sanoh et al. 2014; IRENA 2015; Taliotis et al. 2014;
Tshombe et al. 2007). Yet an over–reliance on a
highly volatile country marred by dysfunctional
political institutions and violent conflict with over
eighty armed groups (Stearns and Vogel 2015),
where parts of the already installed Inga capacity
remained idle, appears to be a politically sub–opti-
mal choice.
Novel insights were derived from creating a
multi–objective linear programming (MOLP) opti-
misation model of the SAPP generation and trans-
mission network that simultaneously included GHG
reduction and political electricity sovereignty targets
on a continuous scale in addition to cost minimisa-
tion. The model yielded geo–referenced Pareto–effi-
cient network designs corresponding to the optimal
trade–offs between these three objectives.
Furthermore, three different political risk scenarios
were defined for which the MOLP was solved sepa-
rately. In their recent study, Spalding–Fecher et al.
(2017) concluded that SAPP is likely to experience
a shift from fossil fuels to renewables by 2070, when
only economic criteria are concerned (Spalding–
Fecher et al. 2017). This study explicitly yielded the
political and ecological decision–making prefer-
ences under which such a shift becomes cost–mini-
mal for satisfying new demand in 2030 in Southern
Africa already.
It should be noted that politics further influence
national electrification policy issues such as man-
agement of state–owned enterprises, tariff setting
and subsidy distribution in southern Africa. While
such factors are highly relevant, network designers
cannot influence them significantly. By contrast,
energy security and risks of relying on politically
volatile countries for imports strongly depends on
network design. Therefore, political factors that can-
not be prevented through different network designs
were not included in this study.
Section 2 briefly discusses this study’s methodol-
ogy, which was presented in more detail in supple-
mentary material. Section 3 shows data sources for
all parameters used, followed by the discussion of
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model results in Section 4 and implications in
Section 5. Section 6 closes with a brief conclusion.
2. Methodology
The MOLP model is used to study the network
implications for the optimal trade–offs between
cost, GHG emissions and political sovereignty for
different political risk scenarios. An instance of an
all–pairs shortest–path (APSP) model is solved first
to determine the minimal transmission cost
between any supply and demand node in each
political risk scenario. The exact solution procedure
is detailed in the supplementary information.
2.1 All–pairs shortest–path optimisation
An APSP model determines the minimal distance
between any two vertices in a network (Dijkstra
1959; Dreyfus 1969; Floyd 1962). The result of an
ASAP problem is used to calculate the minimal
transmission cost minTranscostsgd between each
supply node (in supply country s Î S using genera-
tion technology g Î G) and demand node (in
demand country d Î D). The supplementary mate-
rial provides mathematical implementation details. 
A simple network structure is assumed with one
main geo–referenced demand node, representing
the entire country demand for all twelve SAPP
countries. This demand node is assumed to be
located at the country’s capital city, except for in the
case of South Africa, where it is Johannesburg. The
extra costs of transmitting electricity from the main
grid, which naturally runs via the main demand
node, to the rest of the country is accounted for by
using a generic split between industry, urban and
rural demand (IRENA 2013). It further assumes one
geo–referenced supply node per country and pri-
mary energy technology where the domestic poten-
tial for such a country–technology combination is
significantly greater than 0. All demand nodes can
be connected with any neighbouring supply node
and any neighbouring country’s main grid directly,
or with any non–neighbouring supply node with an
international grid that connects all countries
between the supply origin and the demand country.
It is assumed that each supply country has a cer-
tain political risk, PolRisks to create a discrete set of
political risk scenario analyses. If PolRisks is greater
than a defined threshold value k, this country is not
allowed to export electricity, nor are any interna-
tional transmission lines allowed to pass through it.
This allows to analyse the impact of preventing
energy dependence on politically highly risky coun-
tries. It can be implemented by setting parameter
neighbour   = 0 (see the supplementary material)
where start node ra is in a country s where PolRisks
> k for all possible start nodes in the network.
Therefore, neighbour     = neighbour     (k) and con-
sequently minTranscostsgd = minTranscostsgd(k), the
optimal minimal transmission costs depend on the
maximum allowed country–level political risk in the
network.
2.2 Multi–objective linear programming
electricity planning optimisation 
To ensure quick and deterministic solution proper-
ties, the MOLP model used in this study was linear.
It optimally matched supply sites in s Î S supply
countries using g Î G generation technologies with
the new additional demand of d Î D demand coun-
tries arising over t Î T = {t1,..., tter} time periods.
All demand in the baseline time period t0 is sunk
and not included in the planning model. The
model, to keep its linearity, assumes no economies
of scale. The deployable capacity by 2030 is at
most 25% of the total theoretical maximum poten-
tial (Sanoh et al. 2014). The model features three
continuous objectives, namely cost minimisation,
GHG emission minimisation, and national electrici-
ty sovereignty maximisation. Implementation de-
tails can be found in the supplementary information.
3. Data
Table A1 in the supplementary material lists data
sources for all model parameters. The numerical
example includes the SAPP’s twelve countries and
six generation technologies where their primary
energy source is an un–imported resource of south-
ern Africa, namely solar PV, onshore wind, hydro,
geothermal, coal, or oil. As this study is concerned
with a 2030 timeframe, solar thermal was not
included, primarily because cost projections
showed a clear dominance of utility–scale solar PV
over solar thermal in 2030 (IRENA 2013). Of the 72
potential supply nodes, 41 were found to have a
generation potential significantly greater than 0 and
were thus included (IRENA 2013; Buys et al. 2007).
Demand estimates were taken from IRENA
(2013). Other studies found roughly similar
demand developments until 2030 for SAPP overall
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; Merven et al. 2010).
This study was only concerned with new demand
arising from demand growth and retirement of old
power plants (IRENA 2013). The year 2010 was
taken as the baseline; all demand already met in
2010 was not part of the model.
Generation cost for SAPP were taken from
IRENA (2013). The solar PV unit costs assumed
that two thirds of the capacity was deployed at util-
ity scale, and one third on rooftops fitted with bat-
teries capable of one–hour storage to match the
assumed industry–urban–rural demand split
(IRENA 2013). Unit transmission costs were set to
the average of values presented in three different
studies (Sanoh et al. 2014; Milligan 2012; Bahrman
2007). For a generation technology with a capacity
factor of 50%, the resulting levelised system unit
cost was USD 0.02428/kWh and 1000 km distribu-




tion. This value averaged over different distances
and included different high–voltage DC and AC
configurations. The capacity factors in Table 1 were
used to calculate generation technology specific
unit transmission costs per unit of electricity. These
factors were furthermore used to derive installed
capacity values from the model results. Transmis-
sion costs further included an assumed 3.5% ener-
gy loss per 1000 km of transmission (Sanoh et al.
2014) as well as a price bonus for transmitting elec-
tricity to remote areas using the business–urban–
rural demand split mentioned earlier and associated
costs (IRENA 2013; 2012). 
The CO2 emissions were assumed to be 0 for all
renewable energy technologies and calculated using
standard carbon and energy content values for coal
and oil as well as conversion efficiencies in Table 1,
leading to 882 and 711 tons CO2/GWh of produced
coal and oil electricity, respectively. Much more
detail on the carbon footprint of SAPP electricity
generation has been provided elsewhere (Zhou et
al. 2009).
Solar insulation maps (IRENA 2017) and wind
potential maps (Archer and Jacobson 2005) were
used and the per–country location was assumed to
be where the potentials showed peaks on the coun-
try maps taken from Natural Earth (Natural Earth
2017) in order to geo–reference the supply poten-
tials for all 41 supply nodes. These locations were
taken from the planning literature (Sanoh et al.
2014) for hydro–energy and geothermal energy. 
Table 2 assigns a political risk value to each of
the twelve SAPP countries based on indicators that
quantify country–wide political factors, which were
found to be relevant for African electrification
(Trotter et al. 2017; Trotter 2016; Ahlborg et al.
2015), in order to model the three different political
risk scenarios for which the MOLP model was
solved. In the first scenario, the allowed political risk
of any supply country PolRisks was set to k = 100,
implying that no political risk restrictions were
imposed on electricity transmission. In the second
scenario, k = 80, therefore DRC, the most political-
ly volatile country in the SAPP, was prohibited from
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Table 1: Assumed conversion efficiency and capacity factors.
Technology Conversion Mean capacity Sources
efficiency factora
Solar PV 0.15 0.20 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Onshore wind 0.27 0.33 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Hydro 0.80 0.56 IRENA 2013; Buys et al. 2007
Geothermal 0.05 0.58 Buys et al. 2007; IRENA 2012
Coal 0.37 0.73 International Energy Agency 2008; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
Oil 0.36 0.54 International Energy Agency 2008; US Energy Information 
Administration 2016
a Capacity factors for renewable energy technologies depend on resource availability.
Table 2: Political risk values for southern African power pool countries (World Bank 2016).
Country Political instability Corruption Government Average political 
ineffectiveness risk value
DRC 93.6 76.9 83.0 84.5
Zimbabwe 69.6 76.6 76.6 74.3
Angola 58.9 76.6 73.0 69.5
Swaziland 55.2 55.8 64.0 58.3
Tanzania 54.3 61.3 60.9 58.8
Malawi 49.7 60.6 61.5 57.3
Mozambique 45.6 60.7 61.6 56.0
Zambia 42.2 60.5 63.9 55.5
Lesotho 48.4 48.4 57.1 51.3
South Africa 50.2 47.5 41.1 46.2
Namibia 32.6 44.3 47.5 41.5
Botswana 29.8 31.0 40.2 33.7
Note: All values reflect a 10–year average between 2006 and 2015. They were transformed from a –2.5–2.5 scale provided by the
World Bank to a 0–100 scale, where 100 indicates maximum political risk and 0 indicates minimum political risk (World Bank 2016).
exports and intermediary transmission between two
other countries. In the third scenario, k = 60,
Zimbabwe and Angola were added to this restric-
tion. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the optimal
trade–off results for the unrestricted k = 100 case in
detail. Section 4.3 shows the significant impact that
political risk restrictions have on the generation mix. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 The cost of environmental sustainability
and national electricity sovereignty
Figure 1 shows all non–dominated solutions of the
MOLP model, the so–called Pareto front, for the
scenario where political risk was not restricted (k =
100). The minimum cumulative system cost
between 2011 and 2030 covering exclusively newly
arising demand in SAPP with no emission and elec-
tricity sovereignty restrictions was USD 370 billion.
This figure is 18% below that reported by IRENA for
the ‘Renewable energy promotion’ scenario for
SAPP for the same timeframe (IRENA 2013), main-
ly because, in contrast to the IRENA study, this
study in its global cost minimum did not restrict fos-
sil fuel shares and assign costs to GHG emissions,
but modelled their minimisation as a separate
objective, and allowed higher levels of trade. 
The results show that increasing the minimum
level of electricity sovereignty in the SAPP was com-
parably cheap if no CO2 emission restrictions were
applied at the same time. Increasing the cumulative
system costs between 2011 and 2030 by 2.6%
allowed all SAPP demand to be met domestically.
Mitigating CO2 entirely was considerably more
expensive, requiring an increase of 13.3% of cumu-
lative system cost. Figure 2 shows the optimal
domestic electricity share for the MOLP model with
k = 100. The elimination of CO2 emissions was
done most cost–effectively by significantly increas-
ing the overall international trade levels, mainly
driven by South Africa substituting its reliance on
coal with hydroelectric imports from DRC, as well
as from other domestic and neighbouring renew-
able sources. Section 4.2 gives more details. 
The simultaneous decrease of GHG emissions
and increase of national electricity sovereignty con-
stitutes a sharp trade–off, reflected in an exponen-
tial increase in cumulative system costs. If 50% of
the maximum CO2 emissions were allowed and
50% national electricity sovereignty were required,
the cumulative system costs increased slightly by
2.0%. If only 25% of the maximum CO2 emissions
were allowed and 75% electricity self–sufficiency
was required, the cost increased by 9.0%. In the
fully restricted case, finally, the minimum cumula-
tive system costs were USD 535 billion, or 44.7%,
higher than the cost minimum. 
4.2 Network effects of emission and
electricity sovereignty optimisation
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the non–dominated
generation technology mix for different levels of
required national electricity sovereignty of allowed
CO2 emissions and a joint restriction of the two,
respectively. Figure 6 provides the resulting electric-
ity consumption mix of the twelve SAPP countries
and the power pool as a whole for four extreme sce-
narios, Table A2 in the supplementary material lists
all the related optimal capacity additions for all
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Figure 1: Pareto front of non–dominated solutions for different cost, emissions and 
energy sovereignty tuples.
countries. Figures 7 and 8 show the associated geo–
referenced non–dominated SAPP network configu-
rations using QGIS software. These results again do
not assume a restriction of supply country–inherent
political risk, i.e., k = 100. 
The cost–minimal solution obtained without
CO2 and import restrictions is close to the solution
provided in other SAPP planning literature
(Spalding–Fecher et al. 2017; IRENA 2013).
Between 2011 and 2030, almost 34.0 GW of new
coal capacity additions were required, followed by
21.2 GW of hydroelectric capacity additions. In
addition, the model added 1.4 GW geothermal
capacity, while other technologies played a subordi-
nate role. This generation mix, however, changed
considerably depending on which additional opti-
misation criteria were added to the model.
Figure 3 shows that increasing the required level
of electricity sovereignty had comparably small
effects on the optimal electricity mix for the whole
SAPP region when CO2 emissions were not con-
strained. The overall dominance of coal did not
change with higher required national electricity
sovereignty, as South Africa continued to use
domestic coal to meet its demand. Yet the optimal
electricity mix was significantly impacted for several
countries. In Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zim-
babwe and Swaziland, the hydro share dramatically
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Figure 2: Export share as function of emissions and energy sovereignty.
Figure 3: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for different required electricity
sovereignty levels (no CO2 restrictions).
decreased with increasing national electricity self–
sufficiency requirements in the former four coun-
tries because of domestic replacement of DRC
Grand Inga imports. In the latter case, this was
attributable to missing hydro imports from
Mozambique. Instead, these countries used domes-
tic coal, wind, geothermal, and, finally, solar poten-
tials to compensate for hydro imports. Angola grad-
ually replaced its hydro imports from the DRC with
domestic hydro. Furthermore, Botswana and
Malawi received geothermal energy in the uncon-
strained cost–minimal solution from Namibia and
Zambia, respectively, because of the respective geo-
graphic proximity between geothermal supply loca-
tion and demand. Moving to greater electricity
sovereignty levels, Botswana and Malawi replaced
these geothermal imports with domestic wind and
solar energy, as shown in Figures 6, 7a and 7b. 
As soon as CO2 emissions were restricted, which
translates linearly to introducing increasing CO2
unit emission taxes, the non–dominated generation
mix changed significantly (Figure 4). Its main driver
was South Africa’s need to replace its coal reliance
with renewable energies. Where electricity
sovereignty was not restricted, South Africa now
sourced considerable amounts of its electricity from
DRC’s Grand Inga hydro dam. If CO2 emissions
were restricted by 50% of the maximum possible
value in each country and no restrictions were
placed on imports, South Africa imported 43.2% of
its newly arising electricity demand between 2011
and 2030 from the DRC. If CO2 emissions were
entirely prohibited, South Africa sourced 50.8% of
its additional demand from the DRC in 2030, 8.5%
from hydro in Angola, 2.7% from hydro and wind
sources in Zimbabwe as well as 2.6% from hydro in
Mozambique, as shown in Figure 7c. In this case,
Grand Inga in DRC would need to be operational
at close to its full estimated potential, requiring
39 GW in 2030. Although technologically feasible,
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Figure 4: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for different allowed CO2 emission
levels (no trade restrictions).
Figure 5: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix for sets of different maximum CO2
emission and required electricity sovereignty levels.
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Figure 6: Optimal country generation mix for different optimisation scenarios 
(% of consumed electricity by source).
this represents a highly challenging implementation
prospect. In general, the move towards zero extra
carbon emissions was cost–minimally achieved by
increasing hydro capacities as well as a consider-
able share of domestic solar PV in Botswana,
Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa. 
If SAPP countries value a certain degree of elec-
tricity sovereignty, while also wanting to decrease
CO2 emissions (Figure 5), it would become infeasi-
ble for South Africa to source hydroelectric energy
from the DRC. Rather, it significantly extended its
solar PV capacities to meet new demand between
2011 and 2030. In a hybrid scenario with CO2 and
import restrictions of 50% of their respective maxi-
mum values, South Africa met 45.9% of its newly
arising electricity demand in 2030 through imports
from DRC, therefore, not needing to build any solar
PV capacity, as shown in Figure 8. As the import
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Figure 7: Optimal Southern African Power Pool network for 2030 for different CO2 emission and
sovereignty values, where (a) = no restrictions, (b) = no imports allowed, (c) = no CO2 emissions
allowed, and (d) = no imports and CO2 emissions allowed.
restrictions increased, however, South Africa gradu-
ally added more domestic solar PV to meet the CO2
restriction. In the extreme scenario of full electricity
sovereignty with zero carbon emissions allowed to
serve additional demand, South Africa would be
required to build 120 GW of domestic solar PV by
2030 in the cost–minimal solution. South Africa’s
significant expansion as well as significant additions
in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe made
solar PV the dominant source of newly installed
capacities in SAPP between 2011 and 2030 in this
scenario, as shown in Figures 6 and 7d. The
required solar PV additions again constitute a tech-
nologically feasible order of magnitude. China in
2015 added 2.5 times the solar PV capacity that
would be required annually for South Africa to
reach 120 GW by 2030 (International Energy
Agency 2015a). Twelve different materials for solar
PV cells are abundant enough on the planet to build
solar PV cells that meet the entire worldwide
demand, nine of which may be cheaper than the
currently used crystalline silicon (Wadia et al.
2009). Yet such a goal would be a huge challenge
given its financial implications as well as doubts of
utility Eskom’s willingness to allow independent
solar PV implementation in South Africa (Ting
2017). 
The different optimisation scenarios had consid-
erable implications for the optimal size of the Grand
Inga dam in DRC by 2030. Figure 9 shows that its
size varied from 39 GW in situations where the CO2
restriction was strict and electricity sovereignty
played almost no role to slightly over 5 GW where
trade was entirely prohibited and Grand Inga only
served national DRC demand. In the cost–minimal
solution without CO2 and import restrictions, Grand
Inga had a capacity of 16.8 GW by 2030 and pro-
duced 79 TWh electricity per year, where 27% was
exported to Zambia, 17% to Angola, 14% to
Tanzania, 4% to Zimbabwe and 2% to Namibia.
The more CO2 restrictions increased, the higher the
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Figure 8: Cost–optimal network for 50% CO2
and 50% electricity sovereignty restriction
Figure 9: Optimal capacity of Grand Inga in 2030 for different optimisation scenarios with
unconstrained political risk.
share of Grand Inga’s electricity that was exported
to South Africa.
The resulting implications support other
research, which found that relying on Grand Inga
meant giving up energy sovereignty of many SAPP
countries (Sparrow and Bowen 2005). An impor-
tant implication of this is that a significant amount
of political risk in the network was pooled in the
politically most poorly performing country in the
SAPP, as shown in Section 3. To study the effect of
restricting such political risk in the network, Section
4.3 discusses the results when exports from highly
politically risky countries were prohibited.
4.3 Impact of restricting political risks
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the political risk of the net-
work (other than that arising from low electricity
sovereignty values and high CO2 emissions) was
not constrained. This section discusses two alterna-
tive scenarios where political risks, as defined in
Sections 2 and 3, were restricted in the network. In
the first alternative scenario, ScenPR80, political
risk was curtailed by prohibiting countries with a
political risk value of PolRisks > k = 80 from elec-
tricity exports and from featuring intermediary
transmission lines that connect supply and demand
nodes in other countries, as presented in Table 2. In
the second scenario, ScenPR60, this value was fur-
ther reduced to k = 60. The first scenario affected
the DRC; in the second scenario, Angola and
Zimbabwe were added. Figures 10 and 11 present
the non–dominated trade–offs between cost, CO2
emissions and electricity sovereignty for both sce-
narios. Figure 12 shows the implications of restrict-
ing CO2 emissions on optimal generation mix for
ScenPR80 (the results for ScenPR60 were similar).
Figure 13 depicts the optimal network for
ScenPR80 and ScenPR60 when CO2 emissions
were not and were fully restricted.
In both scenarios, trade was severely impacted
as its main source, the Grand Inga dam, was only
active domestically. In the cost–optimal solution of
ScenPR80 with no CO2 or electricity sovereignty
restrictions, instead of relying on DRC imports,
Angola developed significant domestic hydro
capacity to meet its own supply and to export to
Zambia and Namibia. Furthermore, Zambia, Tan-
zania and Zimbabwe developed their wind poten-
tial. In ScenPR60, Angola’s hydro exports were
replaced by Namibian hydro, wind and geothermal
capacity increased, as did hydro exports from
Mozambique. 
Requiring electricity sovereignty to be high had
only a minor cost effect on the optimal network,
because of the added trade restrictions in both sce-
narios. When CO2 emissions were restricted, how-
ever, the generation mix changed significantly
towards solar PV, as shown in Figure 12. This was
the case for both ScenPR80 and ScenPR60. As
soon as hydro imports from DRC were an infeasible
option for South Africa to drive down CO2 emis-
sions, the cost–minimal solution to mitigate CO2 in
2030 was considerable domestic solar PV capacity
additions. Other cheap renewable sources in South
Africa or other SAPP countries were either too small
or too expensive to meet the full South African
demand. In ScenPR80, South Africa, therefore,
installed a maximum of 110 GW of solar PV by
2030 (if CO2 emissions were entirely prohibited) to
replace its domestic coal usage in addition to sourc-
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Figure 10: Pareto front for political risk < 80.
ing smaller amounts of renewable energy from
Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho,
as shown in Figure 13b. 
There were some notable country–scale implica-
tions in the ScenPR60 scenario (Figure 13). As the
model prohibited intermediary transmission
through a country with a political risk value greater
than 60, the transmission line from Namibia to
Zambia was bent to avoid going through Angola.
Similarly, transmission lines from Mozambique to
Zambia and from Botswana to Zambia were bent to
avoid passing through Zimbabwe. Such a network
design, while implying higher transmission costs,
averted the added complexity of including more
politically risky countries into a bilateral electricity
agreement. When CO2 restrictions were applied to
ScenPR60, several renewable resources in countries
bordering South Africa were used for export and
Zambia was forced to considerably scale up its
domestic solar PV capacity, as shown in Figure 13d.
5. Implications
There are a number of implications arising from this
study. First, while relatively cheaply realisable indi-
vidually, achieving national electricity self–sufficien-
cy and no new CO2 emissions simultaneously
implies a significant system cost increase of 44.7%.
Thus, CO2 emission reductions and national elec-
tricity sovereignty constitute two objectives with
comparably small synergies and a sharp monetary
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Figure 11: Pareto front for political risk < 60.
Figure 12: Optimal Southern African Power Pool generation mix at different allowed 
CO2 emission levels for political risk < 80.
trade–off in the SAPP. The strict monetary trade–off
between climate change mitigation and national
energy sovereignty requires well–defined prefer-
ences of decision makers to select a feasible future
generation mix for the region.
Second, if each country is restricted to 55% of its
theoretical maximum CO2 emissions in 2030,
hydro becomes the dominant generation source of
meeting demand arising between 2011 and 2030.
However, if countries value a certain degree of
national electricity sovereignty, they gradually
replace large–scale hydro imports from DRC, as
well as from Angola, Mozambique and Zambia,
with domestic wind and solar sources in the opti-
mum solution. When both CO2 emissions and for-
eign electricity dependence are curtailed at 25% of
their respective maximum values, solar PV becomes
the dominant generation source for meeting
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Figure 13: Optimal Southern African Power Pool network for different CO2 emission and
sovereignty values, where (a) = political risk < 80, no other restrictions, (b) = political risk < 80, no
CO2 emissions allowed, (c) = political risk < 60, no other restrictions, and (d) = political risk < 60, no
CO2 emissions allowed.
demand arising between 2011 and 2030. This is
mainly driven by South Africa’s need to develop
significant domestic solar PV capacities under these
circumstances, but also by solar PV additions in
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. If South Africa intends to
keep its reputation as the region’s dominant power-
house and also reduce its carbon footprint signifi-
cantly, it needs to quickly scale–up domestic solar
energy. An approach that actively includes both
Eskom and independent power producers seems
most promising given the required scale. Solar PV
in the SAPP today presents a unanimously agreed–
upon market opportunity with significant foresee-
able demand. With the right policy incentives, such
as adequate carbon taxes and costing political risks,
this move towards solar would be cost–optimal
much earlier than in 50 years. To decrease the cost
and required scale of this energy transition, both
supply–side measures surrounding energy efficien-
cy increases and logistical challenges, and demand–
side management to decrease industrial and resi-
dential demand need to be stepped up, especially
where a business case exists to do so. 
Third, when political risk values are restricted,
DRC’s hydro exports become infeasible due to the
country’s volatile political nature. As a result, in the
cost–optimal solution for cases where CO2 emis-
sions are restricted to at most 35% of their theoreti-
cal per–country maximum, solar PV becomes the
dominant generation source for serving the newly
arising demand between 2011 and 2030 in SAPP.
This is the case whether or not decision–makers
value national electricity sovereignty. Equivalently,
higher solar PV shares manage to reduce the politi-
cal risk in the SAPP network. In turn, this result
implies that despite its obvious cost–effectiveness
and large–scale climate change mitigation potential,
a number of institutional and political stability con-
siderations need to be addressed before developing
DRC’s Grand Inga at scale. While scaling solar PV
is a considerable challenge, such a move also pre-
sents technological opportunities. Switching
towards solar PV sooner than later carries the ben-
efit of not having to re–design a whole fossil–fuel
based electricity system when solar PV is fully cost–
competitive in the future. Rather than constructing
a grid designed solely for large–scale projects, it
seems worthy to think about grid architectures and
storage systems capable of dealing with large–scale
centralised and decentralised solar energy today.
Furthermore, research into alternative materials for
solar PV and batteries should be further fostered
which would considerably boost capabilities for
supplying the necessary amount of solar PV cells
long–term. 
It should be noted that the implications of this
multi–criteria study could be refined further if future
research would improve the geospatial optimisation
model to include more concrete site selection within
SAPP countries. Methodologically, the model per-
formance could be compared to evolutionary algo-
rithms, for instance multi–objective particle swarm
optimisations and reactive search optimisation,
which may enable solving bigger models with finer
geospatial resolution necessary to incorporate more
specific site selection problems.
6. Conclusion
This study examined optimal trade–offs between
system cost, CO2 emissions and electricity
sovereignty in the SAPP generation and transmis-
sion network for the demand between 2011 and
2030 for different political risk scenarios. The study
found a number of novel implications for the SAPP
network when political factors are added to eco-
nomic and environmental objectives. These includ-
ed the swift monetary trade–off between CO2 emis-
sions and electricity sovereignty, as well as the
growing share of solar PV capacity in the optimal
solution as environmental and political factors are
taken into consideration. The multi–criteria nature
of the SAPP energy–planning problem thus war-
rants an increase of technological, regulatory and
policy–making efforts to enable large–scale deploy-
ment of solar PV in the coming decade, thereby cre-
ating a significant domestic development opportu-
nity.
Note
1. Supplementary data associated with this article can
be found at http://journals.assaf.org.za/jesa/rt/
suppFiles/2451/0.
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Supp. Material I: Modelling details and implementation 
All-pairs shortest path model formulation 
The APSP problem is a closed model formulation to solve all possible instances of the well-documented 
simple shortest path problem (Dijkstra, 1959; Dreyfus, 1969). It finds the shortest path between each 
supply node in supply country 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of generation technology 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 and demand node 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷. This 
paper assumes that the shortest distance maps linearly to the minimum transmission costs between a 
supply and demand node. The APSP can be solved with efficient approaches such as the Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm which is useful for large problem instances (Floyd, 1962). Here, the model size allows a 
straight-forward closed model formulation of the APSP problem, which is presented below. 
Let set 𝑆𝑇 denote the set of all supply nodes (s,g) where the energy potential is greater than 0. Let 𝑁 =
𝑆𝑇 ∪ 𝐷, where 𝑁 is the set of all combined potential supply nodes 𝑆𝑇 and demand nodes 𝐷. The shortest 
path model guarantees that decision variable 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 is always exactly 1 if the shortest path between 
node 𝑎 ∈ 𝑁 and node 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁 contains the link from node 𝑟𝑎 ∈ 𝑁 to 𝑟𝑏 ∈ 𝑁, and 0 otherwise. This is the 
case even if 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  it is defined to be continuous between 0 and 1(Dijkstra, 1959), yielding a linear 
programming (LP) model with fast solution times.  
The objective function (SM.1) minimises the total distance covered when sequentially travelling from 
each node 𝑎 ∈ 𝑁 to each node 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁. This yields an equivalent result to solving each shortest path 
problem between each node separately. 
  
min ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏
𝑟𝑏𝜖𝑁𝑟𝑎𝜖𝑁𝑏𝜖𝑁𝑎𝜖𝑁
∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  (SM.1) 
 
Parameter 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 denotes the distance between nodes 𝑟𝑎 ∈ 𝑁 and 𝑟𝑏 ∈ 𝑁.  
The set of constraints (SM.2) – (SM.7) are a straight-forward extension of the simple shortest path 
problem to cover all node connections 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 to 𝑚 ∈ 𝑁. Parameter 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  is 1 if node 𝑟𝑏 can 



















∀𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏 (SM.4) 
𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 = 1 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑏 ∈ 𝑁; 𝑟𝑏 = 𝑎 = 𝑏
= 𝑟𝑎 
(SM.5) 
𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 ≤ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑏 ∈ 𝑁 (SM.6) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 ≤ 1 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑎 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑟𝑏 ∈ 𝑁 (SM.7) 
 
Problem APSP, (SM.1) – (SM.7), has an advantage and a disadvantage over solving all shortest path 
problems separately. Its advantage is that it requires only one model initialisation and one output read 
operation to yield all possible shortest paths in the network. The instance of this model discussed in 
section 4 of this paper has 12 demand nodes and 41 supply nodes. Separately solving the relevant 
shortest path problems would require 12 ∙ 41 = 492 iterations, each with a separate model initialisation 
and output read, a number that increases exponentially with larger model instances. The disadvantage 
is that model APSP yields a range of shortest paths that are not required for the later multi-criteria 
planning optimisation. In addition to solving the shortest path between all supply and demand nodes, 
the model also solves the shortest path between any two supply, and any two demand nodes, neither 
having any relevance for the planning optimisation. However, due to the linearity of the model, a 
standard desktop computer using IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.7 was able to solve the problem for 12 supply 
and 41 demand nodes in less than 30 seconds computational time, yielding an overall solution time 
which is highly likely to be smaller compared to initialising and solving 492 models separately. This 
computational time would likely be even shorter if advanced algorithms like current Floyd-Warshall 
approaches would have been implemented. 
The minimum transmission cost between any supply node in country s of generation technology g and 
demand node d can now be calculated linearly as shown in (SM.8). Decision variable 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 also 
indicates the geo-referenced path between each supply and demand node. In expression (SM.8), 
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 is the levelised per kilometre and GWh transmission cost for generation technology g 
(see section 3). Parameter 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 is the unit cost of the transmission losses occurring when 
transmitting electricity generated by technology g (see section 3). 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑑
= 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏
𝑟𝑎∈𝑁𝑟𝑎∈𝑁
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏
𝑟𝑎∈𝑁𝑟𝑎∈𝑁
 
∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑑 ∈
𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
(SM.8) 
 
Multi-objective linear programming (MOLP) electricity planning optimisation implementation  
Due to the linearity of the problem, any one of the three objectives, namely cost minimisation, GHG 
emission minimisation and national electricity sovereignty maximisation, can be modelled as an 
objective function and the remaining two as variable constraints. The model is arguably most intuitive 
when costs are modelled as an objective function, GHG emissions and electricity sovereignty are 
introduced as constraints. The latter feature variable threshold values between 0 and 100. In each model 
iteration, they are fixed to a certain value to solve a simple Linear Programming (LP) problem, and are 
then varied before the next iteration to yield the complete Pareto-optimal trade-off. This procedure is 
then repeated for every 𝑘 of interest where 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 < 𝑘 to address the forth, discrete objective of 
decreasing political risk in the network. Section 2.3 provides more detail on the solution procedure. 
Expression (SM.9) minimises the cumulative levelised system costs for all new demand between 𝑡1 ∈
𝑇 and termination period 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∈ 𝑇. It sums the levelised cost of electrification (LCOE) for all new 
annually generated and transmitted electricity in each time period. Decision variable 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑡 denotes 
the electricity in GWh sent from supply country s using generation technology g to demand country d 
in time period t. 
 










Parameter 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑡 denotes the levelised unit generation cost in supply country 𝑠 by technology 𝑔 
at time 𝑡 (in 2010 USD/GWh). Parameter 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑑 is taken from the APSP problem solution 
(section 2.1) for the current level of k where 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 < 𝑘 ∀ 𝑠𝜖𝑆. The following constraints complete 





 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (SM.10) 
∑ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝐷





 ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇\{2030}, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 (SM.12) 
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑡)𝑔𝜖𝐺𝑠𝜖𝑆,𝑠=𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡
≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑜𝑣 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (SM.13) 
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑔𝑑2030 ∙ 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑔)𝑔𝜖𝐺𝑠𝜖𝑆
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑑2030 ∙ 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙
≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 (SM.14) 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑔𝑑𝑡 ∈ 𝑅≥0 ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (SM.15) 
 
Parameter 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡 indicates additional electricity demand for country 𝑑 between the baseline year 
𝑡0 and time 𝑡 (in GWh). Parameter 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑔 denotes the maximum generation potential from a supply 
node in country 𝑠 and using generation technology 𝑔 (in GWh) in addition to what has been installed 
in 2010. Constraint (2.4) is necessary to enforce the assumption of unit LCOE cost figures, requiring 
capacity built in previous years to be used throughout its lifetime. Constraints (SM.13) and (SM.14) 
impose a minimum level of national electricity sovereignty, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑜𝑣, and a maximum level of CO2 
emissions, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠, respectively. Both threshold levels are modelled to be between 0 and 100. 
For the CO2 emission constraint, this is the case because the unit CO2 emissions of coal, 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙, 
are the highest of all generation technology specific unit CO2 emissions considered here. 
 
Solution approach 
Figure A1 illustrates the solution algorithm used in this study. The optimal trade-offs between costs, 
GHG emissions and political electricity sovereignty at different allowed levels of supply country 
political risk are obtained by solving a series of two different optimisation models sequentially. First, 
the APSP problem is solved for three different values of allowed supply country political risk values 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠, namely k = 100, 80 and 60. This impacts model parameter 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  as shown in the 
supplementary material on the APSP problem. Once the APSP model is solved, the minimum 
transmission cost 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑑(𝑘) for all k can be calculated. The solution algorithm uses this 
result as well as a number of further input data for its parameters to solve model MOLP, (SM.9) – 
(SM.15), repeatedly along the entire range of allowed electricity sovereignty 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑜𝑣 and CO2 
emissions 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 to yield a continuous optimal trade-off function. For the purpose of this study, 
the step change has been set to 5, leading to solving 21 ∙ 21 = 441 LP instances of model MOLP for 
each of the three values for k.  
All optimisation models have been implemented using the IBM ILOG CPLEX optimisation package. 
Due to the linearity of the models, a standard desktop computer was able to solve the (APSP) problem 
in under 1 minute and the multi-criteria optimisation model in under 1 hour of computational time. 
QGIS was used for geo-referencing and map illustrations in the study. 
 
 
Figure A1: Schematic model solution algorithm. 
 
Set k = 100 
Set 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑜𝑣 = 𝑝 and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 = 𝑞 
Solve MOLP (SM.9) – (SM.15) 
Is 𝑝 > 100? 
Define p = 0, q = 100 







Is 𝑞 < 0? 
No 
Yes 
Set maximum supply country risk 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 = 𝑘 
Solve APSP (SM.1) – (SM.7) 
Set k = k – 20 
Is 𝑘 < 60? 
Define k = 100 







Load model input data for 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠 =
𝑘  
Calc. 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑑(𝑘) 
Set q = q – 5 
Set q = 100, p = p + 5 
All-pairs shortest path (APSP) problem 
Load model input data, using 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑔𝑑(𝑘)     
Is k < 60? 
Set k = k − 20 
Yes 
No 
Multi-objective planning (MOLP) problem 
Supp. material II: Data sources for all model parameters 
Table A.1: Data sources of all model parameters. 
Model-elements Description Data source 
Sets   
 𝑠𝜖𝑆 12 potential electricity supply countries in the SAPP network - 
  𝑑𝜖𝐷 12 electricity demand countries in the SAPP network - 
 𝑔𝜖𝐺 6 generation technologies where primary energy is present in 
SAPP (solar PV, wind, hydro, geothermal, coal, oil)  
- 
 𝑡𝜖𝑇 20 time periods (2011, 2012, … , 2030) - 
Parameters   
 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  Shortest direct distance in km between node ra and node rb in the 
network 
(Natural Earth 2017) 
 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑏  Binary variable that is 1 if node ra and node rb can be connected 
directly without crossing through a third country, and where start 
node ra is not in a country with political risk greater than k 
(Natural Earth 2017) 
 k Level of maximum supply country political risk for scenario 
analyses, assumed to be 100, 80 or 60 in this study 
This study 
 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 Transmission system cost per GWh and per 1000 km for each 
generation technology g 
(Sanoh et al. 2014, 
Milligan 2012, Bahrman 
2007) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔 Costs of transmission losses per 1000 km transmitted for each 
generation technology g 
(Sanoh et al. 2014, 
International Renewable 
Energy Agency 2013, 
Buys et al. 2007) 
 gencostsgt Generation cost in supply country s of electricity produced with 
generation technology g at time t 
(International Renewable 
Energy Agency 2013) 
Model-elements Description Data source 
 transcostsdgt Transmission cost from supply country s to demand country d of 
electricity produced with generation technology g at time t 
(Sanoh et al. 2014, 
International Renewable 
Energy Agency 2012) 
 demanddt Electricity demand projection in MWh of country d at time t (International Renewable 
Energy Agency 2013) 
 supplysgt Maximum potential supply in MWh cost in country s of 
electricity produced with generation technology g at time t 
(International Renewable 
Energy Agency 2013, 
Buys et al. 2007) 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑆𝑜𝑣 Minimum required political electricity sovereignty for any given 
demand country, range from 0 – 100.  
- 
 𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑔 CO2 emissions from generation technology g for the production 
of 1 GWh electricity 
This study 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂2𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 Maximum allowed CO2 emission for all countries, percentage of 
theoretical per country CO2 emission maximum where all new 
demand between 2011 and 2030 is met through coal, range from 













Supp. material III: Optimal capacity additions for no political risk constraints for 4 different 
scenarios  
Table A2: Numerical values of optimal capacity additions for no political risk restrictions. 















Angola Cost min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 No Import 0 0 2.73 0 0 0 0 
 No CO2 0 0 4.42 0 0 0 100 
 Full restr. 0 0 2.73 0 0 0 0 
Botswana Cost min. 0 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 
 No Import 0 0.29 0 0 0.76 0.29 0 
 No CO2 0 0.29 0 0 1.60 0.29 13.4 
 Full restr. 0 0.29 0 0 0.76 0.29 0 
DRC Cost min. 0 0 16.79 0 0 0 65.0 
 No Import 0 0 5.88 0 0 0 0 
 No CO2 0 1.08 39.09 0 0 0 85.4 
 Full restr. 0 0 5.88 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho Cost min. 0 0 0.10 0 0 0.04 0 
 No Import 0 0 0.10 0 0.06 0.04 0 
 No CO2 0 0 0.10 0 0.40 0.04 26.3 
 Full restr. 0 0 0.10 0 0.06 0.04 0 
Malawi Cost min. 0 0 0.22 0 0 0.29 0 















 No Import 0 0 0.22 0 0.73 0.29 0 
 No CO2 0 0 0.22 0 0.06 0.29 0 
 Full restr. 0 0 0.22 0 0.73 0.29 0 
Mozambique Cost min. 0 0 1.25 0 0 0 20.2 
 No Import 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 
 No CO2 0 0 1.26 0 0 0.39 71.7 
 Full restr. 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 
Namibia Cost min. 0 0.35 0.23 0 0 0 59.9 
 No Import 0 0.34 0.23 0 0 0 0 
 No CO2 0 0.35 0.24 0 0 0.48 55.4 
 Full restr. 0 0.34 0.23 0 0 0 0 
South Africa Cost min. 33.87 0.17 0.04 0 0 2.59 0.2 
 No Import 33.89 0.17 0.04 0 0 2.59 0 
 No CO2 0 0.17 0.04 0 37.11 0 0 
 Full restr. 0 0.17 0.04 0 120.84 0 0 
Swaziland Cost min. 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 
 No Import 0 0 0 0 0.36 0.01 0 
 No CO2 0 0 0 0 2.33 0.01 84.0 
 Full restr. 0 0 0 0 0.36 0.01 0 
Tanzania Cost min. 0 0.35 0.98 0 0 0 0 















 No Import 0 0.35 0.98 0 1.88 3.02 0 
 No CO2 0 0.35 0.98 0 0 2.27 0 
 Full restr. 0 0.35 0.98 0 1.88 3.02 0 
Zambia Cost min. 0 0.23 0.91 0 0 0 100 
 No Import 0 0.23 0.90 0 7.25 1.11 0 
 No CO2 0 0.23 0.91 0 0 1.11 50.6 
 Full restr. 0 0.23 0.90 0 7.25 1.11 0 
Zimbabwe Cost min. 0.10 0 0.65 0 0 0 0 
 No Import 1.19 0 0.65 0 0 0.31 0 
 No CO2 0 0 0.65 0 0 1.02 100 
 Full restr. 0 0 0.65 0 3.27 1.01 0 
SAPP total Cost min. 33.97 1.40 21.17 0 0 0.34 22.4 
 No Import 35.08 1.38 12.72 0 11.03 5.08 0 
 No CO2 0 2.48 47.91 0 41.50 8.49 45.5 






Supp. material IV: Optimal capacity additions for different scenarios 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of optimal capacity additions for no political risk restrictions. 





































































































































Figure 2: Illustration of optimal capacity additions for political risk restriction k < 80. 






































































































































5.4 Conclusion and implications of Paper IV for the PhD thesis 
The paper in chapter 5 has re-used several modelling aspects, which were developed in chapter 
4 and added two main methodological elements, which will be used in the more complex 
national-level case in chapter 6. To begin with, it used a third objective to the decision problem. 
This third decision criterion minimised carbon emissions, and turned the model from a bi-
objective to a multi-objective problem with a three-dimensional Pareto Front. The solution 
algorithm increased in complexity as it has to account for two nested iterations, which both 
gradually change one specific parameter. Furthermore, this chapter expanded the planning 
model in chapter 4 to include geographically explicit transmission between the centroids of 
certain geographic cells, in this case countries. It showed the applicability of such an approach, 
and was successful in implementing an APSP problem to be used as an input parameter for the 
MOLP planning model.  
In terms of findings, the model results lend further support to the three core themes salient in 
the results of the continental model. Firstly, if no environmental or political constraints are 
applied, the cost-minimal network has severe political risk and environmental impact 
deficiencies. The resulting network relies heavily on hydropower exports from DRC as well as 
domestic and internationally used coal-fired generation from South Africa. National energy 
sovereignty levels for most other countries remain high, implying the potential of further 
exacerbating the already existing political imbalances in the region. Second, however, 
mitigating political risks as well as carbon emissions, albeit slightly less so, was found to be 
achievable with limited required cost increases. The model did, however, produce a further 
novel insight, which was gained by including more than one non-monetary objective function 
simultaneously: In the case of the SAPP, there exists a sharp trade-off between carbon 
emissions and national energy sovereignty. While it is comparably cheap to individually 
achieve national energy sovereignty (2.6% of system cost increase) and to curtail CO2 
emissions (13.3% of system cost increase), achieving both objectives at the same time implies 
a substantial spike in system costs of 45%. The reason for this is that the individual least-cost 
solution strategies to solving either problem on its own each become infeasible if both 
objectives are combined. South Africa is the crucial bottleneck: Meeting its high domestic 
demand is neither possible with its own cheap coal resources (too high carbon emissions) nor 
with cheap hydro energy from DRC (too high political risk). Thirdly, the optimal share of solar 
energy in the system increases steadily when forcing either one of these non-monetary 
objectives, and even more so when forcing both of these objectives at the same time.  
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6. A MULTI-CRITERIA, LONG-TERM ENERGY PLANNING OPTIMISATION MODEL 
WITH INTEGRATED ON-GRID AND OFF-GRID ELECTRIFICATION – THE CASE 
OF UGANDA (PAPER V) 
6.1 Content overview and thesis context 
This chapter further expands the energy planning optimisation models developed in chapters 4 
and 5. It develops a novel Multi-Objective Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MOMILP) 
model to be used on a national level (objective 2c in section 2.5), yielding the non-dominated 
set of geo-referenced locations of both type and size of different electricity generation 
technologies to be built over a specified time to meet geographically explicit demand.  
A total of six key model additions compared to previous chapters make the model presented in 
chapter 6 the most complex of this thesis. Firstly, the model includes the social objectives of 
minimising urban versus rural as well as district-wise electrification inequality. As this chapter 
shows, the solution approach of converting the non-monetary objectives into a set of constraints 
and solving the resulting single-objective case multiple times (the ε-constraint method), which 
has been used in chapters 4 and 5 is shown to be advantageous for the model in chapter 6 as 
well. As the political regime type is constant on a country level, the political risk objectives 
presented in chapters 4 and 5 are not included in the national-level model of this chapter. In 
one of its case studies, chapter 3 has shown that Uganda is subject to one of the highest urban 
versus rural electrification inequalities worldwide (meaning the ratio between urban and rural 
electrification rates as defined in chapter 3, which is over 5:1 in Uganda). Furthermore, it 
documented striking sub-national electrification inequalities in the country. Hence, Uganda 
constitutes an intriguing case for the model developed in this chapter to be applied to. No multi-
criteria model has been applied in Uganda, and no previous model anywhere has explicitly 
included a sub-national electrification inequality minimisation. It should be noted that an 
environmental indicator is also included in the model, but instead of adding it as an objective, 
the model imposes a constraint on carbon emissions consistent with Uganda’s intended 
contribution as part of the Paris Agreement.  
Secondly, and numerically most critically, the model does not aggregate generation supply on 
a country level anymore, but considers actual specific generation plants with certain strictly 
positive minimum and maximum installed capacity bounds. To model this in an expansion 
planning model, binary decision variables have to be included to indicate whether or not a 
specific plant is built at a specific time which considerable increases the mathematical difficulty 
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of obtaining (near-)optimal solutions. Transmission lines are also assumed to have strictly 
positive minimum and maximum capacity levels, again requiring binary decision variables.  
Thirdly, the paper is the first to generalise the demand constraint. While in classic expansion 
models, all demand in the network has to be met, the model developed in this chapter is tailored 
to African realities by specifying an overall electrification rate target, which has to be achieved 
at the end of the planning horizon. Where this target is below 100%, the model’s degrees of 
freedom increase considerably as it can choose, which demand it meets, and which it does not. 
This effectively constitutes the planning problem most African planners are faced with in the 
coming one to two decades as their resources are not sufficient to meet all demand. 
Fourthly, in addition to planning generation and transmission infrastructure, the model 
develops a novel, simple aggregate way of accounting for distribution infrastructure. This is 
crucial on a sub-national level in sub-Saharan Africa as it allows comparing grid-electrification 
of households with off-grid electrification, and select the optimal choice of the two given the 
circumstances of the particular set of households in question. Off-grid technologies have 
rapidly become an important mode of electrification of households in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially in rural areas, but have so far not been systematically included in planning models 
of a country’s power system.  
Fifthly, a number of additional constraints are included to improve the resilience of the solution 
presented. This is due to the fact that the required level of detail of the obtained solution is 
considerably higher in the national case when compared to the regional and continental cases 
in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. New constraints include district-wise energy balances at 
different voltage levels, meeting peak (MW) with a certain pre-defined reserve margin as well 
as annual demand (GWh), and requiring minimum spreads in the geographical distribution 
location of solar plants to minimise weather risks. The paper shows how the additional 
requirement of a silo-free, continuous transmission grid can be implemented using a shortest 
path heuristic based on the modelling approach developed in chapter 5. 
Sixthly, the sub-national geographic scale of the model allows including more local generation 
technologies primarily destined to serve domestic demand such as small geothermal and 
bioenergy plants as well as different off-grid technologies (mini-hydro, solar PV with batteries, 
and diesel generators). On grid solar energy is formally split into solar PV and CSP. Hence, 
the number of included technologies rises to 13 in this paper, 4 more than any other African 
energy planning study identified in the literature review (see gap (iv) in section 2.4). 
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In addition to planning Uganda’s power sector until 2040, the paper also critically analyses the 
official governmental targets for generation expansion in Uganda as part of its Uganda Vision 
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H I G H L I G H T S
• Most sub-Saharan African countries have low and unequal access to electricity.• Multi-objective optimisation model integrates grid and off-grid electrification.• Solar energy is the cost-minimal strategy to minimise electrification inequality.• Off-grid electrification is a crucial component of all optimal solutions in Uganda.• Uganda’s current official expansion plan is infeasible and would be sub-optimal.
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Long-term energy planning
Multi-objective mixed integer linear
programming
Sub-Saharan Africa
Generation expansion problem (GEP)
On-grid versus off-grid electrification
Solar Concentrated Power
A B S T R A C T
While electricity access is lowest in developing countries, the academic literature on generation expansion
planning (GEP) has been informed almost exclusively by challenges in industrialised countries. This paper
presents the first multi-objective, long-term energy planning optimisation model tailored towards national
power systems with little existing power infrastructure. It determines the location, type, capacity and timing of
power system infrastructure additions. Specifically, three novel generalisations of standard generation planning
are introduced: (1) an expansion of the demand constraints to allow for industrial and household electrification
rates below 100%, (2) a minimisation of sub-national energy access inequality in conjunction with minimising
system costs considering environmental constraints, and (3) an integration of distribution infrastructure, ex-
plicitly including both on-grid and off-grid electrification. Using a specifically designed solution algorithm based
on the ε-constraint method, the model was successfully applied to the previously unexplored Ugandan national
power system case. The results suggest that while it is cost-optimal to maintain highly unequal sub-national
access patterns to meet Uganda’s official 80% electrification target in 2040, equal access rates across all districts
can be achieved by increasing discounted system cost by only 3%. High optimal shares of locationally flexible
on-grid and off-grid solar energy enable cheap sub-national shifts of generation capapcity. This paper strongly
challenges the Ugandan government’s nuclear energy and largely grid-based electrification expansion plans.
Instead, it calls for solar concentrated power as a baseload option in the future and a focus on off-grid elec-
trification which the model selects for the majority of household connections in 2040, even in a high-demand
scenario.
1. Introduction
The United Nations has defined universal access to electricity as one
of its Sustainable Development Goals to be reached by 2030.
Approximately 675 million people in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) live
without access to electricity, equating to more than half of all un-
electrified people globally [1]. As most research on energy planning
optimisation has been conducted in and applied to countries with well-
developed power infrastructure, there is an alarming paucity of ap-
proaches designed for developing countries with low initial elec-
trification rates. A recent review failed to identify any such long-term
energy planning optimisation research applied to a case in SSA [2]. Yet,
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c C geospatial cells
c C Cc c cells which are connected to the grid in baseline time t0
c C Cn n cells which are not connected to the grid in baseline
time t0
c C Cec ec cells which are crucial economic hubs for the country
g G generation technologies
l L transmission lines between two adjacent cells
l L Le e transmission lines between two adjacent cells which
exist in baseline time t0
l L Ln n transmission lines between two adjacent cells which do
not exist in baseline time t0
ld LD direction of flow along a transmission line (either from or
to a specific cell)
p P generation plants
p P Poff off off-grid generation plants
p P Pon on on-grid generation plants
p P PnG nG on potential new on-grid plants located in any non-
conneted cell cn
p P PoS oS on on-grid solar PV and solar thermal plants
p P PI I on on-grid plants where capacity can only be added once
during the planning horizon
p P Pvol vol on on-grid plants with volatile electricity output (solar
PV and wind)
sp SP all (pnG,ln) tuples where line ln is part of the shortest path
from pnG to the grid
=t T t T{ , , }set 1 planning times, ranging from the first planning
time t1 to final time T
t T Tt t set, =T t t T{ , , , }t 0 1 total set of times, ranging from base-
line time t0 (status quo) to final time T
Scalars
CFTrans maximum capacity factor of transmission lines [%]
CLkV conversion loss from increasing the voltage from dis-
tribution to transmission level [%]
DOMSh annual distribution operation and maintenance cost share
of investment [%]
εurbRur minimum required degree of electrification equality be-
tween urban and rural areas [%]
εreg minimum required degree of electrification equality be-
tween different sub-national cells [%]
k granularity step size for Pareto Front
MaxLine maximum single transmission line capacity as share of
total demand [%]
MaxSol maximum size of solar plants in any cell c [MW]
MaxVol maximum share of generation technologies with volatile
electricity output [%]
MinLine minimum transmission line capacity [MW]
PDemRt historic ratio of peak power demand to annual electricity
demand [MW/GWh]
RM reserve margin as share of peak demand [%]
TOMSh annual transmission operation and maintenance cost share
of investment [%]
Parameters
CFp capacity factor of plant p
CDisIRc,t average per person investment cost for rural distribution
infrastructure in cell c in time t [mn. USD p.c.]
CDisIUc,t average per person investment cost for urban distribution
infrastructure in cell c in time t [mn. USD p.c.]
CDisIROf average non-module investment cost for off-grid
technologies in rural areas of cell c in time t [mn. USD/
GWh]
CDisIUOf average non-module investment cost for off-grid technol-
ogies in urban areas of cell c in time t [mn. USD/GWh]
CGenIp,t investment cost for plant p in time t [mn. USD/MW]
CGenOMp,t annual operation and maintenance cost for plant p in
time t [mn. USD/GWh]
CO2Emp life cycle CO2 emissions of each generation plant p [tons/
GWh]
CTrIDisl fixed investment cost for existing distribution-voltage
level line l installed between two adjacent cells at time
t0[mn. USD]
CTrIFixln,t fixed investment cost for previously non-existent trans-
mission line ln in time t [mn. USD]
CTrIVarl,t variable investment cost for transmission line l in time t
[mn. USD/MW]
DFt discount factor in year t
DemBusc,t annual electricity demand of non-households (i.e. busi-
ness) in cell c and time t [GWh]
DemRc,t annual electricity demand of rural households in cell c and
time t [GWh]
DemUc,t annual electricity demand of urban households in cell c
and time t [GWh]
DLossl average loss of line l at distribution voltage [%]
DLossBusc,t average distribution losses to businesses in cell c and
time t [%]
DLossUc,t average distribution losses to connect urban households in
cell c and time t [%]
DLossRc,t average distribution losses to connect rural households in
cell c and time t [%]
EBInl,ld,c 0–1 parameter, equals 1 if electricity flowing in direction
ld along transmission line l enters cell c, and 0 otherwise
EBOutl,ld,c 0–1 parameter, equals 1 if electricity flowing in direction
ld along transmission line l exits cell c, and 0 otherwise
ERTart electricity rate target for entire population in time t [%]
ERTarBustelectricity rate target for businesses in time t [%]
ExBusc existing electricity served to non-households (businesses)
in cell c at baseline time t0 [GWh]
ExROffc existing electricity served to rural households via off-grid
technologies in cell c at baseline time t0 [GWh]
ExROnc existing electricity served to rural households via the grid
in cell c at baseline time t0 [GWh]
ExSupp existing installed generation capacity of plant p at baseline
time t0 [MW]
ExUOffc existing electricity served to urban households via off-grid
technologies in cell c at baseline time t0 [GWh]
ExUOnc existing electricity served to urban households via the grid
in cell c at baseline time t0 [GWh]
ExTrl existing capacity of line l at baseline time t0 at transmis-
sion voltage [MW]
ExTrDl 0–1 parameter, equals 1 if the connection l between two
adjacent cells is served through an existing line at dis-
tribution voltage at baseline time t0
GenEffpon generator efficiency for grid-connected plants pon to
transform generated electricity to distribution voltage [%]
MaxEmt maximum allowed carbon emissions in time t [tons]
MinErBust minimum demand which has to be met in crucial eco-
nomic hubs [%]
MinSizeponminimum required size of plant pon [MW]
PCMp,c 0–1 parameter matching plants to cells (i.e. equals 1 if
plant p is in cell c, and 0 otherwise)
PopRc,t rural population in cell c in time t
PopTott total population in time t
PopUc,t urban population in cell c in time t
SPGridp l,nG n 0–1 parameter indicating the shortest path from a plant
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the objectives and challenges of a multifold national electrification rate
increase differ markedly from planning objectives in developed coun-
tries.
1.1. Long-term national-level energy planning optimisation background
A suitable formulation of the long-term Generation Expansion
Planning (GEP) problem is required to assist decision makers in de-
signing cost-efficient energy system [3]. A solution to the problem
yields the optimal type and size, location, as well as construction timing
for new generation capacity over a long planning horizon to satisfy an
expected energy demand. A planning horizon can be considered to be
long-term if it spans 15 years or more [4].
Several review studies have discussed methods and trends for gen-
eration expansion as well as transmission expansion planning. Zhu et al.
[5] as well as, more recently, Koltsaklis and Dagoumas [6] analyse the
GEP literature, Latorre et al. [7] as well as Lumbreras and Ramos [8]
review the transmission planning problem, while Hemmati et al. [9]
discuss various combined generation and transmission planning ap-
proaches. Mathematically, the complete long-term GEP problem is a
Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) problem with multiple
decision criteria and uncertainties. MINLP formulations have been used
by Yuan et al. [10], as well as by Hemmati et al. [11], with the latter
incorporating energy storage and environmental factors into their GEP
model. If transmission is addressed, further nonlinearities exist if
Kirchoff’s Second Law is explicitly modelled. For instance, Zhang et al.
formulated a MINLP planning problem considering transmission infra-
structure [12]. Rider et al.’s proposed MINLP approach for generation
and transmission planning combined heuristics and interior point ap-
proaches to solve their nonlinear sub-problems [13].
However, especially in those cases where the GEP problem has been
applied to long-term case studies, avoiding the considerable
computational complexity associated with such non-linear methods has
led to highly insightful results. Recent advances have focused on con-
siderably broadening the scope and level of analysis of the long-term
GEP problem [8], which in turn required different assumptions to
simplify the model. The consequential diversification of the GEP lit-
erature has integrated such issues as various risk assessments, a variety
of new decision criteria beyond pure economic optimality, operational
power system aspects, the inclusion of interdependencies with other
systems such as water supply, energy storage and security of supply, as
well as policy design. Associated simplified solution approaches have
included mathematical optimisation techniques such as Linear Pro-
gramming (LP), various decomposition approaches, Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) as well as meta-heuristic approaches. For
instance, in their long-term energy planning study, Thangavelu et al.
used an LP formulation to incorporate security of supply concerns with
an environmental objective of low emissions [14]. Guo et al. similarly
used an LP formulation to study the effect of different operational time
scales as part of the Chinese power system under a cap-and-trade
carbon scheme [15]. However, due to their potential to model binary
investment decisions as well as fixed cost functions, MILP approaches
have been a dominant method to expand the GEP problem. Pozo et al.
proposed a three-level MILP model which integrates generation and
transmission expansion planning [16]. Other scholars have used MILP
models to account for reliability measures [17], different types of
problem-inherent uncertainties [18] and scheduling decision making
[19]. Metaheuristic approaches have frequently been argued to allow
for a broad study of long-term energy planning [20]. Metaheuristic
methods have been proposed as alternatives to classical optimisation
methods. These can arise when studying optimal operational conditions
of power plants [21], associated components such as converters [22] or
complex electricity demand forecasting [23]. Kaboli et al. provide an
informative visual classification overview of such metaheuristics [24].
pnG to the grid as it exists in baseline time t0 (i.e. equals 1 if
line ln is part of the shortest path from plant pnG to the
grid, and 0 otherwise)
Supp unexplored generation potential for generation plant p at
baseline time t0 [MW]
TLossl average loss of line l at transmission voltage [%]
Continuous variables
cTotDisI total discounted investment costs for distribution infra-
structure [mn. USD]
cTotDisOM total discounted operation and maintenance costs for
distribution infrastrcture [mn. USD]
cTotGenI total discounted investment costs for generation plants
[mn. USD]
cTotGenOM total discounted operation and maintenance costs for
generation plants [mn. USD]
cTotTrI total discounted investment costs for transmission lines
[mn. USD]
cTotTrOM total discounted operation and maintenance costs for
transmission lines [mn. USD]
disBusc,t annual electricity sent to businesses in cell c in time t via
distribution lines that connect adjacent cells [GWh]
disRc,t annual electricity sent to rural areas in cell c in time t via
distribution lines that connect adjacent cells [GWh]
disUc,t annual electricity sent to urban areas in cell c in time t via
distribution lines that connect adjacent cells [GWh]
elBusc,t electricity sent to businesses in cell c in time t [GWh]
elUpc,t electricity transformed from distribution to transmission
voltage in cell c in time t [GWh]
elDownc,t electricity transformed from transmission to distribution
voltage in cell c in time t [GWh]
elROffc,t off-grid electricity sent to rural households in cell c in time
t [GWh]
elROnc,t on-grid electricity sent to rural households in cell c in time
t [GWh]
elUOffc,t off-grid electricity sent to urban households in cell c in
time t [GWh]
elUOnc,t on-grid electricity sent to urban households in cell c in
time t [GWh]
erBusc,t electrification rate of businesses in cell c in time t [%]
erRc,t rural electrification rate of cell c in time t [%]
erTotc,t total electrification rate of cell c in time t [%]
erUc,t urban electrification rate of cell c in time t [%]
genp,t annual electricity generation of plant p in time t [GWh]
genCapp,t newly installed generation capacity of plant p in time t
[MW]
genCCp,t cumulative newly installed generation capacity of plant p
in time t [MW]
transl,ld,t annual electricity at transmission voltage sent along line l
in direction ld in time t [GWh]
transCapl,tnewly installed transmission capacity on line l in time t
[MW]
transCCl,t cumulative newly installed transmission capacity on line l
in time t [MW]
transDl,ld,t annual electricity at distribution voltage sent along line l
in direction ld in time t [GWh]
Binary variables
xGen p t,on 1 if generation plant pon is built in time t, and 0 otherwise
xTransl t,n 1 if transmission line ln is built in time t, and 0 otherwise
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Proposed algorithms include the hybrid Genetic Algorithms (GA)/dy-
namic programming approach developed by Park et al. [25], the
adaptive Simulated Annealing (SA) algorithm proposed by Yildirim
et al. [26], and Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) based algorithms
[20], which have also been successfully used for transmission planning
[27]. Some models were specifically designed to handle uncertainties
through approaches such as stochastic programming [28] or interval-
parameter linear programming [29].
This paper focuses on the subset of problems which related to na-
tional-level expansion planning. While some studies, such as Chen
et al.’s work on China [30], do not divide their national power system
into distinct cells, a number of recent works have done so to study sub-
national implications of their planning models. For example, Guo et al.
in their long-term energy planning study of the Chinese power system
deployed a linear levelised cost approach for their objective function,
dividing the Chinese system into ten geographic cells [15]. Guerra et al.
integrated generation and transmission capacity planning in their MILP
formulation applied to the Colombian power system, which they di-
vided into five sub-national cells [31]. Georgiou formulated an MILP
model to solve the long-term energy planning problem for the Greek
national electricity system [32]. Georgiou similarly modelled the
system using five different geographic cells and studied optimal trans-
mission requirements between these cells. Sharan and Balasubramanian
presented a single-period MILP model which includes power and fuel
transportation costs and apply it to the case of Southern India, modelled
via 48 demand nodes [33]. These last three works argue for the benefits
of simultaneously optimising generation and transmission infra-
structure. Furthermore, the GEP problem can be formulated as either
driven by a centralised monopoly-utility or by a deregulated market
with several market participants [19].
The different types of decision criteria associated with generation
and transmission planning imply that multi-objective models are well-
suited for energy planning [8], an assertion which has been similarly
made in the context of different market designs [34] and for renewable
energy integration [35]. To be able to obtain solutions for a long-term
national-level planning problem with reasonably high geographic re-
solution or multiple periods, multi-objective expansion planning using
classical optimisation techniques has been dominated by assumptions
which allow for linear methods. Ren et al. formulate a Multi-Objective
Linear Programming (MO-LP) model for the planning of distributed
energy systems and their environmental impact [36], while Luz et al.
[37] as well as Zhang et al. [35] use MO-LP formulations to plan sys-
tems with high renewable energy penetration. Among the most pro-
minent approaches for this type of problem are Multi-Objective Mixed
Integer Linear Programming (MO-MILP) methods [38]. For instance,
Muis et al. use a MO-MILP formulation to assess renewable energy in-
tegration in the presence of a carbon emission reduction target [39].
Antunes et al. similarly use a MO-MILP formulation for their en-
vironmentally informed GEP model instance [40]. In terms of the types
of optimisation criteria studied, previous multi-objective approaches
have most commonly considered the trade-off between costs and en-
vironmental impact. For instance, Koltsaklis et al., in their spatial MO-
MILP energy planning model applied to the Greek system, included an
environmental constraint in terms of carbon emissions, and solved their
problem for different levels of maximum-allowed emission levels, ef-
fectively yielding non-dominated solutions in the cost-versus-emissions
space [4]. In addition to minimising costs and environmental impact,
Meza et al. modelled minimum imported fuel and energy price risks
objectives [41,42], Unsihuay-Vila et al. considered a technical objective
of diversifying the generation mix as part of their MO-MILP model [43],
Luz et al. maximised generation at peak load [37], while Trotter et al.
minimised different political risk factors associated with different net-
work designs in the Southern African Power Pool [44] and a continental
African case [45].
Different methods exist for solving multi-objective optimisation
problems [46]. In the context of the GEP, popular approaches have
included weighted sum methods (see [42,43]), compromise program-
ming based on minimising the Chebyshev distance between the multi-
objective solution and the (infeasible) ideal solution of the single-ob-
jective cases (see for instance [36,38], different variations of the ε-
constraint method (see for instance [35,37]) where all but one of the
objectives are introduced as constraints, and Fuzzy Decision Theory
[47].
1.2. Long-term energy planning in developing countries with low
electrification rates: Problem characteristics and literature gaps
Applying the long-term GEP to developing countries alters the
problem in several fundamental ways when compared to its conven-
tional formulation. It is crucial to have robust planning methods in
place for sub-Saharan Africa which cover the next two decades in order
to efficiently overcome the energy access challenges there [49]. Spe-
cifically, three crucial aspects which characterise the long-term energy
planning problem in developing countries have not yet been addressed
in the mainstream GEP literature. Namely, these are (1) the presence of
substantial planned suppressed demand due to insufficient initial power
infrastructure as evidenced by electrification rates below 100%, (2) the
challenge of dealing with highly unequal access to electricity on a sub-
national level, and (3) the importance of integrating on-grid and off-
grid electrification options into an expansion planning optimisation
model. The following paragraphs explain these three issues and the
literature gaps associated with them in turn, while Section 1.3 explains
this paper’s novel contributions to the literature by specifically ad-
dressing these three gaps.
First, while demand for electricity exists throughout a given de-
veloping country, the power infrastructure may only cover small parts
of the country. In SSA, the average access rate is below 40%. SSA is
home to 18 of the 19 countries worldwide which have reported an
electrification rate of below 30% in 2016, the access rate in Uganda is
below 25% [1]. Hence, a static constraint to meet all demand in a
country which is the way the long-term energy planning problem has
commonly been formulated in the literature is not a sensible modelling
approach in many developing country contexts. Rather, many African
governments have set electrification rate targets below 100% for the
next one to two decades. To assist the associated infrastructure ex-
pansion decision-making process, a long-term national-level planning
model needs to model demand as meeting this electrification rate target
throughout the planning horizon, hence allowing for planned sup-
pressed demand.
Second, electricity access is distributed highly unequally throughout
SSA [50]. While it is accepted that the implicit socio-political dynamics
have often been fundamental to whether or not electrification in de-
veloping countries has succeeded or not [2], to the best of our knowl-
edge, they have not yet been explicitly modelled in long-term national-
level generation and transmission planning optimisation models. SSA is
the only major world region where there is a more than threefold gap
between rural and urban electrification (Fig. 1, see also [50]). Similar
inequalities exist for different sub-national regions of the same country.
As a consequence, electrification has turned into a political good in SSA:
Incumbents have frequently promised to provide access to their poli-
tical supporters during electoral campaigns (see [54] and more recently
[45]). Decision makers are thus faced with the challenge of electricity
access being a deeply socio-political issue, and energy planning efforts
would do well to consider such dimensions.
Third, while the traditional GEP focuses on generation expansion,
expanded by some scholars to transmission planning, the low number of
connections in many African countries warrants the inclusion of dis-
tribution planning. This is necessary to capture where new connections
are provided, which in turn yields the actual, non-suppressed demand
the network needs to meet. What is more, in addition to the traditional
on-grid focus of the GEP, off-grid solutions have been found to be cheap
electrification alternatives in many developing countries and thus need
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to be part of an integrated planning approach [55]. Several planning
studies have used geographic information system (GIS) software to
determine the cost-optimal mode of electrification in developing
countries. Cases include village-level studies [56], country-level as-
sessments in Kenya [57], Burkina Faso [58] and Senegal [59] as well as
on a continental African scale for rural [60] and for all households [61].
These GIS-based studies proposed different approximations to calculate
the costs of different electrification alternatives for a certain spatial area
and then choose the cheapest alternative per spatial area. Mentis et al.’s
work is notable for their continental scale, the quality of their GIS data
and their usage of small spatial units of 1 km2 [61]. They found a high
penetration of standalone technologies as part of the preferred power
system, especially for low per capita demand scenarios. Other scholars
have used the pre-defined cost-minimisation planning model of the
Network Planner software to determine the least-cost choice between
grid and off-grid electrification in African cases, namely for Nigeria
[62] and Ghana [63]. However, while these approaches allow for
choosing a high spatial resolution due to limited computational com-
plexity, all these studies treat grid extension as a black box, attributing
an assumed overall cost rather than explicitly modelling electricity
flows, the implications for the optimal on-grid generation mix or re-
spective generation plant locations and timing. Interactions between
the different spatial areas are limited or non-existent in most of these
studies. They were also largely focused on household access to elec-
tricity and often not concerned with non-domestic demand which
usually makes up around three quarters of overall demand.
1.3. Novelty of the presented model
This paper is the first to expand the long-term GEP such that it can
readily be used for developing country cases with limited initial elec-
tricity infrastructure. It contributes to the trends of broadening the GEP
problem and the usage of MO-MILP methods evident in the literature
review in Section 1.1. Specifically, this paper presents a novel long-
term, spatially explicit, multi-period MO-MILP energy planning model,
featuring the following three main novel generalisations, each addres-
sing one of the three literature gaps identified in Section 1.2:
● The design and application of a national-level energy planning
optimisation tailored towards developing countries with limited
initial power infrastructure, imposing the demand-side constraint of
meeting a given overall electrification rate target which can be set to
any number between 0 and 100% at any time period. Hence, the
model is able to choose to meet demand in some sub-national areas,
and supress it in others. This constitutes a generalisation of the
conventional generation and transmission expansion planning pro-
blem where demand has to be met at all nodes and times.
● The model defines sub-national electrification inequalities (both
urban versus rural and regional access differences) as a separate
optimisation criteria. The model’s multi-objective approach yields
the optimal trade-off between minimising system costs and different
types of sub-national electrification inequalities expressed in a
spatially explicit way, considering a significant number (> 100) of
sufficiently small discrete geographic cells.
● In addition to integrated generation and transmission expansion
planning, the model includes an aggregated formulation of dis-
tribution infrastructure to indicate where new connections are
planned. Crucially, the model integrates both on-grid and off-grid
electrification options to provide energy access, with the latter being
projected to play an important part in electrifying developing
countries. This integrated model is able to derive implications for
the optimal split between off-grid and on-grid electrification of
people without access, as well as derive the implicit load implica-
tions on the grid.
Furthermore, the model’s application is novel as it constitutes the
first energy optimisation study of any kind of the Ugandan network. As
all data used is real-life data, the paper is able to compare its solutions
with official Ugandan energy expansion policies and offer improve-
ments over current plans.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the problem statement to describe the overall structure and
key assumptions of the model. Section 3 mathematically defines the
model, Section 4 provides the solution algorithm. Section 5 briefly in-
troduces the post-optimisation power flow analysis method used for
validating the modelling results, while data requirements for the
Ugandan case are briefly discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents the
solution of the model and tests the least-cost network via an indicative
load flow analysis, Section 8 shows the significant differences between
the model results and Uganda’s official national energy expansion plan.
Finally, a conclusion is offered in Section 9.
2. Problem statement
The problem is stated in terms of the following factors and as-
sumptions:
i. Overall structure and objectives: The MO-MILP model performs
long-term energy planning by dividing the system into a number of
distinct geographic cells c over multiple time periods t. It is tailored
towards cases with low initial electrification rates, and minimises
the discounted system costs, consisting of the investment as well as
operation and maintenance cost of generation, transmission and
distribution infrastructure. Furthermore, it includes objectives to
minimise urban versus rural and regional electrification inequality
within a country (or another unit of analysis).
ii. Demand: The model includes three kinds of demands, namely
urban household, rural household and non-household (i.e. business
and public sector) demand, each aggregated per cell c and time
period t. Both an annual electricity demand (in GWh) and a peak
Fig. 1. Rural and urban electrification in major world regions in 2016.
Data Source: [1].
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load demand with a minimum capacity reserve margin (in MW)
have to be met. In accordance with the decision problem commonly
faced by planners, the main demand constraints are formulated in
terms of meeting a certain national-level electrification rate. The
model is thus free to choose which sub-national cells it electrifies
(fully or partially) to meet these targets. To account for uncertainty
in demand forecasts, different demand scenarios are considered.
iii. Generation: The available on-grid generation options g include
both renewable energy sources (solar PV, solar concentrated power
(CSP), wind, biomass, hydro and geothermal) as well as non-re-
newables (natural gas, coal, oil and nuclear). Furthermore, several
off-grid generation options (solar PV with battery storage, hydro
mini-grids and diesel generators) are considered, however industrial
demand is assumed to require grid-connected electricity. Generation
potentials for each technology are aggregated per geographic cell c,
and together with their associated capacity factors depend on the
endowments in each cell. While all on-grid plants must at least be of
a specific positive minimum capacity size if built (binary decision
variables required), any fractional installed capacity is allowed for
off-grid technologies as they are readily scalable down to several
Watts (no binary decision variables required). Generation resilience
constraints include a maximum capacity percentage from volatile
solar and wind on-grid sources, a minimum reserve margin re-
quirement at peak power demand and a minimum geographical
spread of solar plants to balance weather fluctuations.
iv. Carbon emissions: The model limits annual carbon emissions from
generation. In the specific country case of Uganda, the limit was set
according to Uganda’s intended contributions as part of the Paris
Agreement.
v. Transmission: Each neighbouring cells c1 and c2 can be connected
via a transmission line l. Each line l is assumed to connect the
centroids of c1 and c2, and is assumed to be 20% longer than the
straight-line distance between these centroids due to geographic
barriers. A line l either exists in baseline time t0 (if an existing
transmission line connects c1 and c2), or can be built from scratch.
The model allows for upgrading the capacity for existing lines.
Distances between geographic cells are assumed to be large enough
that constructing lines at distribution voltage (33 kV and below)
between them is always sub-optimal to constructing transmission
lines.1 Furthermore, the model ensures that all new power plants to
be built in unconnected cells are being connected to one con-
tinuously interconnected grid using a shortest path to the grid
heuristic (see Appendix A).
vi. Distribution: The model includes existing distribution infra-
structure between cells (mostly 33 kV), enabling the model to
transmit electricity at low voltage. While such low-voltage are sub-
optimal when compared to transmission lines, they nevertheless
frequently exist in developing countries and covering considerable
distances. The model furthermore considers distribution infra-
structure aggregated at cell-level to determine the optimal choice of
an on-grid versus off-grid electrification strategy for households by
calculating average urban and rural distribution costs per person for
each cell c. The distribution line length requirements in urban and
rural areas located in a cell c to estimate the per person distribution
costs follow from a simple tree-type network approximation (see van
Ruijven et al. (2012) [64]). This approximation mainly depends on
average household size and density in urban and rural areas (see
Appendix B). Within-cell distribution cost for businesses are in-
cluded by considering associated losses, while the connection costs
for businesses can be neglected due to the considerably larger
amount of household connections and the low variability of business
connection costs between different cells.
vii. Market-type: Generation and transmission planning is often done
in a centralised way in developing countries, with a governmental
body being responsible and politically accountable (similar to what
Unsihuay-Vila et al. have argued for the Brazilian case [43]). The
model thus assumes a simple monopoly-type market setting.
3. Mathematical formulation
This section presents the novel MO-MILP model laid out in Section
2. First, the objective functions are discussed in Section 3.1. The sub-
sequent sections address the constraints modelling demand (Section
3.2), energy balances (Section 3.3), generation and environmental im-
pact (Section 3.4), transmission (Section 3.5), distribution (Section 3.6)
and network resilience (Section 3.7). The solution approach, based on
applying an ε-constraint method to the non-monetary objective func-
tions, is detailed in Section 4.
3.1. Objective functions
This model considers three different objective functions, namely (1)
total discounted cost minimisation, (2) urban versus rural electrifica-
tion inequality minimisation, and (3) regional electrification inequality
minimisation. Objective function (1) sums the discounted generation,
transmission and distribution investment costs, cTotGenI, cTotTrI and
cTotDisI, respectively, as well as the discounted generation, transmis-
sion and distribution operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, cTot-
GenOM, cTotTrO and cTotDisOM. Expression (2) minimises the max-
imum absolute discrepancy between urban electrification rate erUc,t and
rural electrification rate erRc,t in any geographic cell c at final planning
time horizon period T. The maximum discrepancy of the total elec-
trification rate erTotc,t between any two regions, i.e. cells c c C,1 2 , in
final period T is minimised in (3):
= + + + +
+




=f erU erRmin max(| |)urbrur c C c T c T, , (2)
=f erTot erTotmin max ( )reg c c C c T c T, , ,1 2 1 2 (3)
3.1.1. Cost objective function
3.1.1.1. Generation investment and O&M costs. The total discounted
investment costs of all newly installed generation capacity are
calculated by summing the product of newly installed generation
capacity genCapp,t and their associated costs CGenIp,t over all potential
generation plants p and time periods t, multiplied by discount factor
DFt. For brevity, unless explicitly stated otherwise, every time a sum
over time periods is used in this paper, it refers to summing over the
planning time periods t1 to T., i.e. summing over the set of time periods
Tset rather than Tt. Similarly, the total discounted O&M costs follow
from summing the product of generated electricity genp,t from the plant
as well as time-specific O&M costs, CGenOMp,t as follows:




p t p t, ,
(4)




p t p t, ,
(5)
3.1.1.2. Transmission investment and O&M costs. The fixed transmission
investment costs CTrIFixln,t are multiplied with binary decision variable
1 For the cost data in the Ugandan case, the distance where constructing 132
kV transmission lines becomes cost-optimal vis-à-vis constructing 33 kV dis-
tribution lines over their lifetime is roughly 7 km due to lower losses and re-
latively small cost differences between the two. The minimum length of any
potential transmission line in the 112 district Ugandan case example is 9 km.
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xTransln,t, a variable equal to 1 if previously non-existent transmission
line ln is built between two adjacent geographic cells in time t, and 0
otherwise. The variable investments costs CTrIVarl,t are multiplied with
the newly added transmission line capacity transCapl,t on line l in time t.
The O&M costs of transmission for lines at transmission voltage are
calculated by assuming a fixed O&M cost share of investment, TOMSh,
to occur every time t. Hence, TOMSh is multiplied with the installed
capacity on line l (the sum of already existing capacity at baseline time
period t0, ExTrl, and the cumulative newly added line capacity transCCl,t
between t1 and t) and the associated investment costs per line,
CTrIVarl,t. Furthermore, where distribution lines exist between cells in
time t0, i.e. where parameter ExTrDl is equal to 1, their maintenance
cost is included in Eq. (7) via their O&M cost share of investment,
DOMSh, multiplied by the original investment cost of the line, CTrIDisl.




l t l t
l






cTotTrOM DF transCC ExTr CTrIVar TOMSh
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3.1.1.3. Distribution investment and O&M costs. Cost parameters
CDisIUc,t and CDisIRc,t denote the average per-person investment cost
for on-grid distribution infrastructure in urban areas and rural areas of
cell c, respectively (see Section 5 for details). The number of people
with new access to electricity through the grid follows from multiplying
urban and rural populations in each cell and time, popUc,t and popRc,t,
with the annual electricity distributed in cell c and time t, elUOnc,t in
urban and elROnc,t in rural areas, lowered by distribution losses
DLossUc,t and DLossRc,t, and divided by the respective electricity
demand DemUt and DemRt respectively. In addition, non-module
investment costs of off-grid technologies are included (such as
logistics costs to provide modules to remote households). They follow
from multiplying the newly generated off-grid electricity in cell c time t,
elUOffc,t− elUOffc,t−1 for urban and elROffc,t− elROffc,t−1 for rural
areas, by an assumed non-module investment unit cost, CDisIUOffc,t
and CDisIUOffc,t. As only the newly constructed distribution
infrastructure has to be considered for each time period, the formula
for cTotDisI calculates the difference in distribured electricity to yield
newly added infrastructure in each time period, and then sums over the
planning horizon. The consumed electricity in baseline period t0 is
known and modelled as an input parameter in accordance to the right-
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(8)
=elUOn DLossU ExUOn c·(1 )c t c t c, ,0 0 (9)
=elROn DLossR ExROn c·(1 )c t c t c, ,0 0 (10)
=elUOff ExUOff cc t c, 0 (11)
=elROff ExROff cc t c, 0 (12)
Analogously to (7), Eq. (13) multiplies the O&M cost share of in-
vestment DOMSh with the cumulative distribution investment until
time period t, and then sums over all cells and planning time periods.
All O&M costs for off-grid technologies are considered as part of the































3.1.2. Electrification inequality objective functions
The objective functions considering electrification inequalities are
expressed in terms of annual rural, urban and total electrification rates.
These follow from dividing the total distributed on-grid electricity,
elUOnc,t for urban and elROnc,t for rural areas, as well as the associated
off-grid electricity elUOffc,t and elROffc,t in cell c and time t, the former
lowered by distribution losses DLossUc,t and DLossRc,t, by the respective
demands in cell c and time t, DemUc,t and DemRc,t. The total elec-
trification rate of a cell at a certain time is a population-weight sum of
urban and rural electrification. The model furthermore includes an
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The model generalises the common demand constraint in the GEP. It
requires meeting an overall domestic electrification rate target ERTart
which is calculated as a population-weighted sum of individual cell
urban and rural electrification rates (17). If ERTart = 100, all demand
would need to be met at all nodes and all times as is the case in con-
ventional GEP planning model formulations. However, as ER-
Tart < 100 is usually the case for the coming decades in sub-Saharan
African countries, the options of the model to meet demand rises ex-
ponentially with the cardinality of the set of cells C| |. Hence, this gen-
eralisation complicates the model as its degrees of freedom are con-
siderably increased.
+erU popU erR popR
popTot
ERTar t
· ·c c t c t c t c t
t
t
, , , ,
(17)
Furthermore, all previously served demand in urban and rural areas
through on and off-grid technologies in baseline time period t0, ExUOnc,
ExROnc, ExUOffc, and ExROffc respectively, has to be met in subsequent
time periods (considering average distribution line losses within cell c
in time t in urban and rural areas, DLossUc,t and DLossRc,t,):
elUOn DLossU ExUOn c t·(1 ) ,c t c t c, , (18)
elROn DLossR ExROn c t·(1 ) ,c t c t c, , (19)
elUOff ExUOff c t,c t c, (20)
elROff ExROff c t,c t c, (21)
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3.2.2. Business demand
Similarly, meeting business demand is modelled by requiring at
least a certain overall fraction of total demand, ERTarBust, to be met in
year t without specifying the geographical areas where this demand
fraction should be met. Each rate erBusc,t follows from dividing elBusc,t,
lowered by distribution losses DLossBusc,t, with the business demand.
The overall business electrification rate is then calculated by weighing




















Furthermore, at least the business demand served in baseline time t0
has to be met in all cells at all times:
elBus DLossBus ExBus c t·(1 ) ,c t c t c, , (24)
3.2.3. Total peak demand
The total demand in GWh served through the grid is converted to
peak power demand in MW by multiplying it with scalar PDemRt which
denotes the historically observable ratio between peak power and an-
nual electricity demand. Constraint (25) requires that the total on-grid
installed capacity in each time t, modelled as the sum over all newly
added and pre-existing grid-connected capacity, genCCpon and ExSuppon,
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3.2.4. Socio-economically motivated demand
Any given electrification rate in each cell c must be at least sus-
tained in two subsequent periods, as a reduction in domestic elec-
trification rates in any district should be avoided. Moreover, constraint
(27) considers the fact that certain districts cec may be fundamental
economic hubs of a country where a specific, large share MinErBust of
business demand must be met. In Uganda, this is the case for the capital
city Kampala which has a unique role both economically and politi-
cally.
erTot erTot c t,c t c t, , 1 (26)
erBus MinErBus c C t,c t t ec ec,ec (27)
3.3. Energy balance constraints
3.3.1. Transmission voltage on-grid energy balance
For each cell c, electricity input must equal electricity output in each
time period t. Each cell receives electricity via transmission transl,ld,t if
parameter EBInl,ld,c equals 1, i.e. if transmitted electricity flowing along
line l in direction ld enters cell c. Similarly, transmission leaves cell c
where parameter EBOutl,ld,c equals 1. All incoming transmission is re-
duced by loss parameter TLossl. Furthermore, each cell may get elec-
tricity input at the transmission level if some electricity elUpc,t is gen-
erated in cell c and then converted upward to transmission voltage to be
sent elsewhere. Alternatively, electricity transmitted from elsewhere
may be converted down to distribution voltage, hence variable elDownc,t
is included on the right-hand side of Eq. (28). Again, conversion losses
CLkV are multiplied for electricity input.
+
= +
trans EBIn TLoss elUP CLkV
trans EBOut elDown c t
· ·(1 ) ·(1 )
· ,
l ld l ld t l ld c l c t
in
l ld l ld t l ld c c t
out
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
(28)
3.3.2. Distribution voltage on-grid energy balance
At the distribution voltage level, all generated electricity in a cell
plus incoming electricity from other cells after losses must equal out-
flowing electricity plus electricity used for distribution within the cell
to meet demand. Losses incurred to convert generated electricity genpon,t
from plant pon to distribution voltage are captured through efficiency
parameter GenEffpon. Parameter PCMpon,c matches generation plants pon
to cells c by being equal to 1 if pon is in c, and 0 otherwise. As intercell
distribution lines may exist in time t0, Eq. (29) contains terms of dis-
tribution transDl,ld,t which models electricity exchange at distribution
level between cells, incurring a loss DLossl > TLossl . These terms are
multiplied with parameter ExTrDl, thereby limiting them to already
existing lines in baseline time t0. Electricity converted down from
transmission to distribution voltage in cell c, elDownc,t, is an input,
while electricity converted upwards, elUpc,t is an output. Furthermore,
variables elBusc,t, elUOnc,t and elROnc,t denote the electricity used via






gen GenEff PCM transd
EBIn DLoss ExTrD elDown CLkV
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c t c t
out
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, , , , , ,
, ,
on on on on
(29)
3.3.3. Off-grid energy balance
For off-grid generation technologies, the associated energy balance
is simply that the sum of off-grid generation genpoff,t equals the elec-
tricity consumed from off-grid sources in urban and rural areas in each
cell c and time t, elUOffc,t and elROffc,t, respectively.
= +gen PCM elUOff elROff p t· ,
p p t p c
in
c t c t
out




3.4.1. Generation supply potential
The cumulative newly added capacity of a plant p in t, genCCp,t, is
the sum of all newly added capacity in certain time period t, genCapp,t,
up until t (31). Note that genCCp,t0= 0. The supply potential Supp for
each plant is the upper bound for genCapp,t, lowered in time t > t1 by

















3.4.2. Generation plant size and timing
Big-M type constraints impose bounds on newly added capacity
genCappon,t. They multiply the binary decision variable xGenpon,t which
is 1 if grid-connected plant pon is built with some positive capacity in
time t, with minimum required plant size MinSizepon (33) and with an
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upper bound, either set to the maximum potential of each plant, Suppon
for non-solar plants (34), or to a certain maximum capacity size MaxSol
for solar plants (35) (see Section 3.7).
genCap xGen MinSize p·p t p t p on, ,on on on (33)
genCap xGen Sup p P P· /p t p t p on on oS, ,on on on (34)
genCap xGen MaxSol p·p t p t oS, ,oS oS (35)
Moreover, a subset PI of all on-grid generation plant Pon can only be
built once during the planning horizon at a fixed capacity. Large-scale
hydro dams or fossil fuel plants may serve as examples of such plants.
xGen p1
t
p t I,I (36)
3.4.3. Electricity generation
Annual electricity generation in each plant p in any time t, genp,t
cannot exceed the installed capacity of plant p in time t, calculated as
the cumulative newly added capacity during the planning horizon until
time t, genCCp,t, plus the existing capacity parameter in time t0, ExSupp,
multiplied by the plant’s capacity factor CFp and the hours in a year as
shown in constraint (37). To decrease potential numerical issues arising
from large differences in orders of magnitude, the model's input para-
meter are assumed to be given in MW and GWh, hence multiplying by
8.760 1000h/a rather than 8760 h/a.
+gen genCC ExSup CF h
a
p t( )· ·8. 760 1000 ,p t p t p p, , (37)
3.4.4. Environmental impact/carbon emission limit
The sum of carbon emissions in all time periods t, calculated as the
product of annual generation genp,t and life cycle CO2 emissions CO2Emp
of plant p, is required to be below allowed emission limit MaxEmt (38):
gen CO Em MaxEm t·
p
p t p t, 2
(38)
3.5. Transmission constraints
3.5.1. Transmission line capacity
Similarly to expression (31), the cumulative transmission capacity
on a line l between two adjacent cells, transCCl,t, is calculated as the









Similar to expressions (33)–(35), big-M constraints impose
minimum and maximum capacities on transCapl,t. Binary decision
variable xTransln,t is multiplied by minimum capacity parameter Min-
Line (40), and by an upper bound, set to the maximum allowable share
MaxLine of the greatest occurring average power demand, calculated as
the maximum value of combined served business and domestic demand
in any time t, divided by the number of hours in a year times an average
transmission line capacity factor CFTrans (41):
transCap xTrans MinLine l·l t l t n, ,n n (40)
+ +
transCap xTrans MaxLine
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Furthermore, it is assumed that it is optimal to build a certain






The annual electricity transmitted transl,ld,t, is bounded by its line
capacity, calculated as the sum of added cumulative capacity transCCl,t
and previously existing capacity ExTrl (43).2
+trans transCC ExTr CFTrans h
a
l ld t( )· ·8. 76 1000 , ,l ld t l t l t, , , , (43)
3.5.3. Continuous grid
All power plants pnG which are built in a previously non-connected
cell cn are required to be connected to the national grid via the shortest
path SPGridpnG,ln from cn to any cell which is connected to the trans-
mission grid in time t0 (see Appendix A for details). Let SP be the set of
all (pnG,ln) tuples where SPGridpnG,ln = 1. If a plant pnG is built in time t,
i.e. if binary variable xGenpnG,t is 1, then the model forces at least one
variable xTransln,t up until time t to be 1 where line ln is part of the
shortest path from pnG to the grid:
=
xTrans xGen p l SP t( , ) ,
t
t
l p t nG n, ,n nG
1 (44)
3.6. Distribution constraints
3.6.1. Intercell distribution capacity limit
Although it is suboptimal to do so, distribution voltage-level (33 kV
and below in Uganda) are frequently used to send electricity over long
distances in deveopling countries. Electricity sent to businesses, urban
and rural households via distribution voltage-level lines which connect
different adjacent cells at baseline time t0 is denoted by disBusc,t, disUc,t,
and disRc,t. Their sum is equal to the difference between incoming and
outgoing intercell distribution transDl, ld,t sent via these pre-exisitng
distribution-voltage-level lines at baseline period t0. It is sufficient to
declare Eq. (45) only for cells cn which are not connected via trans-
mission lines at transmission voltage in baseline time t0 as it is always
optimal to use higher-voltage transmission lines for long-range elec-
tricity exchange between cells rather than low-voltage distribution
where the former exist (see Section 2). The demand served through
disBuscn,t, disUcn,t, and disRcn,t in cells cn is limited by what has been
previously served in baseline time t0 (46)–(48) because distances be-
tween cells are assumed to be large enough for transmission voltage-
level lines to be economically superior to distribution voltage-level lines
for sending electricity (see footnote 1). Variable transDl, ld,t equals 0
where ExTrl equals 1 (49), and disBusc,t, disUc,t, and disRc,t are 0 in
connected cells (50)–(52).
= + +
transd EBIn DLoss ExTrD transD EBOut
ExTrD disBus disU disR c t
· · · · ·
,
l ld
l ld t l ld c l l
l ld
l ld t l ld c
l c t c t c t n
, , , , , , , ,
, , ,
n n
n n n (45)
disBus DLossBus ExBus t c t·(1 ) , ,c t c t c n, ,n n n (46)
disU DLossU ExUOn t c t·(1 ) , ,c t c t c n, ,n n n (47)
disR DLossR ExROn t c t·(1 ) , ,c t c t c n, ,n n n (48)
=transd ExTr l ld t· 0 , ,l ld t l, , (49)
2 Electricity can potentially flow in two directions ld, either from one specific
adjacent cell to the other or vice versa. However, at any one set time, flow is
only possible in one direction. As all transmission incurs a loss, it cannot be
cost-optimal to have an electricity flow in both directions ld at the same time
which is why no additional constraints are required to enforce this physical
limit.
P.A. Trotter, et al. Applied Energy 243 (2019) 288–312
296
=disBus c t0 ,c t c,c (50)
=disU c t0 ,c t c,c (51)
=disR c t0 ,c t c,c (52)
3.6.2. Electricity distribution continuity
The model requires that any amount of electricity distributed for
household consumption in a cell c in time t has to be at least as high as
in previous time period t− 1.
elUOn elUOn c t,c t c t, , 1 (53)
elROn elROn c t,c t c t, , 1 (54)
elUOff elUOff c t,c t c t, , 1 (55)
elROff elROff c t,c t c t, , 1 (56)
3.7. Network resilience constraints
3.7.1. Maximum share of volatile electricity sources
The model imposes a limit MaxVol on the grid-connected installed
capacity share from volatile sources (namely solar PV and wind) of total
installed capacity in time t, calculated as the sum of newly added cu-
mulative capacity until time t, genCCpon,t and the previously existing
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3.7.2. Geographical spread of solar plants
Most developing countries in Africa and South Asia are endowed
with abundant solar insulation. In order to spread the volatility of solar
irrigation over different parts of a country, the model imposes a max-
imum on-grid solar capacity MaxSol on the cumulative generation ca-
pacity in any cell, genCCp,t:
genCC MaxSol p P t,p t oS, (58)
4. Solution algorithm
To solve the presented MO-MILP model, an ε-constraint approach is
implemented. The idea is to convert both non-cost objective functions f2
and f3 to constraints by requiring them to not exceed a certain finite
value ε2 and ε3, respectively. The model is then solved repeatedly for
different ε2 and ε3 combinations to yield a Pareto Front of non-domi-
nated solutions of the original MO-MILP problem.
While for some MO-MILP problems, algorithms based on the ε-
constraint method can be problematic, such an approach is well-suited
for the model presented in this paper for three main reasons. Firstly,
both non-cost objective functions can be written as constraints which
are naturally bounded between 0 and 100, with a straight-forward in-
terpretation of the ε values, as follows: let = 100 100·urbRur 2 be the
minimum required degree of electrification equality measured as the
difference between urban and rural electrification rates in any cell c in
final time T. Furthermore, let = 100 100·reg 3 be the minimum re-
quired degree of electrification equality measured as the difference
between the electrification rate of any two different cells c c C,1 2 in
final time T. Then, the ε-constraints can be written as follows:
erU erR c100c T c T urbRur, , (59)
erR erU c100c T c T urbRur, , (60)
erTot erTot c c100 , Cc T c T reg, , 1 21 2 (61)
By definition of the electricity rate variables, the entire solution
space is covered for , [0, 100]urbRur reg . Crucially, this fact overcomes
a weakness generally associated with the ε-constraint method, namely
that a sensible range of ε values is often not readily available a priori. In
the present formulation, however, a value of 0 for εurbRur and εreg im-
plies that the theoretically possible minimum sub-national electrifica-
tion equality is required (in effect renderingthe associated contraints
inactive by default), whereas a value of 100 implies that the theoreti-
cally possible maximum electrification equality is enforced.
Secondly, this formulation rids the model of not continuously dif-
ferentiable functions: The maximum functions in (2) and (3) are re-
placed with simple linear upper bound constraints. Furthermore, con-
straints (59) and (60) in combination replace the absolute value
function in (2).
Thirdly, as sub-national electrification equality requirements are
increased, the solution space becomes monotonically increasingly
constrained. Hence, any optimal solution with a stricter sub-national
electrification equality requirement is an upper bound for the optimal
solution of a problem with a lower such requirement. This property is
used in the solution algorithm, presented in Fig. 2. It first solves an
MILP, defined by expressions (1), (4)–(61), with a single cost objective
for the case where electrification equality requirements are strictest (i.e.
= = 100urbRur reg ), and then uses the solution as an initial solution for
a case where the electrification equality requirements are slightly re-
laxed by a fraction k [0, 100]. Scalar k can be chosen depending on
the desired granularity of the resulting Pareto Front as it corresponds to
the step change in electrification equality requirements between dif-
ferent solutions that visualise the Pareto Front. To cover the four outer
edges of the Pareto Front where εurbRur or εreg are either 100 or 0, k is
best chosen such that =k(100mod ) 0, e.g. =k 50, 33. 3̄, 25, 20, . The
initial solutions are updated as the ε values are updated to use the best
available initial solutions in every run. Except for runs where either
εurbRur or εreg are equal to 100, the algorithm provides two initial so-
lutions to the MILP, one which was obtained from solving the MILP
with εurbRur being fraction k greater than in the current run, and one
with εreg being fraction k greater than in the current run. The smaller
the k value chosen, the more single-objective MILP models have to be
solved, however, the quality of initial solutions in each MILP solution
run monotonically improves with smaller k values. The algorithm was
implemented in IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio using OPL as a
modelling language and CPLEX 12.8 as the solver.
5. Validation method: Indicative load flow analysis
To indicate that the proposed energy networks for Uganda are valid,
the Power Systems Analysis Toolbox (PSAT) 2.1.10 was used to conduct
load flow analyses [65]. The networks of generation, loads and trans-
mission lines obtained from the results of the optimiser were translated
into the Matlab model format required for PSAT using a Python script.
PSAT was run using Matlab 2016b. The only change was the addition of
the slack bus to the model to enable the solver to converge. Load flow
analysis has been used extensively to analyse power networks [66],
usually where detailed network data is available, and it has been used
in this work to examine the voltage profiles of the optimised networks.
For the case studied in this paper, the load flow model includes both
the existing as well as the newly added generation and transmission line
capacities for all 112 districts in Uganda in 2040, and demand loads for
all 112 districts. Each district is defined as a bus in the network. A
steady state power flow analysis (DC) was completed in PSAT, yielding
the resulting voltage variations. The Newton Raphson Solver was used
throughout. Per unit resistance and inductance values were also im-
plemented for the transmission lines, and the system was simulated on a
per unit basis throughout. As most of the lines do not exist yet, several
load flow analyses were run with slight variations of resistance and
inductance values. The model was constructed using phase estimates
for the future demand loads, however these can be replaced by real
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values as the network develops over time. The load flow analysis should
therefore be treated as indicative and useful for initial validation.
6. Data: Uganda case study
As no previous optimisation study of Uganda's power system exists,
data for geospatial generation potentials, demand and demographics,
costs and existing infrastructure had to be pooled from a variety of
sources: To populate the model for the case of Uganda presented in this
paper, 40 different sources providing data and/or relevant assumptions
were used. Tables 1 and 2 list the data sources for all scalars and
parameters, respectively. Several parameters were not readily available
and had to be calculated based on different data sources. To study the
long-term implications for different generation options and rank these
generation options, the demand projections for the main case in this
paper are comparably high, albeit significantly lower than Uganda’s
official development policy, Vision 2040. Appendix B lists further data-
related details. The value for the discount factor DFt follows from sol-
ving = +DFt i
1
(1 )t t1 . Assuming an interest rate of =i 5% and =t 20201 ,
then = = =DF DF DF1, 0.952, , 0.3772020 2021 2040 .
As of 2016, Uganda had roughly 36 million inhabitants and an
available installed on-grid capacity of roughly 750 MW, with over 90%
coming from hydropower at the source of the River Nile in Central
Uganda [67]. Fig. 3 shows Uganda’s grid-connected power plants and
operational transmission and distribution lines as of baseline time 2016,
hinting at the existing electrification inequality in the country. Total
transmission line length stood at 1200 km, practically all of these lines
had a voltage level of 132 kV [68]. Grid-connected electricity consump-
tion was 2567 GWh, 23% of which serviced domestic and 77% served
business/industrial demand [69]. While not offering all technical details,
geospatial data for the current power infrastructure (generation, trans-
mission and distribution) is of comparably good quality in Uganda after
Ugandan public sector stakeholders and German development agency GIZ
published their GIS working group datasets in 2017 [68]. Electricity ac-
cess in Uganda is highly unequal on a sub-national level, both between
urban (> 50% electrification rate) and rural (< 10%) areas as well as
between different regions (roughly 50% in Central Uganda including
Kampala, below 10% in Northern Uganda) [1,68]. The government has
set an official target of 80% electrification rate by 2040, but has not
specified in detail which areas it intends to electrify. It officially aims to
attain middle-income status by 2040, increasing its per capita electricity
consumption by a factor of 50 [70].
To analyse sub-national electrification inequalities, Uganda was
divided into 112 cells corresponding to its 112 administrative districts.
The average area of these cells is 1780 km2 (roughly equalling a square
with 42 km side length). As discussed in Section 1, previous national-
level generation planning studies have used a considerably smaller
number of cells to divide a country’s power system, usually ranging
between 5 and 10 cells [4,15,31]. The subsequent results section pre-
sents results for both a 10-district case of Central Uganda as well as the
national 112-district case, the latter allowing for a comparison with
official Ugandan governmental targets for generation expansion. The
year 2016 is set as baseline time t0 and the year 2040 as the target year
of Uganda’s national development policy Vision 2040 [70] is set to final
time T. In 2016, only 35 of the 112 districts featured transmission lines.
To reduce computational complexity, the model was implemented
using 5-year time periods.3
7. Results and discussion
This section first presents the results of a case of 10 districts in
Uganda in Section 7.1, thus falling into the 5–10 cell interval used in
Fig. 2. ε-constraint solution approach for MO-MILP problem.
Table 1







k 33.3̄ (this paper)
MaxLine 25% (this paper)
MaxSol 500 MW (this paper)
MaxVol 15% [73]
MinLine 28 MVA [68]
PDemRt 0.000162 [67]
RM 150%1 (this paper)
TOMSh 2% [61,72]
1 Relatively high value of reserve margin chosen due to the high share of
renewables, especially hydro, in Uganda’s power system and the consequential
low average availabilities during peak demand.
3 As a consequence, the O&M cost equations are adjusted by a linear inter-
polation of generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure to accu-
rately count every year within the 5-year time periods, multiplied with an
annual discount factor.
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recent long-term energy problem research [4,15,31]. Section 7.2 then
discusses the results from the national-level, 112-district instance of
Uganda. Section 7.2 also presents the results of the indicative load flow
analysis of the least-cost network to suggest the validity of the model
results.
7.1. 10-district model instance
The illustrative 10-district instance includes adjacent districts from
Central and Eastern Uganda, ranging from Wakiso in the West to Jinja
in the East and Nakasongola in the North (see Fig. 4). The districts are
chosen because they are centred around the two main demand centres
in Uganda, Kampala and Wakiso, home to almost 40% of the entire
urban population of Uganda in 2016. Five of the 10 districts were
connected via transmission lines in 2016. A fictional electrification rate
target for households and businesses was set to 50% in 2040. The in-
stance includes 18 different potential new transmission lines between
adjacent districts and 49 different potential new plants within the
Table 2
Data and assumption sources for model parameters.
Parameter Source Parameter Source Parameter Source
CFp [74–78] DemUc,t [1,67,69] ExUOnc [67,68,71]
CDisIRc,t [64,71,79,80] DLossl [67,71] ExTrl [68]
CDisIUc,t [64,71,79,80] DLossBusc,t [67,71] ExTrDl [68]
CDisIROf fc t, [68,81] DLossUc,t [67,71] GenEffpon [78]
CDisIUOf fc t, [68,81] DLossRc,t [67,71] MaxEmt [82]
CGenIp,t [74–76,83] EBInl,ld,c [68] MinErBust [67,71]
CGenOMp,t [74–76,83] EBOutl,ld,c [68] MinSizepon [68,78]
CO2Emp [84,85] ERTart [70] PCMp,c [68]
CTrIDisl [71,79,80,86,87] ERTarBust [67,70] PopRc,t [1,70,88,89]
CTrIFixl,t [71,79,80,86,87] ExBusc [67,68,71] PopTott [1,70,88,89]
CTrIVarl,t [71,79,80,86,87] ExROffc [68] PopUc,t [1,70,88,89]
DFt (this paper) ExROnc [67,68,71] SPGridpnG ln, [44]
DemBusc,t [1,67,69,70] ExSupp [68] Supp [61,67,68,74–76,78,83,90–102]
DemRc,t [1,67,69] ExUOffc [68] TLossl [44,68,71]
Fig. 3. Uganda’s on-grid power plants, transmission and distribution lines in 2016.
Data Source: [68].
P.A. Trotter, et al. Applied Energy 243 (2019) 288–312
299
districts to meet any demand combination which meets the overall
electrification rate targets.
Using the solution approach described in Section 4, the MO-MILP
problem for the 10-district instance was solved to global optimality in
45 s using CPLEX 12.8 on a standard desktop computer with an Intel
Core i5 3.30 GHz processor and 16 GB RAM for a granularity value
=k 33. 3̄ (resulting in solving 16 MILPs subsequently). Fig. 5 shows the
resulting comprehensive Pareto Front, interpolated between the 16
calculated solutions. Fig. 6 provides the corresponding district-level and
urban versus rural electrification rates for different electrification
equality requirements. Non-surprisingly, it is cost-optimal to continue
(and even increase) electrification inequality due to high population
densities in Kampala and Wakiso vis-à-vis the other districts (Fig. 6A).
As εreg and εurbrur increase, regional as well as urban versus rural elec-
trification rates converge.
Notably, the Pareto Front indicates that achieving electrification
equality between urban and rural areas within the 10 districts, as well
as overall between the 10 districts, is possible at comparably small
overall discounted cost increases of 2.1%. There are four main reasons
for this, namely (1) the dominance of generation over transmission
costs, (2) the abundance and cost-efficiency of different types of solar
energy (Fig. 7), (3) the low cost of off-grid generation due to cost re-
ductions until 2040, and (4) comparably high population densities in
Uganda, especially in the selected 10 districts for the illustrative case.
As these reasons are shown to remain valid for the full country case,
they are discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.
7.2. 112-district model instance
The full national case of Uganda features 112 distinct geographical
cells, 278 different potential transmission lines connecting adjacent
districts, and 483 different potential power plants which the model can
choose to build in any one of five 5-year periods until 2040. The model
ensures that at all times t, the demand which it chooses to meet yields
the required country-wide electrification rate. Consequentially, an ex-
tremely high combination of potential network configurations exists.
Fig. 4. Uganda’s 112 districts, and the ones selected for the illustrative 10-district instance (note that the capital Kampala is itself a district).
Fig. 5. Entire Pareto Front for 10-district instance.
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Many of the feasible solutions are characterised by comparably small
cost differences: Electrifying one specific district over another at a
certain time leads to cost differences several orders of magnitude
smaller than the total system cost. The granularity value was again set
to =k 33. 3̄, and CPLEX 12.8 was used to solve the problem on the same
machine as described in Section 7.1. CPLEX solved the first MILP of the
solution approach described in Section 4, i.e. the case where
= = 100%urbrur reg and no initial solution exists to be utilised, to within
Fig. 6. Electrification rates for increasing regional and urban versus. rural equality requirements for the 10-district case.
P.A. Trotter, et al. Applied Energy 243 (2019) 288–312
301
1% of global optimality within roughly 25 min of runtime, while all
other 15 MILPs where at least one feasible initial solution was provided
were solved to within 1% of global optimality at the root node within
90 s of runtime. An optimality gap of 0.5%, a value significantly below
the degree of uncertainty present in the available data (see Section 6
and Appendix B), was set for each MILP run to ensure practical solution
times.
7.2.1. Non-dominated solutions of multi-objective problem
The resulting Pareto Front is presented in Fig. 8, the corresponding,
steadily converging electrification rates for different regions and urban
versus rural areas are shown in Fig. 9. As these figures show, it is cost-
optimal for high electrification inequality to continue (and in the first
decade, even increase) in Uganda if no electrification inequality mini-
misation criterion is imposed. This result is consistent with the con-
sequences of Uganda’s current electrification approach which is biased
towards those households who already are close to the national grid
[103]. The modelling results suggest that in the purely cost-minimal
case, the capital Kampala is immediately fully electrified in 2020,
Eastern Uganda which is home to most of the generation today is
electrified next, while electrification rates in Northern and Western
Uganda increase much more slowly until 2040. If, however, the model
forces increasing electrification equality (i.e. urbrur and reg approach
100%), then the electrification rates converge for all regions much
quicker. In this case, between 2035 and 2040, almost all new connec-
tions are located in rural areas and urban population growth outpaces
urban connection rates.
However, the resulting cost increase incurred through forcing sub-
national electrification equality in Uganda of roughly 3% is comparably
low. Similarly to the 10-district case, this is due to four main reasons. It
is important to note that several of which are specific to the Ugandan
case. Firstly, in the cost-minimal solution, the discounted total gen-
eration costs make up 84% of the total system costs of roughly 24 bn.
USD. Hence, the model chooses a similar generation mix independent of
where the electricity has to be sent to achieve higher electrification
equality (see Section 7.2.2). Specifically, switching away from cheap
but fixed-location hydro, biomass, fossil fuel or geothermal plants is
more expensive than incurring additional transmission costs to connect
these sources to the grid. Where these resources are comparably far
removed from the grid, there is an added benefit of building new
transmission lines to be used to electrify districts between the plants
and the grid.
Secondly, the abundance of solar insolation in Uganda allows the
model to incur similar generation costs for different generation loca-
tions by shifting solar PV, CSP plant and solar off-grid capacities from
one district to another at little extra cost (see Section 7.2.3 and Table A
in Appendix C). For instance, the cost-optimal solution with no elec-
trification equality requirement turns Kasese district, located at the
boarder to the Democratic Republic of Congo in Western Uganda and
endowed with high solar insolation, into an important generation hub
for Southwest Uganda, installing 398 MW solar PV, 353 MW CSP and
71 MW solar off-grid by 2040. Achieving full electrification equality
with all districts having an 80% electrification rate in 2040 implies
shifting some of this capacity elsewhere: For = = 100%urbrur reg , solar
PV in Kasese is reduced to 382 MW, CSP is reduced to 241 MW and solar
off-grid to 53 MW (Table A). For instance, in Nakasongola district, the
optimal CSP capacity increases from 159 MW to 226 MW. As the
abundance of solar resources and the rapidly falling costs of solar PV
and especially CSP (see Appendix B) lead to high shares of both tech-
nologies in the optimal solution, this is a cost-effective strategy to help
achieve electrification equality in Uganda.
Thirdly, off-grid technology costs have fallen rapidly, and are pro-
jected by IRENA to continue their cost decrease. As current cost levels
already render them a cost-competitive mode of electrification in many
rural areas today, they play a key factor in helping to close the cost gap
between urban and rural electrification going forward. The projected
cost reductions significantly decrease the cost of forcing electrification
equality in 2040. The requirement of electrification equality can be met
in a cost-efficient way by increasing the off-grid share and, even more
so, heavily shifting around off-grid capacity between districts (Table A).
Fourthly, Uganda’s comparably high population density of 208
people per square km is projected to almost double by 2040, further
decreasing the per person cost of electrification.
These results indicate that the Ugandan government and its
Fig. 7. Optimal installed capacity for 10-district instance for no (A) and full (B) electrification equality requirements.
Fig. 8. Entire Pareto Front for full national Ugandan case.
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international development partners can dramatically reduce elec-
trification inequality in Uganda at little extra total system cost if they
allocate spending accordingly. Shifting solar capacities as well as
transmission and distribution expansion to regions with low access
today, and significantly increasing off-grid electrification present cost-
efficient measures to curtail inequality and provide more equal op-
portunities to all Ugandans.
Fig. 9. Electrification rates for increasing regional and urban versus. rural equality requirements for full national case.
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7.2.2. Optimal installed capacity (high demand case)
Fig. 10 highlights the optimal installed capacity over time. As
Appendix B suggests, the demand assumptions for both households and
businesses are comparably high (albeit much lower than Ugandan of-
ficial electricity consumption targets). The resulting capacity addition
merit order, however, is mainly independent of demand estimations: At
first, Uganda’s cheapest generation option is to develop its hydro re-
sources on the River Nile, a resource which offers roughly 2.5 GW in
addition to what is installed already. The next cheapest options are
biomass (roughly 350 MW), geothermal (roughly 440 MW), the limited
wind energy in Northeastern Uganda (roughly 140 MW), and solar PV
(significantly higher potential than any conceivable demand). As solar
PV is constrained by its intermittency, CSP with storage is the next
cheapest option capable of providing 24 h baseload, again with almost
unlimited potential compared to any reasonable demand forecast. In
the example demand scenario presented in Fig. 10, falling CSP prices
lead to a surge of CSP installations in the optimal mix. While the
Ugandan government’s current focus of hydro is supported by this
paper, the importance of solar PV, and especially CSP as well as off-grid
technologies are at odds with the government’s plans to expand nuclear
energy (see Section 8).
7.2.3. On-grid versus off-grid connection results
Fig. 10 also shows a significant amount of off-grid capacity in
Uganda. Falling prices in the off-grid sector, especially for small and
medium-sized solar systems sufficient to power any household appli-
ance, imply that these systems are already cost-competitive with, and in
most cases in the future, cheaper than grid-expansion. Table 3 presents
the total number of household connections throughout the planning
horizon, split by main region and on-grid versus off-grid. These figures
include existing connections in 2016. While exact cost developments
are difficult to predict, the results indicate that the share of off-grid
connections is set to rise significantly in all regions and all years. Pu-
shed by the low cost of solar and hydro off-grid systems, their con-
siderable potential and Uganda’s strong population growth, the pro-
jected overall cost-optimal share reaches two-thirds by 2040. These
results strongly challenge the Ugandan government’s official elec-
trification policy which focuses heavily on grid-expansion (see
[70;67]).
7.2.4. Network design and indicative load flow analysis
Figs. 11 and 12 illustrate the resulting optimal network design for
no and full electrification equality requirements in Uganda in 2040,
respectively. In addition, Table A in Appendix C lists the optimal in-
stalled generation capacity in 2040 for all 112 districts by technology
for the cases of forcing no electrification equality, i.e. = = 0%urbrur reg ,
and for full electrification equality, i.e. = = 100%urbrur reg .
In either case, the main power highways stretch from the various
large-scale hydro dams along the River Nile towards the industrial
epicentres in Central Uganda and Kampala, specifically. The relative
dominance of these lines becomes more pronounced the lower the total
demand projection is. CSP in Central Uganda as well as solar PV in
Eastern Uganda are found to act as crucial technologies to combine
demand centres with close-by generation to minimise transmission
Fig. 10. Optimal installed capacity for full national case for no (A) and full (B) electrification equality requirements.
Table 3
Total number of household connections on-grid and off-grid in cost-minimal solution [million].
Region 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
On-grid Off-grid On-grid Off-grid On-grid Off-grid On-grid Off-grid On-grid Off-grid
Northern 0.10 0.04 0.32 0.05 0.37 0.24 0.40 1.03 0.42 1.75
Western 0.15 0.08 0.53 0.18 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.98 0.58 1.64
Eastern 0.13 0.12 0.34 0.85 0.38 1.78 0.38 2.60 0.38 2.88
Central 0.73 0.04 0.97 0.04 1.11 0.41 1.26 0.69 1.32 1.21
Kampala 0.45 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.83 0.00 1.09 0.00 1.10 0.31
Sum 1.57 0.28 2.78 1.12 3.26 2.94 3.70 5.30 3.80 7.78
Share [%] 85 15 71 29 53 47 41 59 33 67
Electrification rate [%]1 25 40 55 70 80
1 The electrification rate was set as a modelling parameter a priori (see Section 3.2), the 80% in 2040 match Uganda’s official electrification target in the
governmental Vision 2040 policy [70].
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requirements and associated losses. Crucially, in contrast to current
governmental efforts to expand medium-voltage distribution lines [69],
this paper finds the expansion of high-voltage transmission lines to be
superior in most cases due to lower loss implications of high-cost gen-
eration. Furthermore, off-grid technologies, dominated by solar PV and
battery combined systems with a smaller but notworthy role of micro-
hydro, play an instrumental role in nearly all districts in the cost-op-
timal solutions, crucially decreasing the need for distribution infra-
structure. This effect becomes slightly more pronounced as electrifica-
tion equality is forced as more rural households are being electrified
with off-grid solar rather than urban households who rely more strongly
on grid electrification. Due to reasons discussed in Section 7.2.1, it is
not surprising that the networks in Figs. 11 and 12 are similar.
Finally, the results from an indicative load flow analysis as de-
scribed in Section 5 are shown in Fig. 13. The steady state power flow
analysis (DC) shown was performed on the least-cost network shown in
Fig. 11. The network model converged and the resulting voltage var-
iation, which arise from the phases estimates for the network, was
limited: The p.u. minimum voltage of those districts connected to the
network was 0.950 and the maximum p.u. voltage was 1.046. Changing
the resistances and inductances assumed for the newly constructed lines
had no noteworthy effect on the voltage profile of the network. District
24 is completely disconnected from the network, with no transmission
lines through, or connection to the main network, and hence shows up
as zero voltage. Given the long-term planning horizon until 2040 and
the associated uncertainty, the network model is simplified. Due to the
paucity of empirical data, the associated voltage profile results should
be treated as being indicative.
8. Comparison with Uganda’s official generation expansion plan
To compare the official capacity targets from Uganda’s govern-
mental development policy “Vision 2040” [70] with the model results
presented in this paper, an additional demand scenario was studied.
This demand scenario followed from assuming the Uganda’s official
policy target of a 3668 kWh per capita consumption case in 2040.
Fig. 14 compares Uganda’s Vision 2040 capacity targets with the model
results using this high-end demand scenario. The higher total installed
capacity resulting from the model is due to the lower average capacity
factor of the generation mix suggested by the model compared to the one
from the governmental target generation mix. It should be noted that this
high-end demand scenario, although it is the official governmental target,
is highly unlikely to be attainable as it would require an average 20% per
annum electricity consumption increase in every year between 2018 and
2040. Yet even if this high-demand scenario were to be realised, the model
results differ fundamentally from the official governmental targets. Most
dramatically, while the government plans to have a noteworthy 24 GW of
nuclear energy installed in Uganda in 2040, the model does not find nu-
clear to be optimal in any demand scenario. In fact, the governmental plan
is found to be infeasible by the model as it far exceeds a realistic estimation
of nuclear potential (and, to a lesser degree, the fossil fuel potential) in
Uganda by 2040. CSP is found to be a cheaper baseload option for Uganda
(see also Appendix B). In addition, CSP is a favourable technology in terms
of environmental risk, local content potential (as mirrors and solar tracking
devices can be manufactured locally), the technology’s potential to foster
electrification equality and market opportunity due to its projected global
growth in the coming decades.
Fig. 11. Optimal network configuration for no electrification equality requirements (i.e. = = 0%urbrur reg ).
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The model also shows that in addition to the requirement to expand
the grid, a significant degree of off-grid solutions are cost-optimal to
electrify mainly rural areas in Uganda. The model results indicate that
off-grid technologies are the dominant form of electrification in rural
Uganda. Due to its cost reductions, this remains true despite the
country’s comparably high population density in 2040. These findings
furthermore challenge Uganda’s official electrification plans which aim
to achieve its 80% electrification rate almost exclusively by expanding
the grid [70]. The widespread underrepresentation of off-grid tech-
nologies has recently been shown to by systemic among many devel-
oping countries [104]. By expanding electricity planning to incorporate
Fig. 12. Optimal network configuration for full electrification equality requirements (i.e. = = 100%urbrur reg ).
Fig. 13. Per unit voltage magnitude profile for all buses (districts) from in-
dicative load flow analysis.
Fig. 14. Uganda’s official capacity target (“Vision 2040”) versus model results
for similar annual kWh demand assumptions in 2040.
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the generation and transmission system as well as different distribution
options, this paper lends further support to the call for national energy
plans to place more emphasis on off-grid electrification in sub-Saharan
Africa.
In summary, if it is assumed that Uganda’s official Vision 2040 ca-
pacity target would be feasible, the model solution with CSP and off-
grid technologies presented in this paper could be estimated to save
roughly $ 4–6 bn. in discounted overall system cost compared to the
Vision 2040 plan.4
In addition, while Ugandan policies have heavily focused on gen-
eration capacity additions, it is crucial to note that for Uganda to realise
widespread electrification, there needs to be a greater emphasis on
expanding transmission infrastructure. The current goals of transmis-
sion line additions fall considerably short of what is needed, especially
in the time until 2025. The transmission company UETCL is known for
being underfunded. Ironically, despite the cost dominance of genera-
tion versus transmission technology, the evacuation of power is a prime
concern in Uganda at the moment [105].
9. Conclusion
National power systems in many developing countries are char-
acterised by substantial suppressed electricity demand due to low
connection rates, highly unequally distributed energy access, and the
relevance of both on-grid and off-grid electrification approaches. This
study designed the first integrated, multi-criteria optimisation model
for long-term national-level energy planning tailored to developing
countries with low initial electricity infrastructure. The model suc-
cessfully generalised the generation expansion planning problem in
three areas: Firstly, by reformulating the demand constraints in terms of
electrification rates, the model was able to accommodate and plan for
suppressed demand. Second, the model defined sub-national elec-
trification inequalities as a simultaneous optimisation objective along-
side cost minimisation. Thirdly, it integrated generation and transmis-
sion planning with a linear distribution approximation to determine the
optimality of on-grid versus off-grid electrification aggregated at the
level of a geographical cell. The paper suggested a solution algorithm
based on the ε-constraint method which utilises the nature of the
mathematical formulation of the social (i.e. non-monetary) objectives.
The model’s application to the case of the Ugandan national power
system showed that the model is able to accommodate the specific
challenges of this problem. The proposed solution algorithm was found
to perform well and was able to indicate the problem’s entire Pareto
Front of non-dominated solutions. A load flow analysis has indicated
the feasibility and stability of the resulting network designs.
The model results of the numerical case example of Uganda have
generated a number of novel insights. In contrast to the government’s
focus on grid-extension which would imply sub-national electrification
inequality to remain high in Uganda, the model results have shown that
widespread electrification equality can be achieved in Uganda at
comparably little extra relative total system cost: Forcing an elec-
trification rate of 80% in all urban and rural areas throughout the
country increases the total discounted system costs by only 3% com-
pared to the case where no electrification inequality restrictions are in
place. This is driven by the dominance of generation over transmission
and distribution costs, the abundance of cheap solar energy, cheap and
abundant potential for off-grid technologies up until 2040, as well as
Uganda’s comparably high projected population density in 2040.
Uganda’s strategic priority of on-grid over off-grid electrification mir-
rors a more general trend in developing countries. Yet, this paper
suggests that it is cost-optimal to provide a considerable majority of
connections by off-grid technologies by 2040, despite the fact that the
assumed per capita demand is comparably high. Furthermore, this
paper has shown that Uganda’s official generation expansion targets are
infeasible and, if they had been feasible, would be highly cost-in-
efficient. If one were to use Uganda’s official per capita demand targets,
replacing the government’s planned nuclear expansion with solar con-
centrated power and focusing more strongly on off-grid electrification
would lead to savings of 4–6 bn. USD in total discounted system costs
until 2040.
In general terms, this paper has shown that improving planning
approaches by using spatially explicit models that consider generation,
transmission and distribution comprehensively, can reveal cheaper and
more equal ways of electrification for countries with low electrification
access rates. Further improvements regarding the geospatial resolution
and the accuracy of demand estimations are required in developing
countries to best plan national power systems for the long term.
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Appendix A. Shortest path heuristic
To ensure a silo-free grid, all plants pnG which the model chooses to newly build in a cell that was not served through the transmission grid in
baseline period t0 (the year 2016 in the numerical examples) need to be connected to the national grid. The shortest path heuristic requires all plants
pnG to be connected via all lines l which form the shortest path from the plant’s cell to any cell which is connected to the grid in t0. (implemented in
Eq. (45)). The shortest path problem is a classic optimisation problem which has been described in great detail before [106] and can be solved
efficiently as a separate LP for all combinations of pnG and all connected cells cc to find the shortest path from each plant pnG to the grid. The results
are then used as an input parameter to the MO-MILP problem, namely as parameter SPGridpnG,ln which is 1 if transmission line ln is part of this
shortest path to the grid, and 0 otherwise. Reference [44] describes this approach in mathematical detail and applies it to another energy planning
problem. While this heuristic can lead to the model building two separate lines from two close, un-electrified districts to the grid where in fact, only
one line would be a cheaper option, it considerably reduces the numerical complexity of the problem. Also, due to the dominance of generation over
transmission cost, the errors encountered can be expected to be comparably small. Importantly, the heuristic avoids a model structure where the
optimal transmission lines required for newly built plant pnG depend on the status of all other transmission lines ln.
4 This number would be higher if the full cost reduction potential of CSP as projected by IRENA materialises, see Appendix B1.
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Appendix B. Data details
B.1. Cost data
Generation investment as well as O&M cost data for all major on-grid and off-grid technologies in Africa are available from IRENA (see Table 2).
IRENA’s forecast for module cost development have been adopted. Where data for Uganda specifically was not available, Eastern African or sub-
Saharan African averages were used. It is noteworthy that a recent IRENA report cites dramatic cost decreases for CSP [83]. Indeed, the 2017 auction
for the Copiapó Solar Project in Chile produced a winning bid of 0.063 USD/kWh for a 260 MW 24-h baseload CSP plant. Later in 2017, another
Chilean auction received a CSP bid for under 0.05 USD/kWh. While similarly assuming a rapid cost decline for CSP, the reductions used in this study
are more conservative than what follows from the IRENA figures. This study assumes an equivalent levelised cost of electrification of 0.09–0.105
USD/kWh for 24-h CSP in Uganda in 2040, depending on solar insolation levels.
Transmission costs were obtained through personal communication with Uganda’s transmission company UETCL and distribution company
UMEME Ltd. On average, 1 km of a 132 kV double circuit line with 70 MVA in Uganda costs 180,000 USD (a number that is similar to figures given
by the International Energy Agency [87]), with a significant part of this number independent of the installed capacity due to land right and tower
construction costs.
Distribution costs are modelled per grid-electrified person. Following Nerini et al. (2016), the tree-like network structure model by van Ruijven
et al. (2012) [64] was used to estimate the required medium-voltage (MV) and low-voltage (LV) line length of the distribution grid per person as well
as any fractional substation costs. The resulting costs heavily depend on the population density as lower densities imply higher per person investment
requirements to expand the grid. Average costs for the required lines are available from a variety of sources, this paper used the numbers from Mentis
et al. (2017) for Africa. Adding these costs in accordance to van Ruijven et al.’s model, and multiplying by the average household size in Uganda
gives a value of roughly 1200 USD per grid-connection per rural household, a similar albeit slightly lower number than what Lenz et al. (2017) have
found to be the case for neighbouring Rwanda’s grid rollout programme [107]. In terms of off-grid electrification, additional costs (other than
module costs) are considered as part of the distribution costs, namely the extra infrastructure investment cost incurred to transport the off-grid to its
final household location. In case of larger systems, this can require the building of a new road as well as establishing new distribution channels [81].
It is assumed that these non-module cost are proportional to the log of population density in an area, and are not incurred anymore in urban areas
with population densities over 2000 people. At most, these average additional distribution costs are assumed to be 50% of module costs, while cases
of mini-grids in remote areas exist where the non-module cost can exceed module cost [81]. The resulting cost range for the year 2020 of 1300–2000
USD for a 250 W off-grid solar home system with battery which is able to provide Tier-3 type electricity is similar to current offerings in the Ugandan
market.
B.2. Demand data
Domestic demand in future time periods is assumed to depend on the number of urban and rural people in a geographic cell and the average per
capita demand. Rural and urban population sizes are available for all of Uganda’s 112 districts from [88]. Future population sizes are estimated by
applying a population growth rate (initially matching Uganda’s 2016 rate of 3.0% and then slightly decreasing to 2.0% in 2040) to the current
population distribution. Furthermore, Uganda’s high urbanisation rate of almost 5% in 2016 is factored into the calculation, with the capital city
Kampala assumed to grow 20% faster than any other city due to Uganda’s centralised layout. Urban and rural area size was estimated by matching
geospatial population data with Uganda’s official urban and rural population data per district to yield population densities for urban and rural areas
in each cell. For the latter, a Tier-3 type of electricity demand (which allows to power most common home appliances, see [72]) of 160 kWh per
person and year in 2040 is assumed for the main demand scenario. This figure is considerably above the average demand for newly connected rural
households during their first years of consumption, but considerably below the target demand the Ugandan government has set in its Vision 2040
policy. To study the implications of the per capita demand the government of Uganda officially aims for as part of its Vision 2040, a second, high-
demand scenario sets this figure to a Tier-5 type of electricity (which allows to power refrigeration and cooking devices as well as small air
conditioning units) demand of 900 kWh per person and year.
No spatially explicit non-household demand data exists in Uganda. To estimate it, as rural businesses are known to consume little electricity
compared to urban and semi-urban industrial businesses in East Africa [107], demand is assumed to be directly proportional to the share of the urban
population in a cell compared to the national urban population. Hence, most business demand occurs in Kampala and Wakiso, while comparably
little demand exists in Northern Uganda, assumptions which are verified by distributor UMEME’s dispatch data [71]. In the main demand scenario
studied in the paper, the share of business to total demand is assumed to decrease slightly from 77% today to 72% in 2040 [67]. It should be noted
that this constitutes a highly optimistic estimation as commercial demand would almost rise as quickly as household demand, with the latter
benefitting from a large increase in new connections. Business demand is assumed to rapidly increase in the high-demand scenario to match the
official total per capita electricity consumption target of the Ugandan government in 2040 of roughly 3800 kWh p.c. (i.e. all electricity consumed in
Uganda divided by the expected number of people in Uganda in 2040). For the dominating economic hub of Kampala [67,71], it was assumed that a
minimum of 95% of business demand has to be met in 2040.
B.3. Supply data
Data for all existing and several planned power plants as well as transmission and distribution infrastructure are available from Uganda’s GIS
working group which in 2017 for the first time published comprehensive geospatial data for Uganda’s energy system as well as several demographic
indicators [68]. Geospatial solar insolation, wind speed, on-grid hydro potential, biomass potential and fossil fuel reserves follow from various freely
available GIS sources (see Table 2). For potential solar and wind plants, annual geospatial capacity factors as well as generation potentials follow
directly from these maps following the calculations laid out by Andrews and Jelley (2017) [78], more general values for average capacity factors
were used based on the International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) analyses of African power generation plants (see IRENA references in
Table 2) where Ugandan-specific capacity factors were not available. For concentrated solar power, only those districts with easily accessible water
resources (like seas or large rivers) were considered due to the cooling requirements of CSP plants. This constitutes a conservative approach as air
cooling systems for CSP may become cheaper options of cooling in the coming decades, alleviating the need for water cooling. Detailed geospatial
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potential on-grid hydropower plant data was taken from [68], while geospatial micro-hydro potential is based on the results calculated be Mentis
et al. (2017) for Uganda. Building on a number of Uganda-specific documents on geothermal energy potential and feasibility, the total geothermal
potential of 440 MW in Uganda has been divided among the four potential sites in Uganda in accordance to the estimated feasibility at the sites. This
has led to an assumption of a potential of 60 MW in Nebbi, 100 MW in Bundibugyo, 130 MW in Hoima, and 150 MW in Kasese district. For biomass
generation potential, several sources (see Table 2) indicate that for Uganda, bagasse presents the most promising crops for electricity generation and
was thus focused on in the analyses. The potentials were estimated based on global bagasse yield datasets and land as well as irrigation restrictions in
Uganda, leading to a total of roughly 500 MW potential spread over 35 districts.
In terms of non-renewables, Uganda currently operates two medium-sized oil-fired plants as the only fossil fuel plants in the country. Uganda is
endowed with oil as well as small natural gas reserves which have been discovered in the early 2000 s but are yet to be extracted. There are currently
no major natural gas or coal imports into Uganda. Recent natural gas discoveries in Tanzania and Mozambique are likely to be used for oversea
export and internally, thereby rendering large-scale natural gas or coal-fired power plants unlikely to materialise in Uganda until 2040. As it
commonly is more economical to turn coal into electricity close to where the coal is located and transmit it via high-voltage lines rather than
shipping the coal to a third country and generate the electricity locally (especially as no intact railways exist in Uganda), the model assumes that
Uganda has no coal-fired potential until 2040. Natural gas potential is limited to 100 MW in Hoima from its limited domestic resources starting in
2030, as well as relying on imports from neighbouring countries to run 250 MW plants in Hoima and in Tororo. It is furthermore assumed that most
of Uganda’s oil will be used for export as this is a more economical way than investing in expensive oil-fired power plants. Hence, it is assumed that
no additional oil-fired potential exists in Uganda other than potentially keeping the two plants in Tororo and Mukono operational until 2040 (the
government plans to close them before this date) [67]. Lastly, Uganda has invested a considerable amount of institutional capacity in building up
nuclear energy [92]. While the government’s official policy goal is to have 24 GW of nuclear capacity installed by 2040, Uganda’s Ministry of Energy
takes a more conservative approach and aims to have 2.3 GW of nuclear online during the 2030s [92]. Potential plant locations discussed are
Buyende and Lamwo, hence the model used in this paper assigns a theoretical 1.2 GW nuclear potential in these two districts from 2035 each.
However, as the model results show, other baseload electrification options such as hydro, geothermal and concentrated solar power are cheaper than
nuclear, and no instance of the model under investigation produced a positive nuclear installed capacity for Uganda at any point.
B.4. Transmission and distribution loss data
The long-term timeframe as well as the size of the model prohibit an explicit modelling of voltage drop losses due to the inherent numerical
complexities arising from non-linearities. As the purpose of the model, rather, is to provide a high-level overview of how the Ugandan power system
could look like in 2040, transmission losses are instead modelled as simple percent losses per unit of line length. As virtually all existing transmission
lines in Uganda have an operating voltage of 132 kV, this voltage is assumed for newly built lines. The current average transmission losses in Uganda
equate to roughly 1.1% per 100 km [71]. For 33 kV distribution lines, an average loss value of 1.8% per 10 km for the Dog conductor was used. For
within-cell distribution losses, average per-cell distribution losses for urban and rural areas are calculated by defining a range of within-district
distribution losses based on current reported UMEME losses: Distribution losses were roughly 18% on average in 2016, ranging between 5% in some
districts and reaching 40% in others [71]. The required average per-person line length requirements as explained in Appendix B.1 is then used to
place districts on this loss interval using an exponential regression loss function to account for the exponentially increasing losses per added unit of
line length. Its minimum appears in the densely-populated capital city Kampala (assumed 5% within district distribution loss) and its maximum
appears in rural areas of the sparsely populated Bududa district (assumed 40% loss).
Appendix C. Optimal generation capacity by district
See Table A.
Table A
Optimal installed capacity in MW for forcing no equality (NE) and full equality (FE) of regional and urban versus rural electrification for all 112 districts in Uganda.
District Fossil Hydro Geoth. Biomass Solar PV CSP Wind Off-grid Total
NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE
Abim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 2 10
Adjumani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 21 5 21
Agago 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 21 13 31
Alebtong 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 21 31 26
Amolatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 15 19 15
Amudat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 10 13 10
Amuria 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 25 10 33
Amuru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17 1 17
Apac 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 0 0 50 50 0 0 41 33 100 92
Arua 0 0 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 64 92 75
Budaka 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 19 24 20
Bududa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 78 0 0 0 0 21 6 99 84
Bugiri 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 35 46 38
Buhweju 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 1 12
Buikwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 500 500 0 0 48 35 558 545
Bukedea 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 17 24 20
Bukomansimbi 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 15 20 17
Bukwo 0 0 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 24 22
Bulambuli 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 79 199 0 0 0 0 18 14 104 220
Buliisa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 11 13 11
(continued on next page)
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Table A (continued)
District Fossil Hydro Geoth. Biomass Solar PV CSP Wind Off-grid Total
NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE NE FE
Bundibugyo 0 0 5 5 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 18 129 123
Bushenyi 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 23 29 24
Busia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 27 36 27
Butaleja 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 22 29 24
Butambala 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 3 11
Buvuma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 9 11 9
Buyende 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 84 0 0 38 31 146 115
Dokolo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 16 20 16
Gomba 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 16 7 21
Gulu 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 31 55 41
Hoima 350 350 24 24 130 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 52 567 556
Ibanda 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 26 11 29
Iganga 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 41 57 44
Isingiro 0 0 41 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 49 48 90
Jinja 0 0 778 778 0 0 53 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 30 874 861
Kaabong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 24 0 0 69 69 18 15 130 108
Kabale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 48 59 48
Kabarole 0 0 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 44 64 56
Kaberamaido 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 50 50 0 0 24 19 79 74
Kalangala 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 9 8
Kaliro 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 21 38 33
Kalungu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 18 14 18
Kampala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 118 94 118 94
Kamuli 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 42 58 47
Kamwenge 0 0 18 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 41 21 59
Kanungu 0 0 13 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 26 20 39
Kapchorwa 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 23 23 0 0 0 0 11 8 38 35
Kasese 0 0 61 61 150 150 0 0 398 382 353 241 0 0 71 53 1033 887
Katakwi 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 17 14 34 21
Kayunga 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 500 500 0 0 41 33 546 538
Kibaale 0 0 51 51 0 0 13 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 76 70 140
Kiboga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 15 4 15
Kibuku 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 18 23 19
Kiruhura 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 32 17 46
Kiryandongo 0 0 698 698 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 25 738 733
Kisoro 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 25 32 27
Kitgum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 19 6 20
Koboko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 4 5
Kole 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 21 30 24
Kotido 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 3 17
Kumi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 247 161 0 0 0 0 26 21 273 182
Kween 0 0 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 8 30 28
Kyankwanzi 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 19 33 26
Kyegegwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 29 5 29
Kyenjojo 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 42 15 49
Lamwo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 4 14
Lira 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 31 46 35
Luuka 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 21 29 23
Luwero 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 39 53 46
Lwengo 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 26 35 29
Lyantonde 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 5 12
Manafwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 23 39 23
Maracha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 17 22 17
Masaka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 25 17 25
Masindi 0 0 350 350 0 0 26 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 28 387 404
Mayuge 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 500 500 0 0 52 33 554 535
Mbale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 23 50 23
Mbarara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 40 25 40
Mitooma 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 18 26 21
Mityana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 31 5 31
Moroto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 70 12 9 82 79
Moyo 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 8 19
Mpigi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 25 6 25
Mubende 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 66 5 66
Mukono 49 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 310 310 0 0 65 47 424 406
Nakapiripirit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 14 18 14
Nakaseke 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20 19 31
Nakasongola 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 0 0 159 226 0 0 3 16 173 253
Namayingo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 138 101 0 0 25 20 163 121
Namutumba 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 23 31 26
Napak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 31 0 0 0 0 3 13 41 44
Nebbi 0 0 0 0 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 31 101 91
Ngora 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 112 112 0 0 0 0 14 12 128 126
(continued on next page)
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6.4 Conclusion and implications of Paper V for the PhD thesis 
To develop and tailor an energy planning optimisation model to the decision problem faced by 
national-level energy planners in sub-Saharan African countries, this chapter has added several 
modelling elements to the models developed in chapters 4 and 5. The application to Uganda 
has created novel insights on a national level (see objective 2c) on different fronts. 
Interestingly, the three major themes identified in the earlier chapters, despite being based on 
a different scale of analysis, remain valid in the Ugandan case and can be further detailed. To 
begin with, if electrification inequalities are not explicitly minimised, the model choses 
solutions, which further increase electrification inequality due to their cost-optimality, at least 
in the coming decade. This further confirms the importance and the added insights possible 
from including such non-monetary objective functions into planning models in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Furthermore, including objectives to minimise sub-national electrification inequalities 
identifies comparably cheap ways to electrify Uganda in a more equal way by 2040, thereby 
minimising the risk of social and political tensions within the country. The paper has argued 
that a combination of country-specific (most notably Uganda’s high population density and the 
high 80% electrification target, which, by definition, does not allow for the same excess of 
electrification inequality, which is currently present) and more general factors contribute to the 
fact that a system cost increase of 2.5% is able to close the electrification gap between rural 
and urban areas as well as between districts in 2040.  
Finally, solar energy, in terms of solar PV and CSP on-grid generation, as well as PV off-grid 
generation, is prominently featured in the optimal energy mix in Uganda. The considerable cost 
decreases of solar PV and, even more strikingly, CSP, are among the main reasons why higher 
sub-national electrification is possible in Uganda at comparably small cost increases.  
When examining Uganda’s official generation capacity addition targets, this chapter has found 
that governmental targets detailed in Uganda’s Vision 2040 policy especially for their nuclear 
energy expansion are highly infeasible. Even if they were feasible, the solution presented by 
the model with similar demand estimations would save roughly 4 – 6 bn. USD in discounted 
total system costs compared to the government’s targets. In addition, the high reliance on 
concentrated solar power brings additional environmental and local content advantages over 
the preferred nuclear option by the government. 
147 
 
The poor status of electrification in Uganda, as well as the dubious current expansion plans, 
raises questions about implementation practices of electrification in Uganda. This is especially 
relevant as the international donor and development community has been heavily involved in 
Uganda’s power sector. Chapter 7 analyses financing patterns of electrification in sub-Saharan 
Africa in general, in parts relying on Uganda as a case study, and whether the dominating 







7. RE-FOCUSING FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S POWER 
SECTOR ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PAPER VI) 
7.1 Content overview and thesis context 
While optimal planning of resources is a key endeavour to design efficient and resilient energy 
systems in Uganda, it is furthermore crucial to ensure an electrification implementation 
approach that is able to expand electricity access broadly and quickly. The alarming state of 
electrification in sub-Saharan Africa described in chapter 1 has not gone unnoticed in the 
international community. More than 60 international African electrification initiatives exist 
today, mainly sponsored by bilateral and multilateral donors. Yet despite these efforts being 
implemented since the late 2000s, early results do not seem to be able to significantly alleviate 
energy poverty in the region. In fact, the econometric evidence in chapter 3, while explicitly 
not conclusive on this issue, did suggest a negative association between foreign aid levels and 
rural electrification, and especially between foreign aid and rural versus urban electrification 
inequality. Uganda serves as a case in point for the poor performance of donor-sponsored 
electrification. Chapter 3 has indicated that Uganda’s energy sector has long been dominated 
by foreign aid finance, leading to limited accountability by the government in the eyes of 
Ugandan citizens, which has kept public expectations low. 
Thus, this final chapter of the main part of this thesis goes beyond developing planning models 
and asks how electrification is currently implemented in sub-Saharan Africa. Finding that in 
the last decade, a significant majority of funds have originated from outside Africa, it presents 
a qualitative analysis of the design and workings of international electrification initiatives. The 
main focus is on Western electrification programmes, but reference to Chinese efforts are also 
made. The paper, which makes up this chapter identifies four mechanisms under which the 
current foreign support operates, namely (1) the financing of non-African companies with 
development aid; (2) the growing number of foreign stakeholders in the sector; (3) the support 
provision beyond physical infrastructure; and (4) the neoliberal conditionalities attached to 
receiving assistance. It then goes on to point out several social, economic, political and 
environmental challenges for long-term sustainable development of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
power sector arising from these four mechanisms. The paper includes country case study 
evidence from Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Benin, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Building on insights gained from 
the work presented in chapter 3, the paper also draws lessons from past successful 
electrification cases in Korea, Thailand and Russia. Finally, based on the analyses in the paper, 
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a number of policy recommendations are offered how international electrification efforts could 
be re-structured such that their impact for widespread electrification in the sense of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goal 7 would be more significant and sustainable (addressing 
objective 3 in section 2.5).  
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International engagement in sub-Saharan Africa's power sector is increasing rapidly. Aid is used to directly
finance a growing number of foreign companies to implement power projects, accompanied by calls for policy
and governance reform. This paper argues that while new and much-needed finance is becoming available, the
current approach to foreign support poses several new challenges for broad and sustainable long-term develop-
ment of the African power sector. They include a focus on creating market opportunities for non-African rather
than domestic companies, the difficulty of delivering large-scale rural electrification through the externally
advocatedmarket-based approach, economic inefficiencies of current aid spending, and the difficulty of tackling
complex, country-specific issues with continental electrification initiatives. To address these challenges, we
suggest redirecting public funds towards rural electrification, increasing African ownership, individualising
policy interventions and easing the current types of neoliberal conditionalities.








Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) current electricity situation is alarming.
Roughly 675 million people live without access, SSA firms experience
8.5 power outages on average per month, and rural electrification
stands at 15% (World Bank, 2018). Increased electricity access in the
long-term in SSA has been linked to economic development, local in-
come generation, literacy improvements, and better health care
(Abdullah & Markandya, 2012; Cook, 2011). Universal access by 2030
is a UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG).
The international community has recognized the necessity to act on
electrification in SSA. Currently, there are at least 60 international
financing initiatives aimed at the region's power sector (Quitzow
et al., 2016; Tagliapietra & Bazilian, 2017). Foreign capital investments,
albeit existing data imperfections, appear to have risen significantly in
the last decade. The most recent data, supplied by the Infrastructure
Consortium for Africa (ICA), suggest that capital expenditure (CAPEX)
commitments have come predominantly from outside Africa since the
large-scale US-led Power Africa initiative was launched in 2013 (The
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2016, 2017). While the current
total annual commitments considerably exceed SSA's power sector
CAPEX from10 years ago, only 25% ofwhich stems fromAfrican govern-
ments. By contrast, between 2001 and 2006, slightly more than 50% of
power sector CAPEX originated from African governments (Foster &
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Fig. 1 illustrates this trend.
A recent, growing literature has recognized and documented the
rising importance of foreign public and private finance in SSA's power
sector (Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2017; Eberhard, Gratwick,
Morello, & Antmann, 2017; Gualberti, Bazilian, & Moss, 2014; Moss &
Bazilian, 2018; Tagliapietra & Bazilian, 2017). Scholars generally agree
on the necessity of additional finance to reach the SDG. They have
pointed out that foreign private sector involvement and large-scale
international initiatives like Power Africa are a significant part of
securing these funds.
This paper adds to this literature by critically analysing the implica-
tions of this rising foreign support for the long-term sustainable
development of SSA's power sector. It follows three steps. Firstly, it
discusses four mechanisms under which the current foreign support
operates, namely (1) the direct financing of non-African companies
with development aid; (2) the growing number of foreign stakeholders;
(3) the support provision beyond physical infrastructure; and (4) the
conditionalities attached to receiving assistance. Secondly, this paper
examines the long-term developmental implications of each of these
four mechanisms. It draws from various policy reports and empirical
cases including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Botswana, South Africa, Côte
d'Ivoire, Benin, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and
Zambia, as well as several non-African countries. While acknowledging
the positive impact on available finance and foreign know-how,
this paper points out that the current mechanisms of foreign involve-
ment imply several new social, economic and political challenges. They
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include the focus on creating market opportunities for non-African
rather than domestic companies, an associated risk of increased aid
dependency, the difficulty of delivering large-scale rural electrification
through the advocated free and undistorted market approach, economic
inefficiencies of current aid spending, transparency issues, and the diffi-
culty of tackling complex, country-specific issues with continental elec-
trification initiatives. Thirdly, policy actions are recommended to foster
long-term development, addressing each of the four mechanisms. Spe-
cifically, the paper suggests re-directing public aid towards rural electri-
fication and domestic African companies, increasing knowledge transfer,
customising policy interventions and easing current conditionalities to
enable state-driven leadership.
Four mechanisms of current foreign support
With financial commitments of over USD 54 billion, Power Africa
constitutes the largest multinational African electrification initiative
(Power Africa, 2017). Closer analyses of Power Africa and other interna-
tional efforts uncover four dominant mechanisms of the rising foreign
support for African electrification, which this section addresses in turn.
1. Usage of aid to finance non-African companies
Since the early 1980s, theWorld Bank's and International Monetary
Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) dominated aid
provision to Africa. They consisted of loans given directly to African
governments with the intention to economically stabilise the recipient
countries. The subsequent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
introduced in 1999, aimed to strengthen the ownership of African states
and supported their poverty-reduction efforts. Their main means of aid
delivery was direct budgetary support for African states and govern-
mental ministries to help implement developmental policies (Unwin,
2004). Assistance to the energy sector was firmly embedded within
these aid delivery regimes, and often coupled to neoliberal reform con-
ditions (Söderholm, 1999). In the last decade, however, SSA's energy
sector has emerged as a focus area of aid. While total official develop-
ment aid (ODA) from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) for SSA has been largely constant between 2007 and 2016, ODA
for SSA's energy sector specifically has increased by 600% during this
time (OECD, 2018). In 2016, DAC-countries committed as much aid to
the energy sector as to education in SSA.
This has coincided with a noticeable trend towards aid privatisation
(Hook & Rumsey, 2016). Non-governmental actors have played an in-
creasingly important role in aid delivery. Significant amounts of
current public development assistance for African electrification are
used to directly fund non-African companies. More than 90% of the
USD 7 billion US commitment to Power Africa finances the US govern-
ment agencies Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) (Power Africa, 2016a). Both provide capital
and insurance to US companies investing in developing countries.
Thereby, a considerable majority of US development aid to SSA's
power sector is de facto retainedwithin the US economy. Indeed, official
US estimates expect Power Africa commitments to generate a positive
return for US taxpayers of USD 86 million (US Congressional Budget
Office, 2014). China, similarly, delivers aid by directly financing Chinese
companies to build infrastructure in SSA. Germany uses public funds to
incentivise German companies tomove into SSA, aiming tomultiply the
number of German companies active in SSA by six. Many electrification
initiatives support public-private partnerships (PPPs) and promote
foreign direct investments (FDIs) to further encourage foreign company
engagement.
2. Increasing number of foreign financers
In 2016, at least 43 different non-African governments and 28 public
sector institutions have been engaged in at least 60 African electrifica-
tion initiatives (Quitzow et al., 2016; Tagliapietra & Bazilian, 2017).
This includes the 10 richest OECD countries, the EU, the UN and the
World Bank. In addition to public sector stakeholders, by 2016, Power
Africa alone had coalesced over USD 40 billion from over 100 private
sector entities, mostly global engineering and equity companies such
as General Electric, Standard Chartered Bank and Aldwych International
(Power Africa, 2016b). International private sector engagement overall
has increased steadily in the last decade (Eberhard et al., 2017).
3. Support beyond physical infrastructure
Most African electrification initiatives engage with the power sector
in an encompassing way. They include institutional and technical
capacity building, policy reforms, partnership development, coordina-
tion and monitoring (Quitzow et al., 2016). Large-scale initiatives like
Power Africa have developed toolkits to support transaction processes.
For instance, PowerAfrica's Understanding Power Purchase Agreements
Fig. 1. Capital expenditure spent and commitments in the African power sector (data sources: Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2016, 2017).
Note: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) report actual CAPEX spending between 2001 and 2006, while the ICA reports CAPEX commitments. In its reports, the ICA jointly states power
sector and gas pipeline commitments. To only report power sector commitments here, the ICA figures have been lowered by 10%. According to both data sources, data inconsistencies such
as double counting and misallocations cannot entirely be ruled out. The private sector figures agree with theWorld Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database which in-
cludes both purely privately financed as well as public-private partnership (PPP) projects.
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handbook and its African Legal Support Facility helped secure signing
two generation projects worth 105MW in Benin in 2016. In an attempt
to increase transparency, Power Africa has made its Power Africa Track-
ing Tool (PATT) freely available, tracking the progress of electrification
transactions in real-time (Fig. 2).
4. Conditionalities
Since the SAPs have been introduced in SSA in the 1980s, develop-
ment aid has beenwidely coupledwith conditionalities. Recipient coun-
tries had to implement a set of pre-defined, neoliberal policies which
limited the role of the state. While the subsequent PRSPs aimed at
strengthening African ownership of developmental policies, they have
continued aid conditionality and constrained state intervention
(Cheru, 2006; Unwin, 2004; Zack-Williams & Mohan, 2005). This ap-
proach to aid deliverance remains salient in Western power sector en-
dowments to SSA today. Power Africa's reform goals include increasing
commercial viability, market-based pricing, cutting subsidies, reducing
import taxes and guaranteeing political liberties (Power Africa, 2016b).
For example, after election rigging allegations surfaced in Tanzania in
2016, US agency Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) pulled out
of a previously committed USD 473 million generation project. Other
African electrification initiatives like Germany's EnergisingDevelopment
or Norway's Energy+have similarly made funding conditional on policy
reforms, reflecting the former country's Fördern und Fordern (support
and request) aid approach.
The mechanisms' implications for developmental sustainability
African electrification requires a long-term approach. Total electric-
ity demand in SSA is projected to increase almost threefold between
2030 and 2050, requiring significant capacity additions (see Fig. 3).
This section therefore analyses the implications and potential impact
of each of the four foreign support mechanisms concerning long-term
development in turn. It closeswith a tabulated summary of thefindings.
1. Implications of using aid to finance non-African companies
Increased financing of foreign companies is raising private sector
activity in African electrification (Power Africa, 2017), and the potential
scale of new capacity additions. There are, however, several social,
economic and environmental issues coupled with this mechanism.
With respect to social issues, the crucial developmental need to
electrify the rural population at scale appears to be difficult to achieve
when large shares of foreign capital are being spent on funding foreign
companies. This mechanism shifts the mandate of aid from African de-
velopment towards foreign business interests. Over 80% of the unelec-
trified people in SSA live in rural areas, yet rural electrification in SSA
does not present a market where companies easily achieve attractive
margins. More than two-thirds of the unelectrified rural population
lives in poverty (World Bank, 2018). In Kenya, poor rural households
have required at least 10 years to pay the connection costs (Abdullah
& Markandya, 2012). The Korean government granted the rural poor
35 years to repay loans for upfront costs, an important factor in Korea's
holistic, state-driven rural development programme (Van Gevelt, 2014).
Limited liquidity and the long resulting cost-recovery timeframes are at
Fig. 2. Overview of 297 potential Power Africa projects in 2016monitored through the PATT (Power Africa, 2016a). Note: Power Africa does not disclose howmany of the above project it
finances or part-finances, a power project merely need to be facilitated by Power Africa to be tracked in the PATT, without a specific definition of what facilitation has to entail.
Fig. 3. Electricity demand projections for SAA (data sources: (International Renewable
Energy Agency, 2015; World Energy Council, 2013), authors' calculations). Note:
Demand projections are the average of two potential scenarios presented by the World
Energy Council (WEC) (World Energy Council, 2013). Capacity needs follow from
assuming an average capacity factor range between 33% and 53% in 2050, depending on
the energy mix. This capacity factor range is based on International Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA) results for SSA electricity planning (International Renewable Energy
Agency, 2015), and increased by a further 10% to account for long-term uncertainties.
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oddswith the private sector's pressure to achieve short-term returns, es-
pecially for high-risk investments in politically and economically volatile
countries. In addition, electrification initiatives often focus their efforts
on quantitative targets for new capacity additions, thereby defining
cost per MW as a key decision parameter (Quitzow et al., 2016). Off-
grid technologies, often best-suited to electrify rural households, are con-
siderably more expensive per MW and less profitable than grid-
connected electricity which can be used to power the industrial sector.
For instance, despite contrary intentions, off-grid technologies account
for only 0.9% of the capacity of all tracked Power Africa transactions
(Fig. 2). An important caveat of international initiatives supporting distri-
bution in general is its inherent complexity. While grid-connected
generation expansion is usually governed centrally, distribution is
largely a decentralised task involving a multitude of sub-national
stakeholders. It can include reaching sparsely populated areas where
the state lacks representation. The Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) serves as a case in point. While several electrification initiatives
are targeting DRC to develop the prestigious hydro dam at Grand Inga
valued at a record-setting 44 GW, considerably less efforts concern
how to increase electricity connection rates for households in a country
where rural electrification is estimated to be below 1% (World Bank,
2018).
With regard to economic issues, the present private company
fundingmechanism quickly pulls foreign companies into the electrifica-
tion market in SSA. The market, which features the fastest growing
demand worldwide (International Energy Agency, 2016b), is thereby
effectively ceded to the foreign private sector. Between 2010 and
2015, Chinese companies alone were responsible for 30% of new
capacity additions in SSA, a number that rises to 46% if South Africa is
excluded (International Energy Agency, 2016a). Power Africa's project
pipeline includes over 100 transactions involving the US private sector
which are set to increase US exports by USD 7 billion (Power Africa,
2017). Crucially, there currently is no obligation of a shared value
approach in return, in which the private companies would align their
business objectives to Africa's societal challenges or would actively fos-
ter thediffusion of knowledge. This is complicating the long-termdevel-
opment of an already technologically inferior domestic African
electrification industry. Thomas Piketty argues that “[n]one of the
Asian countries that have moved closer to the developed country in
the West in recent years has benefited from large foreign investment,
whether it be Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, and more recently China.
In essence, all of these countries themselves financed the necessary in-
vestments in physical capital” (Piketty, 2014, p. 89–90). Furthermore,
companies supported through Power Africa as well as Chinese compa-
nies have thus far heavily focused their activities on relatively stable,
high-growth markets in selected Western, Eastern and Southern
African countries as opposed to Sahel and Central African countries
(International Energy Agency, 2016a; Power Africa, 2017). This raises
concerns of cherry-picking themost profitablemarkets rather than pur-
suing a holistic developmental approach.
Additionally, using aid to finance non-African companies can be seen
as an extreme version of tied aid (where recipient governments are re-
quired to spend their aid on goods and services from the donor coun-
try). In the case of SSA's power sector, donor countries like the US or
China effectively choose which company is awarded a project in SSA,
thereby reducing transparency for African governments compared to
when they can procure services themselves. Tied aid has been widely
argued to be economically inefficient for recipients. The additional
costs incurred through tied aid have been estimated to range between
15 and 30% for goods and services (Clay, Geddes, Natali, & te Velde,
2008).With respect to Africa's power sector, Uganda's President Yoweri
Museveni for example has blamed the US developers of the Bujagali
hydro dam for recent tariff increases in the country. As a consequence,
the Ugandan government has emphasised its intentions to rely more
heavily on domestic finance for Uganda's electricity sector in the future.
A contrarymodel to a donor country pre-selecting a project developer is
competitive auctions where project developers can submit bids and the
cheapest viable proposal is awarded the contract. Renewable energy
project auctions in South Africa's Renewable Energy Independent
Power Producer Procurement Programme (REI4P) and Zambia's Scaling
Solar initiative have led to the lowest solar PV tariffs in SSA at around
USD 0.06 per kWh. Despite repeated efforts from the OECD to curtail
tied aid, as of 2012, over one-third of U.S. total development aid was
tied to procurement in the U.S. (Hook & Rumsey, 2016).
Table 1
Implications and impact of foreign support mechanisms.
Legend: flags a potentially positive, and a potentially negative impact on developmental sustainability.
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In terms of environmental concerns, short-term profit maximisation
may impede ecological sustainability. Natural gas plants in SSA cost USD
600–1000 per kW, 20–60% of the cost of renewable energy technologies
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2013). While Power Africa
intends to promote renewables, natural gas has instead accounted for
around 70% of financially closed capacity additions facilitated through
Power Africa so far (Power Africa, 2017). As associated capacity factors
are 1.5–4 times higher than for renewables (Trotter, 2017), the share
of carbon-based electricity in SSA is effectively increasing through cur-
rent PowerAfrica projects. As long-termprojections suggestfinancial op-
timality of renewables in SSA (International Renewable Energy Agency,
2015; World Energy Council, 2013), building fossil fuel plants today in-
curs avoidable, yet currently unconsidered long-term restructuring
costs due to switching from fossil fuels to renewables.
In summary, the current aid spending mechanism has produced a
foreign dominance in SSA's power sector which is set to increase
the future reliance on foreign assistance. As political investment risk
factors have not markedly improved in SSA in recent years (Trotter,
Maconachie, &McManus, 2018), foreign companies are likely to depend
on security guarantees similar to those given by OPIC and EXIM in the
future. Hence, the current foreign support mechanisms are at danger
of further increasing the sub-Saharan African power sector's depen-
dence on foreign aid. This constitutes a paradox, given that the ultimate
goal of giving aid is commonly to decrease aid dependency in the future.
This goal of decreasing aid dependency in the long run was explicitly
brought up during the US House Hearing which discussed the legal
basis for Power Africa (U.S. Government, 2014).
2. Implications of the increasing number of foreign financers
The increasing number of foreign financers has raised the amount of
available finance in SSA's power sector. As current level FDIs have been
found to be an important driver for future investments in Africa
(Mijiyawa, 2015), today's growing activity is likely to facilitate follow-
up investmentswhich are crucial tomeet the high capacity requirements
in the coming decades (Fig. 3). Once Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)
have been signed, a steady and secure flow of capital has benefited
timely construction of power plants. Externally financed Uganda's GET
FiT initiative or South Africa's REI4P serve as examples in this regard.
Yet, several concerns arise from the growing number of foreign
financers.While overall ODA to SSA has remained constant, aid devoted
to the energy sector has sharply risen since 2007 (OECD, 2018). As inter-
national efforts coupled to energy increase, African governments have
an incentive (or a necessity) to spend their budget elsewhere. While
foreign investments increased threefold between 2014 and 2015,
African governments decreased theirs by 30% in 2015, and by a further
30% in 2016 (Fig. 1). They have accounted for only 16% and 19% of SSA
power sector capital expenditure in 2015 and 2016, respectively,
roughly a third of the share in the early 2000s (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). Albeit different circumstances, increased foreign fi-
nance has similarly coincided with reduced African public investments
during the SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s (Stein, 2003). The resulting de-
creased African ownership threatens household electrification and en-
ergy equality, both have been shown to benefit from strong African
accountability (see (Ahlborg, Borang, Jagers, & Soderholm, 2015;
Kroth, Larcinese, & Wehner, 2016; Trotter, 2016) for econometric anal-
yses, as well as (MacLean, Gore, Brass, & Baldwin, 2016) for qualitative
evidence on the importance of accountability in SSA's electrification).
A high share of foreignprivate sector stakeholders furthermore com-
plicates accurate and efficient power infrastructure planning on several
fronts. For instance, new challenges arise for reaching mutually satisfy-
ing agreements for power transactionswhich have to be carefully taken
into consideration when matching future demand and supply. For
instance, the negotiation process of PPAs between a national utility
and an international developer can substantially prolong power pro-
jects. In Ethiopia, Icelandic generation company Reykjavik Geothermal
in 2013 planned that the PPA for its 520 MW Corbetti geothermal pro-
ject would be signed in Q1 2015 (Reykjavik Geothermal, 2013). Yet de-
spite advisory support from Power Africa, the signing of the PPA
between RG and Ethiopian utility company Ethiopian Electric Power
(EEP) was delayed by almost three years until December 2017. A senior
EEP official explained the delay by pointing out that since it was
Ethiopia's first PPA, EEP lacked the technical capability to negotiate
with an international energy firm equipped with an experienced legal
team (Ezega, 2017). This prompted EEP to hire a legal consulting firm
with financial support from the African Development Bank.
In addition, the increased number of stakeholders puts pressures on
Africa's electrification institutions. For example, after Côte d'Ivoire had
opened up its domestic for private generation companies in 1994 by
signing a PPA with CIPREL, owned by French generation company
Eranove, an overhaul of power sector regulations ensued which created
redundancies and unclear responsibilities. Numerous new institutions
were installed, such as a supervisory body for national utility EECI, na-
tional electrification finance and technology institutions, and a panel
to design national policy for electricity. Edjekumhene and Dubash
(2002) describe the resulting governance challenges. They note that
“[a]s a result, regulation, planning, and policymaking within the sector
became increasingly duplicative and unclear. As one observer noted,
‘each private operator can literally pick the government body with
which it is comfortable in order to solve its problem with the lowest
possible risk’” (Edjekumhene & Dubash, 2002, p.123). The ensuing
information asymmetry within the sector's governing bodies has
complicated centralised infrastructure planning for efficient resource
usage.
3. Implications of the current support beyond physical
infrastructure
The initiatives' broadness is crucial to overcome institutional ineffi-
ciencies and capacity shortfalls (Trotter, McManus, & Maconachie,
2017). Their model, however, carries the risk of using generalised,
pre-defined policy support toolkits for highly country-specific issues, a
common problem of SAPs and PRSPs (Stein, 2003). Uganda, for instance,
has been frequently called a ‘donor-darling’due to the heavy involvement
from the International Financial Institutions in the country. However, it
has suffered from low electrification rates and sector inefficiencies. The
World Bank itself has acknowledged this problem in its assessment of
its power sector engagement. A 2008 World Bank report on Uganda's
power sector noted that “[t]he Bank's power sector policy and lending
strategies of the 1990s, with their strong emphasis on unbundling and
privatization, did not lead to better performance of the sector and in-
creased access, because they were not applied with due consideration to
the country's characteristics” (World Bank, 2008, p. xii). Specifically, the
World Bank underestimated the effects private sector participation in
the sector would have for Uganda. The Ugandan government was unable
to address its contingent liabilities created through private sector partici-
pation in major power projects. System costs increased and projects
struggledwithdelays. As a consequence, theWorld Bankwas forced to of-
ficially rate performance in Uganda's energy sector between 1991 and
2001 as “unsatisfactory” (World Bank, 2008). Despite these experiences,
issues of overly broad approaches to the governance of electrification in
SSA appear to remain present. Of all current external sub-Saharan
African electrification initiatives reviewed by Quitzow et al. (2016), a
vast majority of 84% focus on the entire sub-continent, whereas only
14% have a regional focus such as East or West Africa. This raises
the concern to which extend the considerable differences of specific re-
gions within SSA are currently being considered in most international
initiatives.
A multitude of such regional and country-level issues exist which
require highly specialised governance approaches to achieve universal
energy access. Complicated geographical settings are well-known to
cause governance challenges in SSA, for instance in the Sahel countries
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and Sudan (Herbst, 2000). As electrification in SSA becomes more
decentralised in remote areas, stakeholders need to be able to deal
with highly specialised socio-cultural issues of rural constituencies.
Some countries or territories, for instance Somalia, Central African
Republic or NorthernNigeria, cannot electrifywithout conflict resolution
and ensuring basic security. Notably, continental-scale initiatives like
Power Africa, Sustainable Energy for All or Chinese efforts have mostly
been unable to provide electrification endowments to such complex
country cases (International Energy Agency, 2016a; Power Africa, 2017).
Property rights with regards to land ownership, crucial for infra-
structure construction, are another area where broad foreign interven-
tions are at danger to not comprehensively incorporate the deeply
country-specific and often informal institutions involved. Only a small
fraction of land in SSA is titled and free to trade (Boone, 2014). Complex,
socio-cultural customary land tenure regimes dominate. A lack of sensi-
tivity towards these issues by applying broad developmental policies
have been argued to inflame new forms of territorial politics and
conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (Boone, 2007). With respect to the electricity
sector, foreign companies who have bought land on a large scale for
energy projects have become increasingly subject to protest in SSA
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015). In Uganda, transmis-
sion company UETCL has recently struggled with complex land tenure
regimes while trying to secure land for new transmission lines. In re-
sponse, the government has developed a plan to amend the constitution
allowing it to take land without permission if a certain project is of na-
tional developmental importance. This has sparked a highly politicised
debate in the country, the effects of which are difficult to predict for for-
eign stakeholders. For instance, theGerman-led GET FiT programmehas
achieved notable progress in its core task to increase renewable energy
generation capacity in Uganda, but has identified bottlenecks in
Uganda's transmission anddistribution grid as its singlemost significant
and, crucially, entirely exogenous risk for achieving its targets (KfW,
2017). Land access for solar PV plants in Nigeria is known to be prob-
lematic for foreign investors, despite the country's high solar PV targets
(Ohunakin, Adaramola, Oyewola, & Fagbenle, 2014).
4. Implications of the current conditionalities
The assistance conditionalities currently in place, such as freemarket
reforms, import tax reductions and cost recovery requirements, further
benefit foreign companies (Trotter & Abdullah, 2017). International
pressure to cut subsidies and reduce import taxes undermines political
self-determinism of the African developmental state (Mkandawire,
1999). Yet taxing imports and subsidising domestic companies are
key policy instruments to protect domestic African infant electrification
industries. In 2014, the Kenyan government dropped import taxes for
all solar energy products to lower installation costs in the country.
While the move has been hailed by non-profit organisations like UK
charity Solar Aid, it has been criticized by Ubbink East Africa, the first
solar module manufacturer in Kenya. Its managing director Haijo
Kuper said that “[t]he new tax exemption, while being a very noble
idea on the surface, will have negative effects on local manufacturers.
The vibrant solar energy market that Kenya has developed will be
flooded with cheap imports” (originally quoted in Willis, 2014).
The setting of electricity tariffs in SSA constitutes another areawhich
is subject to considerable external pressure. International organisations
and initiatives involved in SSA's power sector such as the World Bank
and Power Africa demand the implementation of fully cost-reflective
electricity tariffs (Kojima, Bacon, & Trimble, 2014; US Agency for
International Development, 2016). They explicitly question the useful-
ness of lifeline tariffs where the first few units of consumed electricity
are sold belowmarket price to enable access for low income users. His-
torically, however, successful large-scale electrification cases have dem-
onstrated the importance of a growing domestic electrification industry
and considerable state intervention such as cross-subsidies and lifeline
electricity tariffs, especially to serve the rural poor (e.g. in Korea,
Thailand and Russia, see Barnes & Floor, 1996; Van Gevelt, 2014). In
Peru, power sector privatisation with cost-reflective tariffs created im-
portant incentives for distribution companies to expand access, yet
caused price increases which adversely affected the welfare of low-
income consumers (Anaya, 2010). They had to be countered through a
cross-subsidy social tariff scheme, which partly offset the price effects
for low-income users.
Implications of different levels of state interventionist electrification
approaches in Africa are salientwhen comparing the cases of Ghana and
Botswana to the cases of Uganda and Zimbabwe. Ghana managed to
increase its rural electrification rate from 1% in 1990 to 63% in 2014
(World Bank, 2018), deeming it one of the most remarkable rural
electrification success stories in SSA. Despite continued pressure from
the IMF and the World Bank since the 1990s, Ghana's government has
managed to maintain ownership of its power sector and independently
direct a state-driven approach to electricity provision (Edjekumhene &
Dubash, 2002; Trotter, 2016). In one of its PRSP reviews, the IMF has
criticized Ghana's insistence on keeping lifeline tariffs for low income
households (International Monetary Fund, 2004). State interventionist
policies including lifeline tariffs have been key to expand affordable
access in Ghana, leading to the citizenry holding long-standing expecta-
tions towards the government to provide electricity (MacLean et al.,
2016). Although system costs are comparably low and the bill collection
rate is at 95%, Ghana's tariffs for customers are too low to recover the
costs, requiring state subsidies to the utility (Trimble, Kojima, Perez
Arroyo, & Mohammadzadeh, 2016). Crucially, Ghanaian governments
have understood rural electrification as part of a greater task of develop-
mental nation-building. Similarly, Botswana has achieved notable rural
electrification increases, largely driven by developmentalist, state-
driven policies. After the government found that its original cost-
recovery approach was too expensive for much of its rural population,
it significantly decreased the initial down-payment required for a
connection to a low standard rate. The remaining connection fee could
be paid over a 15-year period. The government furthermore financed
the extension of the grid to villages. As a result, 80% of the people
connected through Botswana's Rural Electrification Collective Scheme
could not have been connected if the scheme had not existed (Prasad,
2008).
By contrast, Uganda's rural electrification rate has remained below
10%. The World Bank provided its first-ever loan to Uganda in 1962
intended for the power sector, with subsequent frequent engagements
“cementing the Bank as a dominant advisor and funder of projects
until the early 2000s” (MacLean et al., 2016, p.114). Neoliberal reforms
were implemented, including a full unbundling of the Uganda Electric-
ity Board in 2001. A large-scale privatisation of the sector limited gov-
ernmental accountability and its capability to intervene. Consistent
with the current international electrification initiatives' focus on gener-
ation expansion, subsequent investments in Uganda greatly focused on
highly visible generation projects rather than costly and decentralised
distribution to villages far-removed from the grid. This has led to limited
rural electrification gains. Uganda is one of only two countries in SSA
which manage to cover the total costs of electricity services through
what they collect from electricity customers (Trimble et al., 2016). The
average cash collected per kWh from customers is 60% higher than in
Ghana despite similar system costs. While a lifeline tariff exists in
Uganda, private distribution company UMEME Ltd., responsible for
over 95% of distribution in Uganda (Electricity Regulatory Authority,
2016), only applies it to the first 15 kWh per month (for comparison,
in Kenya, the lifeline tariffs is applied to the first 50 kWh, and Ghana's
two-stage lifeline tariff is effective for the first 300 kWh consumed per
month). UMEME's profit-driven approach has led it to repeatedly cut
electricity access for low-income customers, as well as to hospitals
and health centreswhere bills were overdue. In some areas, this has sig-
nificantly affected the ability to deliver adequate health care services
(Walukamba, 2014). The Ugandan experience is comparable to
Zimbabwe's, where the power sector has been dominated by neoliberal,
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market-based and cost-recovery oriented policies since World Bank in-
terventions in the 1990s (Söderholm, 1999). Zimbabwe's rural electrifi-
cation in 2014 has similarly remained below 10%.
Consistent with Van Gevelt's (2014) argument for South Korea,
these African cases suggest that in the absence of profitable sales
markets, successful rural electrification appears to be more likely to
occur where it has been driven by the state as part of an integrated,
long-term national development strategy rather than being left to free
market forces.
Summary of implications and impact
Table 1 summaries the implications of the four identified foreign
support mechanisms in SSA's electricity sector as well as their potential
impact on development sustainability.
Recommendations and conclusion
While foreign involvement is starting to overcome several electrifica-
tion barriers in SSA, its current design implies different developmental
issues.We recommend a complementary mix of interventions to address
each of the four identified mechanisms of current foreign support.
1. Redirect foreign public funds:
▪ Rural electrification needs to be the biggest public sector priority to
increase access figures in SSA substantially. As profit-driven
approaches are unlikely to solve the problemat scale, foreign public
funds should be redirected towards proven, developmentally-
minded finance instruments to enable universal rural electrifica-
tion. Available approaches include long-term rural electrification
cross-subsidies, affordable credit lending with long-term loan
repay times, credit co-operations, renting and East African pay-as-
you-go schemes (Abdullah & Jeanty, 2011).
▪ A self-sustaining, domestic electrification industry would help
reduce foreign dependencies and tackle electrification long-term.
Public electrification initiatives should aim to develop the African
private sector rather than relying on foreign companies. In addition
to financing entrepreneurs, this crucially entails scale-up strategies
for established African companies. The creation of adequate knowl-
edge and skill levels is key for any successful domestic industry. To
foster knowledge transfer, participation in SSA's rapidly growing
renewable energy market should be viewed as an African asset. In
the medium-term, market access could be priced with technology
transfer to African companies. China serves an example: In order
to invest in China's fast growing machinery and automotive mar-
kets, China successfully requires foreign technology companies to
form joint ventures with technologically inferior Chinese compa-
nies (Si & Bruton, 1999). In addition, minimum local job creation
and local content levels should be mandatory, similar to South
Africa's REI4P requirements (International Renewable Energy
Agency, 2017).
▪ Public efforts to develop a domestic African electrification industry
should focus on renewable energy technologies. Their evolving na-
ture, small-scale applicability in beyond-the-grid systems, and high
future demand make near-term competitive advantages more
likely than other technologies. This would furthermore limit future
infrastructure restructuring costs.
2. Increase African ownership:
▪ To lessen African governments adapting a mindset of relying on
foreign investments and encourage domestic African finance
and electrification investments, foreign funds could be coupled to
African commitments more tightly, functioning as variable
top-ups of the latter where applicable.
▪ Tomanage the growing number of stakeholders, African electrifica-
tion agencies need to be supported to improve managerial and
procedural efficiencies. Such support needs to be tailored to the
specific institutional and socio-political setup in a given country,
rather than applying universal staff size benchmarks as performed
by the World Bank (Trimble et al., 2016). A stronger cooperation
of donor initiatives would decrease interfacing requirements and
create synergies (see Tagliapietra & Bazilian, 2017). For example,
the newly established Sino-German Center for Sustainable Devel-
opment provides German-administered vocational training to
Africans in Chinese-led infrastructure projects in SSA.
3. Customise policy interventions:
▪ The spectrum of non-technological assistance should be widened
and more closely designed according to country-specific circum-
stances. Where population densities are low, electrification agencies
and state-owned enterprises should be supported to move from
establishedgrid-focusedbusinessmodels to new,moredecentralised
governance approaches which are able to cope with off-grid rural
electrification at scale. Furthermore, where necessary, interventions
should target security increases, sub-national energy inequalities
reductions, and socio-cultural considerations. To create transparency
and manage investor expectations, policy interventions should be
communicated with accurate timelines for change to materialise.
Continental electrification initiatives should be set up internally to
allow for differing, country-specific approaches to electricification
rather than being led by overarching maxims.
4. Ease current types of conditionalities:
▪ Conditionalities related to free market reforms and cost-recovery
requirements should be eased to allow previously successful state
intervention approaches. These include a support for lifeline tariffs,
cross-subsidy schemes, flexibility of setting import taxes and
allowing state support for utilities. Historic case example evidence
suggest that these measures are particularly important where
large shares of the rural population cannot pay market prices for
electrification in the years following connection. To foster African
governments' political will to lead long-term electrification, it is
crucial to not repeat the mistakes of SAPs which undermined
African self-determinism and resulted in many African govern-
ments falling out with international financial institutions. As the
SDGs necessarily include all countries in SSA, political conditional-
ities attached to finance directly oppose the SDGs' inherent
comprehensiveness.
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7.4 Conclusion and implications of Paper VI for the PhD thesis 
To address the objective of suggesting policy measures to improve the implementation of current 
electrification initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa (objective 3), this chapter has critically analysed 
international electrification efforts. One the one hand, the four mechanisms, which have been 
identified in the paper, have helped to increase foreign finance for much-needed infrastructure 
investments in Africa, and have increased (foreign) skill levels through private sector 
involvement. On the other hand, however, the mechanisms pose new challenges for the sector’s 
sustainability. Financing non-African companies, broadening external influence and requiring 
free market reforms carry the risk of mainly benefitting foreign entities rather than developing 
a sustainable domestic African power sector. Also, where urban areas with their high economic 
output are endowed with higher per capita purchasing power, rural communities especially are 
unlikely to benefit from the current approach as much as they need to if the UN’s goals are to 
be met: Many rural inhabitants simply cannot afford market prices for electricity. In general, 
while development aid traditionally has the goal to lower dependencies in the long term, the 
identified mechanisms, paradoxically, are set to increase them, leaving African countries 
vulnerable to political change abroad. 
To address these challenges, the paper has suggested to redirect public funds towards 
supporting rural electrification and creating a business case where currently no such business 
case exists. An African-run energy industry needs to be actively financed at scale to build up 
know-how for sustainable self-electrification going forward. Crucially, the current types of 
liberal market conditionalities need to be eased to not grant international companies more 
competitive advantages over local companies than what they already have. Rather, knowledge 
transfer between foreign and African companies needs to be encouraged.  
Although not explicitly mentioned in the paper in this chapter, chapter 6 has argued that 
concentrated solar power, a technology that was found to be highly favourable in Uganda due 
to its significant cost decreases in the last 1 – 2 years, offers the chance of comparably high 
levels of local content. Mirrors, solar tracking devices, tower structures and thermal storages 
do not require excessive amounts of technological know-how, offering a the potential of a 
locally manufactured technology that has significant growth potential in Africa, is carbon-
neutral, can provide baseload electricity 24 hours a day and is flexible in terms of plant location. 
This technology constitutes an example where a more localised approach to African 
electrification seems feasible and promising.  
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8. CONCLUSION, IMPACT AND FUTURE WORK 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s electrification challenges are greater than in any other region of the 
world. More than 650 million people lack access to electricity. Per capita installed capacity is 
less than 10% of that in Europe and has recently shown decreasing trends. Despite some of the 
highest renewable energy potentials in the world, the region’s renewable energy share in its 
generation mix is less than in Europe. 
This thesis has focused on improving electricity planning approaches used in sub-Saharan 
Africa to encourage to use the limited resources more efficiently. Long-term energy planning 
models determine the optimal size, location and time of construction of electricity generation 
plants as well as transmission lines to meet all projected demand. While showing some 
encouraging positive research trends, the review literature review in chapter 2 has revealed a 
number of glaring gaps in terms of the quantity and the quality of sub-Saharan African 
electricity planning research. The PhD thesis has contributed to addressing five of these gaps, 
namely (i) the relevance of political decision objectives, (ii) the paucity of continental, regional 
and national planning research, (iii) the underutilisation of multi-criteria planning approaches, 
(iv) the limits in evaluating many different generation technologies, and (v), going beyond 
planning per se, the gaps in understanding current implementation and its shortcomings. 
Studying the relevance of political factors for understanding electrification in sub-Saharan 
Africa, chapter 3 has provided econometric and qualitative evidence that political regime type 
and institutional variables are strongly positively associated with rural electrification 
(addressing gap (i) and objective 1 defined in section 2.5). As these political factors are usually 
measured at a country-level, their differences are especially important for international power 
networks. Hence, they were included as objective functions in novel, linear multi-objective 
energy planning models of continental Africa and the regional Southern African Power Pool in 
chapters 4 and 5, respectively, each model featuring multiple potential generation technologies 
(addressing gaps (ii), (iii), (iv) and objectives 2a and 2b defined in section 2.5).  
Chapter 3 has furthermore shown the high prevalence of sub-national electrification inequality 
in sub-Saharan Africa as well as associated social implications, singling out Uganda as a salient 
manifestation of this with an urban versus rural electrification rate ratio of over 5:1. The novel 
long-term MOMILP energy planning model presented in chapter 6, in addition to adding a 
variety of detailed modelling aspects, includes the social objectives to minimise different types 
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of sub-national electrification inequalities (addressing gaps (ii), (iii), (iv) and objective 2c 
defined in section 2.5).  
While chapters 4, 5 and 6 each produced a number of detailed and case-specific insights, there 
are a number of methodological and content implications, which are supported by all three 
models across different scales. Methodologically, the modelling papers included in this thesis 
demonstrated that different techniques exist to include political and social objectives into 
optimisation models. They showed advantages for both interpretability and the model solution 
algorithm to model such factors to have a fixed upper and lower bound, intuitively a 0 – 100 
scale. This has allowed for the successful usage of the ε-constraint method in the different 
model settings to estimate the shape of the entire Pareto-Fronts of non-dominated solutions.  
In terms of content, all modelling papers, although addressing different cases and levels of 
detail, have supported the following storyline: When planners only consider cost-minimisation 
objectives, the network solutions they obtain are at risk of leading to undesirable outcomes in 
non-monetary objectives. This thesis has demonstrated the existence of such cases in terms of 
the high political risk in the cost-optimal continental African power network, low levels of 
national energy sovereignty in the Southern African Power Pool, and continued high sub-
national electrification inequality in Uganda. However, when such factors are included in 
multi-objective planning exercises, these models have been able to identify comparably cheap 
ways how such adverse outcomes can (at least partially) be alleviated. Notably, in all studied 
instances, solar energy expansion has been found to be highly effective in mitigating different 
political and social risks. Its falling costs and growing demand, its technological variability 
(solar PV on and off-grid, CSP on-grid) and additivity, its environmental benefits, and its 
decentral abundance in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa imply unique opportunities to 
improve on a range of decision criteria. These findings add new arguments to the narrative of 
solar energy carrying an immense untapped potential for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 7 went beyond energy planning and examined the current mode of implementation of 
electrification in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that considerable changes are required to re-
orient current efforts (addressing gap (v) and objectives 3 defined in section 2.5). Instead of 
primarily supporting the Western and Chinese private sector, public sector funding should be 
re-directed towards financing rural electrification as well as establishing a viable, domestic 
electrification industry. The poverty levels in many rural areas render the widely advocated 
market-based approach ill-suited to bring electricity to all, implying that public money is 
required to create a business case. A number of recent cases have successfully used a state-
162 
 
sponsored approach built on accessible loan schemes, cross-subsidies, infant industry 
development and knowledge transfer, indicating the necessity to re-think the current approach 
of electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. 
While the academic field of energy planning optimisation applied to sub-Saharan Africa is 
unfortunately minuscule compared to the efforts currently underway to plan and transition the 
energy systems in industrialised and upper-middle income countries, this thesis illustrated that 
such work can have a direct impact on decision and policymakers. Due to work presented here, 
the author was invited to a number of presentations outside of academia. These included a talk 
at the European Union Parliament on the importance of renewable energy for sustainable 
development in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states in 2018, an invitation to join IRENA’s 
Long-Term Planning Scenario workshop in Berlin in 2019, and several engagements with 
senior policymakers, politicians and other energy-sector stakeholders in Uganda, Ghana and 
Eswatini. Some key recommendations made by the author were adopted verbatim in the ACP-
EU/102.723/19/fin. Resolution passed by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in March 
2019. There is a need for considering multiple criteria and implications of energy systems and 
account for them at the planning stage to maximise the level of sustainability these 
interventions can achieve. The feedback received from policy makers and practitioners was 
positive with regards to trying to quantify social and political aspects while noting that some 
dynamics cannot be adequately captured with quantitative models. 
There is a great necessity for future research to help close the many gaps, which exist in terms 
of planning African power systems and implementing successful electrification programmes. 
As chapter 2 has shown, researchers are currently faced with the problem of which research 
gap to fill, rather than finding one in the first place. All the gaps identified warrant increased 
efforts. Energy planning is difficult if data is scarce. Hence, coordinated efforts to map the 
power system and different generation potentials in several countries, which are currently 
entirely omitted by world-leading research is required. The models presented here show the 
potential benefits of including new objectives and determine more resilient network solutions 
in the future. Mixed method approaches of quantitative and qualitative evidence are a 
promising and underused way of analysing sustainability holistically in different interventions. 
The model in chapter 6 is a first step how distribution and off-grid technologies can be captured 
in a comprehensive power network optimisation model. This integration, however, should be 
further improved and detailed. In general, in order to translate to specific and accurate power 
system plans, in-depth electrical engineering simulation tests have to be run to design 
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technically viable solutions. The academic challenge associated with such efforts can be 
expected to be intriguing due to the considerable differences to simulating power systems in 
industrialised countries (for instance due to the prevalence of low-voltage conduction even for 
large distances in Africa).  
On many occasions throughout this PhD, African decision-makers and private companies in 
the energy sector have voiced their frustration over the knowledge and skill gap in Africa. In 
addition to generating novel scientific findings, research should therefore actively attempt to 
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